Military intelligence on Karelian front events in spring of 1942

Бесплатный доступ

The article is concerned with two World War II combat operations that the Red Army carried out on the territory of Karelian Republic and the Arctic Region in spring of 1942. These operations known as Murmansk and Kestenga offensives turned into a real challenge for commanders and fighter units of the 14th and 26th Armies. The events are considered from the Soviet military counter-intelligence perspective. One of the officers’ duties was to inform their military council and the Red Army command about every problem revealed in the armed forces. Military counterintelligence officers located at the headquarters, command posts, and in the Red army ranks during various battlefields reported on miscalculations in combat operations plans, military intelligence ineffectiveness, personnel losses, ineffective actions of the troops and military staff failures. Their reports also informed about the lack of weaponry, poor gear, inadequate provision of personnel in severe climatic conditions, immoral actions of the personnel, the lack of proper equipment repair and etc. The article is based on declassified, for the first time, and introduced into the scientific circulation documents of the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

Еще

Great patriotic war, karelian front, military counterintelligence, murmansk offensive, kestenga offensive, the nkvd special departments, army 14, army 26

Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/14751084

IDR: 14751084

Статья научная