Mark Sykes, Britain and the Middle East front in 1916

The article analyzes the state of the Middle East front in 1916 assessed by the British ruling and military circles. Attention is paid to the positions of a military adviser Mark Sykes. The paper is based on the documents from Sykes's personal archive stored today at the University of Hull and on the materials of the British parliamentary debates: Sykes's secret memorandum "Middle East Problem" (June 1916), debates in the House of Lords on the situation in Arabia, Sudan, and Syria (June 1916), and the memorandum of the General Staff and the UK Ministry of War "Sheriff of Mecca and the Arab revolt" (July 1916). The documents recorded the changes in the attitude of the British ruling circles to the place of the Middle East front among the theaters of the Great War and demonstrated Sykes's increasing role in shaping the course of the British Middle East policy. Sykes argued that the failure of the British army in Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles forced the British to go to the substantial risks (uprising of Sherif Hussein) and concessions (the creation of an Arab state, the Straits) to the Arabs and Russians who were the only two forces able to withstand the Turks in the region in 1916. At the same time, concerning the promise to create the Arab state, Sykes and the General Staff did not yet have a clear position and felt considerable skepticism about the success of the enterprise. Sykes' conclusions differed from the opinion of the British Parliament and formed the basis for the analytical report of the General Staff. They had a significant impact on the British policy in the Middle East in 1916-1917.