30 years without the USSR. Part 2. The crisis of the 1990s and its consequences

The article provides a theoretical review and analysis of the Washington Consensus, the 500 Days Program and the first program of the Government of the Russian Federation after the collapse of the USSR. The question of how effective these programs could be in a specific post-Soviet situation after the 1991 revolution is being considered. The theories of the “transformational” crisis are considered and the position is argued that transformation, transition to the market and the economic crisis of the 1990s are not “cause” and “consequence”. The cause of the crisis is the geo-economic shock of 1991, which also affected countries with mature market economies that were partially integrated with the USSR. Market reforms only partially accelerated and prolonged the crisis in cases when they were inappropriately rapid (shock) in nature, or even had an ideological background instead of an economic justification. A methodology is proposed for quantifying the consequences of the 1991 revolution and the economic crisis of the 1990s, based on a comparison of real statistical series of GDP for 15 countries of the former USSR for 1991-2020. with a hypothetical growth range of this indicator, what it could be if the average global growth rate of 3% per annum is maintained.