Digital Sovereignty and Web Browser Telemetry: Research and Control Methods of Information Flows in Domestic Software

This article presents a comprehensive investigation of telemetric data flows originating from the of the domestic Yandex Browser installer examining the substantial volume of network connections established during the software installation phase and prior to its initial launch. The research explores the architectural framework of modern telemetry systems as applied to software installers and their multifunctional capabilities for data collection and transmission. Using an empirical analysis utilizing deep packet inspection methodologies in controlled experimental environments, the study documents the establishment of connections by the installer with 28 distinct domains during the installation process prior to any user interaction with the browser itself. The research reveals significant discrepancies between the observed telemetric behavior of the installer and the provisions of the end-user license agreement, particularly regarding the timing and scope of data collection at the installation stage. Special attention is paid to the regulatory framework governing personal data processing in the Russian Federation, contextualizing installer telemetry within current legislative requirements. The article evaluates the potential information security implications of uncontrolled telemetric flows initiated by installers and proposes practical methodological approaches for managing and restricting unwanted data transmission, contributing to the advancement of digital sovereignty principles and privacy protection mechanisms in contemporary software ecosystems.