The criticism of the transcendental-phenomenological and rationalistic traditions of subjectivity in the personalistic philosophy of I. A. Ilyin

The article explicates and analyzes the criticism of the transcendental-phenomenological and rationalistic philosophical traditions in connection with the concept of subjectivity in the philosophy of I. A. Ilyin. The methodological basis of the research is the principle of historicism, concreteness, as well as the method of philosophical reconstruction. In classical philosophy I. A. Ilyin did not find a consistent model of the object that would help determine the way out of the crisis. In the philosophy of I. Kant, the subject reveals contradictions not only in the knowledge of himself and the world, but also of the Absolute. Exploring the relationship between the human and the divine in the Fichtean model of subjectivity, I. A. Ilyin criticizes the fact that all reality in such a model is concentrated in the human subject. The crisis of the model of subjectivity of I. A. Ilyin also discovers in the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, where the human subject becomes only a moment in the self-development of the Absolute Subject. G. W. F. Hegel failed to create a philosophical system that accepts the empirical world. Therefore, the speculative laws of universality, concreteness and dialectics formulated by him turned out to be untenable. The crisis of reason and subjectivity, according to I. A. Ilyin, became the basis of the crisis in all spheres of life. In the philosophy of I. A. Ilyin, it is obvious that he strives to find the basis for the constitution of the subject in the Absolute. Attention to “mental processes” allows I. A. Ilyin to develop his own philosophical method in accordance with the phenomenology of E. Husserl and with an orientation towards the Orthodox tradition.