Methodological grounds for the deduction of law in the teaching of J.G. Fichte and his interpretation of the concept of judicial power

J.G. Fichte develops a method of transcendental interpretation of the concept of freedom and makes it the starting point of his theory of law. The divergence between Fichte and Kant in the original methodological principle of the deduction of law determines differences in the interpretation of the concept of judicial power. Fichte’s concept of law, based on the idea of “freedom as an integral sphere”, constitutes a transitional stage to the concept of law developed by G.W.F. Hegel. Unlike Fichte, for the absolute idealist Hegel of the “Science of Logic” period, the initial is the universal, understood simultaneously both as a substance and as a subject of action. Hegel denotes the universal substance-subject by the concept “spirit”, giving it a categorical content, which is new in relation to the entire preceding philosophy. In connection with the fact that in this universal, the plurality of individuals is already set, the starting point is, unlike Fichte, not an individual, but the very law and Hegel defines man’s natural state as a legal state, unlike Hobbes and Rousseau. Kant and Fichte substantiate the principle of the individual's activity both in the sphere of cognition and in socio-political relations, pointing to the idea of freedom, absolute autonomy of the human person.