Once again about the Mannerheim line

The subject of the article is the events of the Winter War (Finnish - Soviet war), in particular, the most significant and tragic episode of it - the storming of the Mannerheim Line. The publication concludes that the Red Army was not prepared in either technical or operational terms for such storming activities. The purpose of the article is to analyze the failures of the Red Arm during the Winter War, including for such reasons as oblivion, inattention and negligence in dealing with military scientific researches and theoretical trainings provided by the Top leadership. Attention is focused on disregarding the experience of the First World War by the High Command, in support of what the Publication includes the quotations of the Soviet military theorists and practices, the First World War and Civil war veterans who analyzed in detail the battles of the First World War, including breakthroughs and frontal attacks in the research works for a limited readership. These works have been published for several years prior to Winter war. The comparative-historical method when on the basis of one events, in our case of World War I, we try in more detail, more deeply to comprehend what occurred already later, in the years of the Soviet-Finnish war is the cornerstone of a research. The analysis of the selected materials of the top leadership's speeches about the results of the Winter War showed that from the side of the Soviet leadership the assault of the Mannerheim Line looked more like an improvisation bordering on an adventure.