The fight for the North Caucasus in the Soviet and German command's plans in early 1943

The paper deals with the problems of planning and preparing for combat operations faced by the Soviet and German command in the North Caucasus in the winter of 1942-1943. It analyzes the impact of the successful defense of Stalingrad by the Red Army and the defeat of the Axis powers on the tide of the Battle of the Caucasus. The author examines the intentions of the Supreme Command Headquarters of the Soviet Armed Forces (Stavka), the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), and the High Command of the German Army (OKH). Much attention is paid to the comparison between the initial and subsequent plans of the opposing forces. The study describes the order of battle of the Soviet Transcaucasian Front and the German Army Group A and identifies the number of military personnel, armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. The research data is drawn from the following sources: the operational documents of the Red Army and Wehrmacht, the memories of such Soviet and German military figures as I.V. Tyulenev, L.M. Kaganovich, S.M. Shtemenko, E. Kleist, and E. Manstein. As a result, the study reveals a lack of predetermination in the Soviet and German plans and considerable changes in them in early 1943.