Theses on the Structure of Legal Norms

The problem of „is” and „ought” is no longer treated as a general philosophical-legal difficulty, but as a question of the structure of legal norms in the process of their practical application. It becomes clear that in different types of norms, the decisive factor is not only the imperative of obligation (the „norm programme”) but also the factual structure of that part of social reality which underlies the norm (the „norm sphere”). The separation of „law” and „reality” gives way to a more thorough analysis of the directive and social reality-shaping elements of normativity. This has been examined in particular detail using the example of fundamental rights and other provisions of constitutional law. However, a similar challenge faces all other areas of law: to find a new form of interaction between the law in action and the findings of the social sciences. For legal sciences as awhole, this poses the task of rethinking their scientific and epistemological purpose.