Phenomenon of evil: epistemic difference between good and evil

In this paper I focus on a contradiction between the logical problem of evil and privation theodicy ( privation boni ), namely, between propositions that there are examples of horrendous and meaningless evils in the world, and that evil does not exist actually, as it is only a lack of good. In the first part I explicitly formulate this contradiction. In the second I introduce William Alston’s theory of “doxastic practices”. In the third part I provide three examples aiming to show that doxastic practices can form and transmit beliefs pertaining to worldviews though they might not have a universal character. In the fourth part I formulate my hypothesis explaining the contradiction. I argue that phenomena of evil are found within certain doxastic practices, more specifically, within the practices adopted in non-theistic worldviews. Then I suggest that problem of evil is a part of secular humanism. Finally, in the fifth part, I draw some conclusions for the problem of evil arising from approach proposed in the paper.