A difficult road after the Rubicon

Автор: Ilyin Vladimir A., Morev Mikhail V.

Журнал: Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast @volnc-esc-en

Рубрика: Editorial

Статья в выпуске: 3 т.15, 2022 года.

Бесплатный доступ

February 24, 2022, the RF President announced the beginning of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine, which entailed large-scale geopolitical changes and, among other things, became a Rubicon for the internal development of the Russian Federation. The article analyzes a number of complex implications that resulted from the events occurring after February 24, 2022, and which had a significant impact on the state of Russian society. We consider in detail the dynamics of the moral state of Russian society for the period from 1996 to 2020, which (as shown by the results of the conducted research) over the past almost 25 years were negative and were developing within the framework of the existing liberal model. Analyzing the data of official statistics and sociological surveys, we rely on the assessments of experts, who, in many respects, agree that after February 2022, a new, albeit difficult, road opens up before Russia; the country has to travel this path one way or another, in order to achieve full (internal and external) national sovereignty in the contours and rules of the new geopolitical reality that are forming before our eyes.

Еще

Special operation, president, the russian idea, moral state of society, public administration efficiency

Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/147238056

IDR: 147238056   |   DOI: 10.15838/esc.2022.3.81.1

Текст научной статьи A difficult road after the Rubicon

Fruitful creative work, which our Fatherland needs so much, is impossible in a society that is in a state of schism, that is internally divided. In a society where the main social strata, political forces adhere to various basic values and fundamental ideological guidelines...

Vladimir Putin “Russia at the turn of the Millennium” (1999)

In the Munich speech delivered in February 2007 the President of the Russian Federation announced to the international community that “Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today”1. Starting from this speech, Russia tried to convince the world community and the Collective West2 (which includes about 40 states3)

that the idea of a unipolar world is hopeless and futile, and that it is necessary to be guided by the norms of international law (enshrined in the UN Charter (1945), the Yalta and Postdam agreements (1945), the charters of regional collective security organizations) and take into account the national interests of all countries, including Russia.

However, these diplomatic steps were not heeded. Since 2007, the hybrid war with the Collective West has continued. In 2014, it reached

  • 1    Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007. Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034

  • 2    Some assessments of Russian and foreign experts about which countries belong to the Western world:

a higher level after the coup d’etat in Ukraine, which ended with the events of the Crimean Spring: the accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation, the emergence of two self-proclaimed state entities in the east of Ukraine – the Donetsk People’ s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic.

After that, for eight years, futile (as it turned out) attempts at a peaceful settlement of the war in the Donbas continued. The implementation of the Minsk Agreements was purposefully sabotaged by the new Kiev authorities, instead, regular shelling of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics continued, and the Collective West continued to implement its “anti-Russia” project on the territory of modern Ukraine4...

In the end, this could not but lead to a forced response from Russia in the form of a special military operation announced by the President on February 24, 2022, which became the “starting point” of a new era in the history of our country in the 21st century.

As we noted in the previous article, the special operation announced by the President was “the edge after which the running processes become irreversible and lead to irreversible consequences”5. Up to this point, experts say, there was “full integration of Russia into the global world, which means the adoption of all the norms and rules of the

“One of the clear results of the confrontation of the last eight years was not just a statement, but also the acceptance of the impossibility of agreeing with the West and the neo-Nazi authorities of Ukraine about anything; they basically do not comply with the agreement” 7 .

West, which is taken as the standard of globalization. This has been the main strategy of the Russian government since 1991. Adjusting all standards of life – education, economy, culture, science, politics, technology, fashion, art, education, sports, media – to the standards of the modern West was the main goal of all the reforms”6.

And of course this new time includes both new perspectives and new challenges, determining Russia’s difficult but inevitable path to achieving full national sovereignty and its place in the changing geopolitical reality.

Today most experts agree that when the Collective West publicly declares the need to “completely eradicate”8 the “Russian world”, it is, in fact, launching a direct attack that demands Russia to take appropriate steps to protect its national interests, which go far beyond the relatively local tasks set during the special operation in Ukraine (denazification, demilitarization, protection of the population of Donbass).

It is about preserving state sovereignty as such (which is of “vital importance for our country” 9 ) and Russia’s achievement of full state sovereignty, which, as experts note, has five components: territorial, diplomatic, military, economic and cultural. At the same time, the latter, “as our history shows, is the most important component...; its absence announces the beginning of a path to nowhere” 10 (ideas about the essence of state sovereignty in the assessment of the President of the Russian Federation are reflected in Insert 1 ).

It is important to note that the vast majority of Russians are aware of the essence of the historical

“It’s not about Ukraine at all, it’s about aggression against everything Russian – interests, religion, culture, language, security and so on... there is a life-and-death battle going on for Russia’s right to be on the political map of the world with full respect for its legitimate interests”11.

moment and in the current conditions of external and internal threats they are consolidating around the President and around the goals of the special operation in Ukraine. According to VCIOM, the level of approval of the work of the head of state against the background of the special operation (for the period from February 20 to June 12, 2022) increased by 15 percentage points (Tab. 1) The share of Russians supporting the special operation increased by 7 percentage points for the period from February 25 to May 26, 2022. (Tab. 2) . According to the regional monitoring of public opinion conducted by VolRC RAS, for the period from February to June 2022, the share of positive judgments about the work of the head of state increased by 10 percentage points. According to experts, citizens support the President not only because the failure to achieve the goals of the special operation “will not be understood by society”, but also because real threats to national security that have affected all segments of the population; because “NATO is at the gate”12.

Table 1. Attitude of Russians toward t he work of the RF President in February – June 2022, % of respondents

People’s assessments Feb. 20, 2022 June 12, 2022 Dynamics, (+/–), p.p. Proportion of positive assessments 64,3 78,6 +15 Proportion of negative assessments 24,4 13,4 –11 Source: State institutions assessment rating. VCIOM. Available at:

Table 2. Attitude of Russians toward the special operation on the territory of Ukraine, % of respondents

People’s assessments Feb. 25, 2022 May 26, 2022 Dynamics, (+/–), p.p. I support 65 72 +7 I don’t support 25 18 –7 It’s difficult to answer 10 10 0 Source: VCIOM analytical review “Special military operation: monitoring”. VCIOM. May 30, 2022. Available at: https://wciom. ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/cpecialnaja-voennaja-operacija-monitoring

Insert 1

Й ы>

'S

=5 У Д 3 У О „« > Ч Ч Ч £ Л $ лв а 2 у 3

Sfl oS Ч Е g Ц

4—i У "^ У Z) <Л СО 8 5 у 5 2 е о 5 ™ 2 а га й ^ д у $ £ .ад

4 д 3 й Я Я £ u s у s ° Д 2 4

° 2 у g S У - S g g а ё ч 2 е&| £ ° | 4 д g 2 5 ^ й

у Д 43 £ д д 2 и 4 У £ о 2 ^2?2 Е & У £ а£ га лз : О й a g У 4 £ й у я^-о g гаУа?2о2Уд 1 = М I s S Н »11$ # 1 ^co^Oco^cd--^ 2 у £ й.д оо у "§ Д

|< Р р р-о

2 .3 В Е У £

Й S л И .2

0д«йс82д.2°

ДУУЗдЭзУдЙ 5О’Й^И-д>°у д й и । д 5 у

■ЗйЗд^дА0 Еу2га.В§£Е2 ” aS 2 2 5 Я С

3 3 2 Уза У 2 у ам.уад^оду S д § о 2 Ъ 2 с о 8^ § а Д'5 д у & S йо ДЗД7-ДЙЯ>> : д ■- |^ .У .2 «2 яуз2°^5'й5

S ”^.s| ° ^3 й д ад^ й "д д "д В ад : 5 У Й -5 3 Eg «Я § § = 5

4 2^ § ё О § .8 s

у лз д У д я Д Й сд

оЗ 5

£ a 2

> д £ о £ £

■У У У

Н У д   E

9 23 -5

ЛЗ    44

у О -^ ь а Е .5^8 $ ■С й д оо У oi 2 <у ^ ^ У

У О д ^ ■ д

Е у Е

Г В лз у й га ^ 2 « а 2 -^

2   3

у у у

“ 73 Д Д Д д

га а у

о 2

Д у

.2Р ^

У ^ ^

й сл У у Е ”

О & $

ЛЗ Д А ДУМ

О ” О 00 О и

44 -^ Д га ^-2

2 § § §

Д д   й

'й о S У 00    о лз

<2 е£

>,    00 О ЛЗ

зз"й 2 й О 2 -s § s 2 8^22» о ~ а 2 ° •< й о

g д 'О в

."У D       Д

й з .у -Ч 2

° д £ м 2 ” га О < « д у Й'а 2 3 5 га ” ■у у у о 2 у о Е "° 43 5 д 2 У й д га 2 С 45 -а « 12^54 й S й й га р 1 й-g ■= S Е g^ 5 д ° 2 2 Ч й 2 s Ч

а s g й 2 а “ Е 2 ,Д 2 Ч

Ч 5 2 Ч га у Я уз У у - д 2 3 2 й 5 лз га Е у 2 а 2 а ° 2 2 5 М ^ "у* 5 2 Ч >2 "g 2^9 й -5 ч ” ч ц g s "11=^ га й у 5 2 Й ” -2 Й ” у 2 й й у   у Ц

.00 Д га 2 2

ЕЧ £ а|| 2 у 2     о

- 2 а у га 2 у ° ° 2 8 ^ чУ Д* ^Д 5-1 У 5 о -У уз О О

О Д О ЛЗ Й 7- — 7- д ■у Ь У 3 ” 2 м Е й 21 3 3 с ^ й % га йн у оо о у 2 Е 45 2 О 5 Ц

2 д S £ о £ § ”  .

оо           2

Д ЛЗ    -Ч Д ЛЗ

й     |  ч

&Ч й у | ^

<2§^ С

Я 8 | -S а 2

Ч ^ ” Ч з 1,

о 2 О В  2

S 2 д « О 3

2 4” оо 2 § - у 2 й у

й £ 3   с 2?

лз д лз 2 лз д

О О X) | О § 1 3 д £.Р й Е 3 о ^ ^ й о .2 2 «2га й 2 > Я й 4 45 § 2 3 2 з Ц Й га й Ч ад О1 « ££ У У „ У и у Й Д д ЛЗ у д й « О ’« й 2 Д .Д "2 д 3 £ 5   \

Ч 4 8 й Ч й S      о у

.у 3 ° Е й й

ЛЗ Д        й ор

Е лз -Е    -я .Е

д ” Я у g д

8 Ч    Ч у £

Д и У —1 Й й

у щ оо ад о я

Е       м .2

у а га -д -^ а д 2 Е .з £ « ° Е : 2 g у у S лз   я

^28?^^ g я ° £ я 8 о   и

Е Ь & § Ч й Ч Е 1 Е s 2 “я22 ЕЧ 2 ч 2 -§ Й § з я ст* о лз а

а  В   а  ”

Ч  S Ч ч

га    3    га    R

2  2  2  й

2   3   83   й

1  2  I  2

j 1      у

ч  Ч  ч  ч

3^2|

Е   з    й

а  у  а  2

а  3  а  л

£ S       g

2  £   у  2

3  а  £  Е

с   2   с   Е

Ч           5

S   °   ^  <

2   2   "га    а

£  Ч  2з  2

2  4  °  У

1  1  §  1

сч

£ °  2  Е

Ч ч ч  ^

§      £ а

*4   a!   Q    8

§  t  2  £

"-У   ^   5   ^

й  а  и  ^

О   га   §   2

о  2  2

w     -    со     О

У  о   у   о

■Й        2   «

|     Е  1

У   У   Й  3

£  Q  £  о

°  £   я  п

Е   -о   =   §

|  й  4

^  ^  1  ^

2 г-1 ЛЗ   -Я^д

Ч Ч Е  з 4

£ 4 £  у < Е

У ^    У У оо

У CD 44    У    «

"О о    о> -о У

"m -<z) ^ чО гУ "со Р^

у Е     2 Е с

а £5 у ^— ” Ч и у 2 й 4 Ч 2 у

2 д я ^ у Д а Е ад Е а Е 2 Я D       « У “S

« "д' 4 > -”   ^”

Е я Ц 2   5 д

лз д у   2 д 2

< в Ч s ч е ч

5,5  у  га  в -Й   у

8 2 = | В £ В

Ч Е Z а ^ Е ^

й §

о о

5 Ь Р£ Д О о

о 5 х у ^ со         S

2 2 о 4 &

a g а Ч |

С £ S   га

а -^

>»о Цо 2 a 'jr д аОсм" У се—, V Q-) ^-^ Д и>>

2 ад у Я й у 4Л0

30т-

2

&Ч -2 I О 2 Ч га О Ч

Д Д Й Д

2 Ч 2 °

а у 5 $ у

Д о

2 2 Л У

2 2 ° О >

а £ га

2 с 2 Е

The growing support for the head of state and for the special military operation on the territory of Ukraine also proves that Russian society understands the fact that a “combined, civilizational” conflict has been unleashed against Russia; during this conflict Russia must prove not only the ability of the armed forces to protect the territorial integrity of the country and the ability of the national economy to “survive” and develop effectively in an unprecedented sanctions pressure from the Collective West, but also “first of all, to show ourselves what kind of civilization we are. What is our uniqueness, what are our main differences?” 13 . Experts have been saying for a long time that this is “not just about a geopolitical confrontation ..., but about something much deeper and more important”14, which began long before the special

“We all understand that the hybrid warfare is going on against Russia now. The war is hot, because in a special military operation, the armed forces of Russia are opposed not by the Ukrainian army, but by the combined forces of NATO... There is an economic war going on: an unprecedented set of sanctions that have been adopted against our country today – there has never been such a thing. There is an informational and psychological war going on. The purpose of all this is to try to make us give up and stop defending the national interests of our country... And this conflict is systemic and civilizational 15 .

operation on the territory of Ukraine; about our ability to preserve what is called the “Russian world”, its traditions, values and worldview in the conditions of aggressive expansion of the “consumer society” cultivated by the Collective West.

In this sense, it is advisable to consider the civilizational war declared on Russia in the context of two aspects.

First, in the context of the centuries-old, cultural and historical origin of the confrontation between the Anglo-Saxon and Russian civilizations, between which, as experts note, there is a “mental gulf ..., and the struggle of these two worlds is the essence of our history for the last few centuries” 16 .

“...it is necessary to take a look at the entire history of the formation of liberal ideology – starting from its roots. Only in this case we will be able to appreciate the seriousness of our situation.... Biden and the forces behind him embody the culmination of a historical process that dates back to the Middle Ages , reaches maturity in Modern Times with the advent of capitalist society and today is at its final stage” 17 .

Even if we take only the 20th century, we will clearly see that its key events that determined the course of development not only of our country, but also of the whole world (such as the First World War of 1914–1918, the October Revolution of 1917, the Second World War of 1939–1945 (including the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945), the Cold War of 1946–1991, the collapse of the USSR in 1991), were nothing more than an escalation of the conflict between the Anglo-Saxon and Russian civilizations, or rather the “attack” by the former and the “defense” of their national interests, their statehood by the latter (sometimes successful, sometimes not). Today’s confrontation between the Collective West and Russia is of the same nature – the former are trying to “cancel” the latter, turning it, in fact, into a “gas station” (as one of the American senators noted)18, which does not have the slightest chance of sovereignty, national interests, culture, values, etc.

Second, the civilizational conflict that emerged (as we noted earlier) long ago, but that reached a new level after February 24, 2022, should be considered in the context of the crisis of the capitalist system itself, liberal ideology and, in general, the unipolar world led by the Anglo-Saxons, the crisis that has been escalating throughout the 20th and 21st century.

From the collective introduction to the book (the general opinion of the authors 20 ): “Capitalism, along with its creative destruction of older technologies and forms of production, has also been a source of inequality and environmental degradation. Deep capitalist crisis may be an opportunity to reorganize the planetary affairs of humanity in a way that promotes more social justice and a more livable planet.

Capitalism is a system, and that all systems have lives; they are never eternal.... The question now facing the world is not how governments can reform the capitalist system... the question arises of what will replace it” 21 .

“A number of events developing simultaneously and seemingly unrelated to each other have a common denominator. These are elements of one global crisis – the systemic crisis of the world capitalist system 19 .

This fact is confirmed by the assessments of many foreign experts and by the results of authoritative international studies showing that in many countries (including NATO member states) more than half of citizens believe that “capitalism does more harm than good” (Fig. 1) .

Figure 1. Proportion of people who believe that capitalism does more harm than good*, % of respondents

* The study was conducted in 28 countries: Thailand, India, France, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Italy, Spain, United Arab Emirates, the Netherlands, Colombia, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Germany, Russia, South Africa, Kenya, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the UK, Argentina, Australia, Canada, the U.S., South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan.

Source: Edelman Trust Barometr – 2020. Available at:

On average, 56% of respondents in 28 countries share this point of view. Which is quite natural in the context of growing global inequality22, due to the fact that “it is superprofit that gives rise to a greed for gain”23.

In this context, the uncompromising and extremely harsh rhetoric from leading representatives of the political and economic elites of the United States and NATO24 in relation to Russia becomes quite understandable: the defeat of the Collective West in this civilizational war leads to the fact that “Western domination will be nullified”; new economic, political, sociocultural “rules of the game” will be gradually established, in which there will be several sovereign world centers.

“The military defeat of Ukraine will essentially mean the end of the West that we all know today... No one in the world dares to challenge the power of the Collective West, although there are many who are dissatisfied. If Moscow withstands the total pressure and wins, then others will follow, and Western domination will be nullified” 25 .

“According to the unanimous opinion of competent experts in international relations, the special military operation is the last and decisive chord in the process of transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar one” 26 .

“Multipolarity initially means that it is a dance with many players. There is a much more complex system that becomes less manageable and more conflictual. Moreover, we should not forget that this will be a multipolarity with nuclear weapons . And this is a very specific and unprecedented experience from a historical point of view... multipolarity itself suggests that it is always a complex balance of power that is constantly changing 28 .

And although some experts note that such a world will be “less manageable and more conflictual”, one cannot but agree that this trend exists; that it is objective and inevitable.

Therefore, it is no coincidence, as international studies show, that “negative views on Russia are mainly limited to Europe and other liberal democracies” 29. According to some estimates, “at the moment at least 37 countries adhere to a fairly uniform strategy of sanctions against Russia. These 37 countries account for about 55% of global GDP”30.

“For about a century, the United States of America was a global monopolist, and suddenly the mechanism stopped working. There are contenders for the role of the world capital center – China, Russia, maybe India. Russia has all the advantages for this: it has a huge territory, vital natural resources, military power and cultural heritage” 28 .

The results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Alliance of Democracies Foundation in 52 countries in the spring of 2022 showed that 55% of Europeans were in favor of ending economic ties with Russia (residents of Poland, Ukraine, Portugal, Sweden, Italy, the UK, Germany and the U.S. were the most negatively disposed toward our country).

At the same time, the population of 20 out of 52 countries of the world treats Russia mostly positively and opposes the sanctions war: two European states (Hungary, Greece), major Asian countries (China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan), most Asian countries (including Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines), major African countries (such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya), Mexico (the largest country in Latin America), most of the Arab world (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, etc.) 31 .

Nevertheless, the Cold War turned out to be victorious for the West; it ended in 1991 with the betrayal of the elites, the collapse of the USSR and the “immersion” of post-Soviet Russia in long decades of so-called “market transformations”, perceived today as a period of slow loss of national sovereignty, the transformation of the country into a semi-colonial power, decades of moral “decomposition of society”35.

According to Russian experts, “the world has divided into two unequal parts. The anti-Russian minority is limited to the West... ; however, the special operation did not turn either local elites or the bulk of the population of the non-Western world against Russia (we are talking about Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia)”32.

Today, many Russian experts33 draw parallels between the current world situation and the period of the Great Patriotic War, noting that “Hitler, unlike the previous enemies of Russia, set the task not just of military victory, but of erasing Russians from history. Apparently, this is the task set today by his heirs – ultra-globalists on both sides of the ocean” 34. However, at that moment (largely due to the industrialization carried out by Joseph Stalin in a timely manner) the Soviet Union survived and by the end of the first post-war decade was ahead of many Western countries in key indicators of industrial and agricultural development (Tab. 3) .

“When we talk about the events of 1991, it is worth remembering 1917. Both then and in the nineties, our country was going through tragic days. Both in 1991 and in 1917, the elites betrayed the interests of the people and the state 36 .

“The basis of the global dominance of the West is built primarily on the adoption of the Western system of values, a kind of Western semantic code” 37 .

Some findings of sociological research speak eloquently about the results of these decades (1991– 2020) of existence in the coordinate system of the “consumer society” imposed by the West.

The monitoring of public opinion conducted by VolRC RAS in the Vologda Oblast since 1996 makes it possible to trace the dynamics of changes in values and moral norms of society over the entire period of market transformations (from 1996 to 2020), and to analyze the corresponding changes in the context of major socio-demographic groups.

Table 3. Dynamics of development of the USSR in comparison with some Western countries (1937–1956)

Country 1937 1956 1956 to 1937, times Dynamics ofindustrial production, % to 1913 USSR 588 3018 5.1 Germany 116 223 1.9 France 114 179 1.6 UK 122 180 1.5 USA 172 409 2.4 Share in globalindustrialproduction, % USSR 9.2 19.8 2.2 Germany 8.4 7.5 0.9 France 5.5 3.4 0.6 UK 11.5 8.0 0.7 USA 37.8 39.4 1.0 Coal production, million tons USSR 128 429 3.4 Germany 203 230 1.1 France 44 55 1.3 UK 244 226 0.9 USA 451 459 1.0 Steelmaking, million tons USSR 17.7 48.7 2.8 Germany 15.6 23.1 1.5 France 7.9 13.4 1.7 UK 13.2 21.0 1.6 USA 51.4 104.5 2.0 Growth rates ofgross output of mechanical engineering and metalworking, times in relation to 1913 USSR 20.0 184.0 9.2 Germany 2.1 4.0 1.9 France 1.2 2.4 2.0 UK 2.4 5.0 2.1 USA 5.0 16.7 3.3 Electricityproduction,kilowatt-hours USSR 218 954 4.4 Germany 715 1572 2.2 France 488 1234 2.5 UK 675 1875 2.8 USA 1136 4015 3.5 Dynamics of area under crops, million hectares USSR 132 195 1.5 USA 132 129 1.0 Dynamics of capital construction, % to 1929 USSR 445 2371 5.3 USA 51 427 8.4 Railway transport freight turnover,billion ton-kilometers USSR 355 1079 3.0 USA 528 945 1.8 Labor productivity, % to 1928 USSR 258 726 2.8 USA 98 155 1.6 Germany 130 170 1.3 Source: The USSR and capitalist countries over 40 years. Available at:

The results of the study show that over the past almost 25 years in Russian society :

  • 1.    The importance of the majority (14 out of 18) of moral traits reflecting people’s attitude toward their life in general, their country, profession, and surrounding people has noticeably decreased (Appendix 1A, p. 35) .

  • 2.    Mainly negative trends over the past 24 years (1996–2020) are also observed in the dynamics of people’s attitudes toward various moral phenomena and actions.

Dynamics of people’s attitude toward various moral qualities over the period from 1996 to 2020 in socio-demographic groups*

Total number of socio-demographic groups

Number of negative changes

Number of positive changes

Absence of changes

11

7

1

3

* According to the estimates of people who consider the listed moral qualities “unimportant”.

Dynamics of people’s attitude toward various moral qualities for 1996–2020*

Total number of moral qualities listed in the question

Number of negative changes

Number of positive changes

Absence of changes

18

14

2

2

* According to the estimates of people who consider the listed moral qualities “unimportant”.

Ten of the 15 negative phenomena and actions listed in the survey have become “acceptable, quite normal (Appendix 2A, p. 37) .

Dynamics of people’s attitude toward various negative moral phenomena and actions for 1996–2020*

In particular, there has been an increase in the proportion those who consider the following traits unimportant :

V empathy (by 8 p.p., from 14 to 22%),

V mutual aid (by 8 p.p., from 11 to 19%),

V tolerance (by 8 p.p., from 13 to 21%),

V decency (by 7 p.p., from 6 to 13%),

V honesty (by 7 p.p., from 7 to 14%) and many others.

Moreover, during this period, negative trends were noted in 7 out of 11 socio-demographic groups, including middle-aged and older people (the proportion of people who consider more than half of the moral qualities listed in the survey unimportant increased by 6 and 17 p.p. respectively); residents of districts (by 18 p.p.); both men and women (by 4 p.p.; Appendix 1B, p. 36) .

Total number of negative acts listed in the question

Number of negative changes

Number of positive changes

Absence of changes

15

10

0

5

* According to the estimates of people who consider these acts “acceptable, quite normal”.

In particular, there has been an increase in the proportion of those who consider the following as “acceptable” or “quite normal” :

V laziness (by 20 p.p., from 22 to 42%),

  • V    desire to work less and earn more (by 13 p.p., from 36 to 49%),

  • V    arrogance and conceit (by 9 p.p., from 11 to 20%),

  • V    sycophancy and servility (by 7 p.p., from 9 to 16%),

  • V    bribes (by 4 p.p., from 10 to 14%), etc.

  • 3 . Finally, we should note that along with people’s general attitude toward various moral qualities, negative phenomena and actions existing in society as a whole, we observe negative changes in the dynamics of their behavior, according to the results of 1996–2020.

As well as with regard to moral qualities, negative changes in people’s attitude toward negative moral phenomena and actions are noted in almost all (12 out of 14) socio-demographic groups (with the exception of people under the age of 30 and those residents of the region who, according to self-estimates of income, belong to the top 20%; Appendix 2B, p. 38).

Dynamics of people’s attitude toward various negative moral phenomena and actions for 1996–2020 in socio-demographic groups*

Total number of socio-demographic groups

Number of negative changes

Number of positive changes

Absence of changes

14

12

1

1

* According to the estimates of people who consider these acts “acceptable, quite normal”.

In total, out of the 11 negative actions and behaviors listed in the question, people began to experience feelings of guilt and remorse less often in nine cases (Appendix 3A, p. 39) .

There has been an increase in the proportion of those who do not feel guilt or remorse when they:

  • V    offend someone, are rude to someone (by 19

p.p., from 16 to 35%),

  • V    show insufficient attention to parents (by 19 p.p., from 34 to 53%),

  • V    commit some kind of unfair act (by 16 p.p., from 25 to 41%),

  • V    dont fulfill their promise (by 15 p.p., from 25 to 40%),

V treat children badly (by 13 p.p., from 54 to 67%), etc.

Moreover, the only group of the population in which the proportion of those who feel guilty when committing any negative moral acts has not decreased is older people (as in 1996, it was 55%; Appendix 3B, p. 40 ) .

Dynamics of the proportion of people who do not feel guilty when committing certain negative acts for 1996–2020 in socio-demographic groups*

Total number of socio-demographic groups

Number of negative changes

Number of positive changes

Absence of changes

11

10

1

0

* According to the estimates of people who “don’t feel remorse” if they commit the abovementioned negative acts.

Dynamics of the proportion of those who do not feel guilty when committing certain negative actions for 1996–2020*

Total number of negative acts listed in the question

Number of negative changes

Number of positive changes

Absence of changes

11

9

1

1

* According to the estimates of people who “don’t feel remorse” if they commit the abovementioned negative acts.

We should note that concerning these negative trends in the dynamics of the moral level of society, the Vologda Oblast is not a unique Russian region, but rather is a typical constituent entity of the Russian Federation37. Thus, the data of VolRC RAS public opinion monitoring are confirmed by the results of all-Russian sociological surveys,

38 At the same time, we should note that the Vologda Oblast, and in general the regions of the Northwestern Federal District, have traditionally been more critical of the activities of government bodies, which, in particular, is manifested in federal elections. For example, according to the results of the latest election to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (September 19, 2021), the turnout in Russia as a whole was 52%, on average in the NWFD – 42%, in the Vologda Oblast – 46%. Support for United Russia in these elections was 50% on average in the country, 35% in the Northwestern Federal District and 34% in the Vologda Oblast.

indicating that, compared with the Soviet period, “the basic life values of Russians, what they value in life, have undergone significant changes... The measure of a person’s social status, well-being, and success in society has now been reduced to only one thing – material well-being. Other indicators of a person’s social status in society have lost much of their significance”39 (Tab. 4).

Table 4. Russians’ perceptions of life values and success factors in 1986 and 2006*, % of respondents

Answer option 1986 2006 Dynamics (+/–), p.p. Life values Material well-being 31 55 +24 Family, marriage 60 53 -7 Children 55 45 -10 Respect on the part of others 27 17 -10 Interesting job 41 29 -12 Desire to be useful to society 26 6 -20 Success factors “Connections” with influential people 7 30 +23 Luck 7 30 +23 Abilities, talent 15 32 +17 Ability to adapt, flexibility 4 20 +16 Education 39 54 +15 Help from influential relatives 4 14 +10 Purposefulness 27 37 +10 Financial assistance of parents 9 16 +7 Leadership 9 16 +7 Social connections, support of neighbors 27 31 +4 Initiative 21 25 +4 Integrity 22 14 -8 Unselfishness 20 10 -10 Responsibility 46 32 -14 Honesty, decency 63 41 -22 Industriousness 74 52 -22 Human understanding, mutual assistance 53 27 -26 Responsiveness, kindness 57 27 -30 Compiled according to: Andreenkova A.V. Changes in the lifestyle and values of Russians. Available at: * Ranked by change (in percentage points). The most significant changes (more than 20 p.p.) are highlighted in bold.

Another Russian study conducted by RAS Institute of Sociology allows us to assess the dynamics of value changes already in the 2000s (for

“The processes taking place in Russia in the last two decades have changed a lot not only in the economy and politics, but also in the everyday life of every person, in relations between people, in the understanding that today there is a success in life, what goals should be set and what means can be used to achieve these goals. Many Russians are convinced of the complete and irrevocable loss of moral norms by our society and its citizens, that the erosion of morality has reached the critical point beyond which spiritual rebirth of Russia, or rather, its degeneration, is coming 40 .

the period from 2003 to 2011). Thus, according to experts, the share of Russians who believe that “the modern world is cruel; in order to succeed in life, sometimes you have to step over moral principles and norms” has increased from 34 to 43%. In turn, the proportion of those who “would rather not succeed in life, but would never overstep moral norms and principles” decreased from 65 to 57% (Fig. 2) .

This trend continued in the mid-2010s: for example, in 2015, experts of RAS Institute of Sociology recorded that the proportion of people “ready to step over moral principles and norms” increased to 52% (see Fig. 2), and the proportion of those who “would rather not succeed in life, but would never step over moral norms and principles” has decreased to 49%41.

Figure 2. Moral attitudes of Russians, % of respondents

—•— The modern world is cruel; in order to succeed in life, sometimes you have to step over moral principles and norms

I would rather not succeed in life, but I will never cross moral norms and principles

Compiled according to: Twenty years of reforms through the eyes of Russians (the experience of long-term sociological measurements) (2011): Analytical report of IS RAS. Moscow; Gorshkov M.K., Sedova N.N. (2015). “Self-sufficient” Russians and their life priorities. Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya , 12.

Thus, the results of both Russian and regional sociological studies empirically show that the entire post-Soviet period was characterized by the processes of decline in the moral level in Russian society, and not in some groups, but in fact in all major sociodemographic categories of the population.

“Over the past 20 years, the values of our citizens have changed a lot, and not for the better... In the value system of Russians in modern Russia, material well-being and consumption occupy the first place... Decades of scarcity, the ostentatious consumption of the elites and the broadcast of the values of prestigious consumption in the media logically led to the fact that the “nation of winners” became a “nation of consumers” 42 .

Although this does not mean that over the past 25–30 years, Russian society has completely degraded morally. According to our research in 2020, as in the mid-1990s, the vast majority of Russians (from 70 to 90%) still consider such feelings as justice, decency, respect for elders, responsiveness, etc. important for themselves.

And this is of fundamental importance, because it means that “the ship has not sailed yet”; that it is quite possible to achieve cultural sovereignty with effective leadership, that is, when the orientation toward national interests (in economics, politics, culture) is confirmed not only by the public rhetoric of authorities at all levels, but also by honest steps that actually reach the broad strata of the population.

Nevertheless, if we talk about the dynamics of the changes noted so far, then in this case negative trends (in the form of an increase in egoistic attitudes, a willingness to step over the norms of morality and even the law for the sake of personal success) are obvious…

“The cultural sovereignty of a country includes the right of a country and its people to be guided by those patterns, values and norms of behavior that have been developed in the course of their history, recognized and accepted by its people ...; to counteract the spread of information products that threaten the historical and cultural identity of society ...; the duty of the state is not to allow the use of the cultural sphere to damage the national state-political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country” 43 .

And this, basically, is not surprising, since people could see examples and patterns of such “behavior” at all levels of the state hierarchy: starting with corruption at the regional, municipal, and sometimes federal levels44 and ending with “a scam that has no precedent in our history”45 (as experts described the reform of collateral auctions conducted by Boris Yeltsin in 1995).

“The deideologization of the state turned out to be the main goal in the preparation of the Constitution of the RSFSR... As a result, for almost thirty years the country has been wandering in the dark and looking for a national idea...” 46

The RF President Vladimir Putin highlighted overcoming the processes of internal moral decay as a key landmark of the future Russian statehood, which he began to build from the moment of his first presidential term. This is evidenced by the fact that in his first program article “Russia at the turn of the Millennium” (1999), the “Russian idea” appears first in the list of guidelines for national development, anticipating such goals as “A strong state” and “An efficient economy”47. The head of state noted that “achieving the necessary growth dynamics is not only an economic problem. This is also a political problem and, in a certain sense, an ideological one…”48

Through his specific actions (such as the Munich Speech of 2007, a speech at the Valdai Forum in 2013, the Crimean Spring of 2014, amendments to the 2020 Constitution, the National Security Strategy and the draft law on traditional values of 2021, a speech at the Valdai Forum in 2021 and many others) the RF President not only personally contributed to the process of formation of a national idea in Russian society, but also stimulated the discussion of organizational and theoretical foundations of state ideology in the scientific community49.

“The national idea is the main goal of the community of people united by national identity. The national idea is not rational, it is perceived by people not only as a task on the way to something, but as an end in itself, as a mission. Only on its basis can we talk about a national strategy aimed at implementing the national idea” 50 .

Experts called some of these steps of the President the attempts to formulate a new state ideology.

paradigm, so the head of state simply did not have the opportunity to complete the task of nationalizing the elites.

“The value categories enshrined in the updated Basic Law of Russia are elements of a crystallized ideology” 51 .

Experts on Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Valdai Forum on October 21, 2021: “The President has actually declared war on the ideology of globalism... moreover, Putin’s speech (expanded with answers to questions) became a statement of a new Russian state ideology. This is the “ideology of healthy conservatism”, or “reasonable conservatism”, “moderate conservatism” 52 .

However, like many other initiatives of the head of state, the task of forming the “Russian idea”, which the President set for himself and for the country back in 1999, was not fully realized.

And it could not be, because throughout this time there were “fifth” and “sixth” columns in the system of public administration.

Experts note that “the Russian version of crony capitalism began to take shape in 1991” 53 , and in fact for 30 years (before the President announced a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine in February 2022), the ruling elites of the country were “fit in” with the liberal development

“The fifth column is those who serve the interests of other countries, and who are only tools for others’ political goals” 54 .

“The sixth column is the bearers of liberal Westernist ideology, who at the same time hide behind the “Putin’s friend” badge, with some formal position in the state system” 55 .

Back in the mid-2010s, experts noted that “the main problem of the current moment is that the oligarchic-comprador state is basically incapacitated and only aggravates the dramatic systemic crisis, bringing it closer to a domestic political crisis...”; to solve this problem “it is necessary to return the commanding heights of the economy – the banking sector, infrastructure industries, foreign trade – to national sovereignty. The state sovereignty of Russia should be restored over the commanding bases of the economy: there must not be any foreign, private and oligarchic-comprador capital”56.

However, in 2013 experts said that “the real nationalization of the elites would be too cruel a punishment for officials, deputies and senators”57, while after the launch of the special military operation on February 24, 2022, the vector of expert rhetoric changed: they say that “the real nationalization of the elites has begun”58; “the promised nationalization of the elites... will definitely happen how”59.

We recall that back in 2021, A. Voloshin – a man who is called the “ideologue of the Family”60 and the “brain” of the liberal clan”61 left his “most significant post”62 (as experts note) of Coordinator of the Expert Council under the Government of the Russian Federation (to which he had been appointed by the former Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev63).

After February 2022, Presidential Adviser V. Yumashev, Boris Yeltsin’s son-in-law and a member of the Board and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Yeltsin Center, left his post (in the first days of the special operation, the Yeltsin Center called for “an immediate cessation of the military actions”64).

According to experts, V. Yumashev was “one of the few remaining links between the Putin administration and Yeltsin’s rule, the period of liberal reforms and Russia’s openness towards the West ... Chubais was a manager, and Yumashev was a strategist and a guide to the policy of the remnants of the Family [actually beneficiaries of the unipolar world in Russia]... his leaving the post means in fact a complete break in the relations between the Family and the current government. The crisis of these relations has been maturing for a long time, since 2012, now the final end has come ... The obligations to the late Yeltsin have been recognized as fulfilled”65.

It is premature to say that after February 24, 2022, all these problems in the public administration system will be solved by themselves. Nevertheless, the new Russia has not yet had such a historic chance to achieve full (not only external, but also internal) national sovereignty.

“...an oligarch is not just a billionaire, but a billionaire who determines the internal and foreign policy of the state or has a serious influence on it... a special operation of the RF Armed Forces in Ukraine would be impossible under the conditions of oligarchic rule. No one would have allowed the army to advance on the territory specially protected by the West, i.e. by the owners and the celestials” 66 .

“The actions of the United States and its satellites open up a wide range of opportunities for Russia, which increasingly seem to be perceived as responsibilities 67 .

For the first time in the entire post-Soviet period, the internal vector of movement, set and supported by the President, completely coincided with the external conditions that had been formed and stimulated (paradoxically) by the Collective West. And in this sense, the civilizational crisis that arose in 2022 between the Russian and Anglo-Saxon civilizations is a “window of opportunity” (and which can no longer be “closed” just like that).

Currently, the state is beginning to actively “master” this “window of opportunity”, as evidenced by initiatives and decisions aimed (which is important to emphasize) not only at consolidating Russian society in difficult conditions for the country, but also at future generations. By and large, this process began even earlier: in particular, Insert 2 presents the key decisions and actions of the President since the amendments to the RF Constitution supported by 79% or almost 58 million Russian voters came into force (January 1, 2021).

Thus, the practical realization of the goal of forming the “Russian idea” in society was going on long before the special operation in Ukraine.

However, the Rubicon, which Russia crossed on February 24, 2022, provides the country and its President with a unique historical chance to complete this unfinished business.

In this perspective, the special operation in Ukraine is only a tactical, although the most important, task, without the successful solution of which it will not be possible to achieve strategic goals. But the essence of the global conflict and the prospects opening up for Russia consists in a much greater thing.

Ultimately, the essence consists in the possibility of creating conditions for effective and intensive internal development; for the final eradication of the obstacles represented primarily by the “sixth column”, “family” or, simply put, the liberal “past” (in the future), which throughout the post-Soviet period were not interested in finding a real solution to the problems of poverty, inequality, corruption, increasing individualism, moral degradation and many other phenomena that characterized Russia during the period of movement along a market and liberal-capitalist development path.

Our main task is to create a new solid and, therefore, artistically strong image of the future. And if it is bright, if people believe in it, then it will slowly become a reality... Creating an image of the future is the ideological foundation for building a new Russia. After the creation of the image, a “prototype” should arise (an experimental model, a standard, and in fact – the grain of the desired social arrangement of people’s lives), after which the system of replication of an acceptable scenario of the future is turned on. In a broad sense, the education system is engaged in replicating what people have achieved. This is the sequence of development of society: “image – sample – education 68 .

The Soviet Union “sent only 14% of the energy produced in the country to the foreign market. The main donor was Saudi Arabia, which sent almost everything to the foreign market. But since the beginning of the 2000s, when we adopted the strategy of an energy superpower, the entire increase in energy production was exported, domestic consumption stagnated. And by the end of the 2000s, Russia, having increased the volume of production by one and a half times, began to send half of the energy produced in the country to the foreign market... Russia should become an industrial power. But can we do it? 69

Insert 2

Chronology of some actions of federal state authorities to strengthen the internal foundations of national sovereignty in 2021–2022

June 9, 2021 – The Moscow City Court satisfied the claim of the Prosecutor General’s Office, recognizing the FBK and A. Navalny’s headquarters as extremist organizations. Activists and donors face criminal liability if they continue their activities or funding 70 .

“He created conditions for the “destabilization of the social and socio-political situation”, his goal was “to change the foundations of the constitutional system”, “including using the scenario of a “color revolution” – this is the wording of the prosecutor’s verdict. Literally in a year, the entire grid of the so-called non-systemic opposition was cleared, and Alexei Navalny himself, after numerous possible violations of the order of serving his suspended sentences, went to jail” 71 .

June 30, 2021 – Former Minister of Education O. Vasilyeva was elected President of the Russian Academy of Education (RAO).

According to experts, O. Vasilyeva “revives the best traditions of Russian education” 72 ; “she sees ideological upbringing rather than business as the main task of education” 73 ; “she is perceived as a counterweight to the liberal public” 74 ; «she gives hope for overcoming the crisis phenomena that have accumulated in the domestic higher and secondary schools over the past decades” 75 .

July 1, 2021 – the change of the rector of the Higher School of Economics, an establishment that is considered “the largest conductor of Western ideology in our country, the engine of liberal ideas”76.

Rector of the Higher School of Economics (HSE) Ya. Kuzminov left his post; he had held this position since 1992 and, as some experts note, was “the ideologue of the liberal bloc in the Cabinet of Ministers of the Russian Federation and a recognized gravedigger of education” 77 . His place was taken by the former rector of the Far Eastern Federal University N. Anisimov; according to some experts, “undoubtedly, a placeman of the Presidential Administration” 78 .

July 30, 2021 – the Interdepartmental Commission on Historical Education was established.

The Commission was headed by V.R. Medinsky, Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation. The purpose of the Commission is to “ensure a systematic and proactive approach to the issue of defending the national interests of the Russian Federation related to the preservation of historical memory and the development of educational activities in the field of history” 79 .

Continuation of Insert 2

January 21, 2022 – the draft decree “On the approval of the foundations of state policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” was published, developed by the Ministry of Culture in accordance with the National Security Strategy.

The document formulates a list of moral guidelines that “form the worldview of Russian citizens”. Its tasks include “ensuring Russia’s moral leadership in international relations as the guardian of traditional universal values”, countering “destructive ideology”, protecting the Russian language from abusive words” 80 .

February 21, 2022 – Presidential Decrees on the recognition of the independence of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic81.

In connection with the adopted decrees, the head of state made an appeal to the Russians, in which he noted that “each state is entitled to freely choose ways to ensure its security ..., but international documents expressly stipulate the principle of equal and indivisible security, which includes obligations not to strengthen one’s own security at the expense of the security of other states… whereas Ukraine joining NATO is a direct threat to Russia’s security... Russia has done everything to preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity. All these years, it has persistently and patiently pushed for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2202 of February 17, 2015, which consolidated the Minsk Package of Measures of February 12, 2015, to settle the situation in Donbass. Everything was in vain.... In this regard, I consider it necessary to take a long overdue decision and to immediately recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic...” 82

February 24, 2022 – Address of the RF President to the citizens of Russia in connection with the beginning of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine.

The head of state noted that the purpose of the special operation is “to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime... in territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile “anti-Russia” is taking shape, fully controlled from the outside.., for our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation... It is not only a very real threat to our interests but to the very existence of our state and to its sovereignty... we are acting to defend ourselves from the threats created for us and from a worse peril than what is happening now” 83 .

March 4, 2022 – Administrative liability for public actions aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces of Russia is established 84 , as well as criminal liability for public dissemination of deliberately false information containing data on the use of the Armed Forces of Russia under the guise of reliable reports 85 .

According to experts, this law is necessary “in order to fight information terrorism” 86 ; “the norms of direct action will force those who lied and made statements discrediting our Armed Forces to be punished, and very severely” 87 .

Continuation of Insert 2

May 3, 2022 – Presidential Decree 252 “On the application of retaliatory special economic measures in connection with the unfriendly actions of some foreign states and international organizations”88.

Pursuant to the Decree, a list of companies has been approved with which (and with those they control) Russian legal entities and individuals are prohibited from conducting any financial transactions and the supply of goods 89 . As the experts noted, “this clear, tough and at the same time demonstratively deliberate and so far very limited response in the gas sphere, which is the most sensitive for the aggressor countries, testifies not only to Russia’s ability to defend itself, but also to the readiness to launch new retaliatory strikes both in gas and in other sensitive areas for the West” 90 .

May 16, 2022 – Rimas Tuminas, former artistic director of Vakhtangov Theater was excluded from the list of persons who were awarded the 2021 prize of the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of culture 91 , who planned to stage the play My Friend Bandera and declared the need “to erase Russian artists from memory” 92 . According to experts, this is “a significant, albeit symbolic manifestation of Russia’s determination to defend its national interests... Previously, the high-ranking Russophobes in the sphere of culture looked fundamentally untouchable” 93 .

May 24, 2022 – V. Falkov, RF Minister of Science and Higher Education, announced Russia’s withdrawal from the Bologna education system.

First of all, we are talking about the rejection of the accepted two-level system of training in universities (four years of bachelor’s degree and two years of master’s degree) and returning to the specialty (5–6 years of study). The Ministry will prepare a new list of specialties by 2024. As V. Falkov noted, “the Bologna system should be treated as a thing of the past. The future belongs to our own unique education system, which should be based on the interests of the national economy and the maximum space of opportunities for each student” 94 . Many experts call this a “ripe decision” 95 , which “will improve the situation regarding education in our country” 96 .

June 7, 2022 – the RF State Duma approved the draft law “On the Russian movement of children and youth “Big Change” 97 .

The movement is a mass non-profit self-governing organization. Its scale and specifics exceed the existing framework of public associations. The goals of the movement will be to promote the implementation of state policy in the interests of children and youth, participation in the upbringing of children, their professional orientation, organization of children’s leisure, creation of opportunities for their comprehensive development and selfrealization, preparation of children and youth for a full life in society. The Chairman of the Board of the “Big Change” is appointed by the RF President 98 .

According to experts, “the fact that the State Duma adopted the draft law on the creation of the “Big Change” in the first reading is a step in the right direction. The creation of the movement will help strengthen ideological work with the younger generation” 99 .

End of Insert 2

June 7, 2022 – the RF State Duma adopted the draft law “On control over the activities of persons under foreign influence” in the first reading” 100 . As part of the implementation of the draft law, it is proposed to amend 16 existing federal laws.

The draft law provides for the emergence of a single register of foreign agents instead of several existing ones now. It is proposed to recognize Russian or foreign legal entities as foreign agents, regardless of their organizational and legal form, that is, commercial organizations can also be recognized as foreign agents. New restrictions are being introduced: foreign agents will not be able to be organizers of public events; become civil servants or municipal officials; conduct teaching, educational, educational activities in relation to minors; produce information products for minors; receive state financial support; will not be able to invest in strategic enterprises in Russia, etc. The Ministry of Justice annually submits a report to the State Duma and the Federation Council on the activities of foreign agents.

According to experts, the essence of the draft law is “to do away with an extensive and confusing set of restrictions for foreign agents, to restore order in the relevant registers, to strengthen the prohibitive norms and powers of state agencies, and finally, to tighten the responsibility of all persons involved in this legislation” 101 .

June 7, 2022 – amendments were made to the law on the use of pension savings of liquidated non-state pension funds (NPFs), remaining after settlements with creditors.

The President gets the right to freeze almost any property (including cash); prohibit and restrict individual transactions (operations), including with currency; introduce requirements for the purchase or sale of financial instruments; establish “features” of currency control, introduce other temporary economic measures to ensure the financial stability of the Russian Federation, etc.

According to experts, “the fundamental meaning of the amendments is simple: the President of Russia can do anything in the financial sphere... liberals of all stripes formally remain in their places, but their real capabilities are reduced to operational, tactical, routine management... the real power in the field of finance will go to professionals who are not visible in the presidential administration (it has not been engaged in economics for a long time), but are quite obvious in the Mishustin government” 102 .

According to actual facts and public opinion polls (which we have cited in this article) show, after the start of the special operation, the activity of the President and the Government of the Russian Federation to achieve full national sovereignty by Russia, despite unprecedented political and economic pressure from the Collective West, not only did not weaken, but even intensified.

consequences for the entire Russian society and the country as a whole, for future generations.

According to experts, “ Russia, after a catastrophic defeat by the West in 1991 ... is forced today, as 105 years ago, in February 1917, to start a new world perestroika from scratch. Only this time, the perestroika will not be socialist, but structural, social and energy-related”104.

“It is difficult to overestimate the severity of the sanctions imposed on Russia now. The country is functionally cut off from the global financial system. Most of the assets of its central bank are frozen. Hundreds of private companies, from Visa to Shell and McDonald’s, have left indefinitely. And this is only an incomplete list... This is an economic war. And, in particular, it is an economic war directed against civilians...” 103

“Major social upheavals occur in Russia once every 75–80 years (suffice it to recall in this regard the history of Soviet Russia in 1917–1991)... Russia’s historical activity shows that its new, 80-year-old wave of life, which started with the beginning of the 21st century, will rise at least until the 2060s. If we count back 80 years, then we will find ourselves at a similar critical point in our history – the beginning of the Stalingrad battle against fascism” 105 .

As the results of the 30th anniversary of market transformations show, there was a need to solve this problem , and today it is being actively implemented. We should note that the ongoing reforms are of a forced, urgent nature, largely dictated by external threats to national security. However, according to the results of regional and federal sociological surveys, people feel their importance and believe that over time they will have a significant positive impact on national development; that they are designed for tomorrow and will have historical

Thus, the country that crossed the Rubicon on February 24, 2022 and began a new stage in its history has a long and difficult way to go.

Staying on this path (especially at this crucial moment) will depend not only on how all the key actors of social development (broad segments of the population, ruling elites, civic associations, academia, cultural figures, etc.) will be able to consolidate around the President, but also on whether they will be able to “think sovereign”, that is, not just to offer Russian analogues of Western standards, but to be guided by their own, unique, national values, traditions, management decisionmaking practices, human and scientific potential, and its practical achievements corresponding to our “gene code”.

We agree with one of the leading participants of the Izborsk Club, philosopher A. Dugin, who notes that “it is no longer possible to continue copying the West and its norms, standards and rules. Borrowing liberal Western standards... will lead us to ideological convulsions” 106.

Список литературы A difficult road after the Rubicon

  • Balatsky E.V. (2021). Return on equity as an economic growth driver. Ekonomicheskie I sotsial’nye peremeny: fakty, tendentsii, prognoz=Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast, 14(1), 26–40 (in Russian).
  • Wallerstein I., Collins R., Mann M., Derluguian G, Calhoun C. (2015). Est’ li budushchee u kapitalizma [Does Capitalism Have a Future?] Moscow: Izd-vo Instituta Gaidara.
  • Gorshkov M.K., Sedova N.N. (2015). “Self-sufficient” Russians and their life priorities. Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, 12, 4–16 (in Russian).
  • Gubanov S.S. (2022). N. Mulder: The purpose of sanctions is to change the political regime in Russia. Ekonomist, 4, 20–39 (in Russian).
  • Twenty years of reforms through the eyes of Russians (the experience of long-term sociological measurements) (2011): Analytical report of IS RAS. Available at: https://www.isras.ru/analytical_ report_twenty_years_reforms.html (in Russian).
  • Dobrenkov V.I., Ispravnikova N.R. (2013). The Russian version of “crony capitalism”: Is there a way out of the impasse? Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 18. Sotsiologiya i politologiya, 26–55 (in Russian).
  • Zikeev V. The ideology of a multinational people. Ekspert, 20, 68–70 (in Russian).
  • National identity and the future of Russia: Report of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Moscow, 2014 (in Russian).
  • Gromyko Yu.V., Krupnov Yu.V. (Eds.). (2019). Rossiya – Noev Kovcheg chelovechestva: Filosofsko-religioznye i metodologicheskie aspekty gosudarstvennoi ideologii budushchei Rossii [Russia – Noah’s Ark of Humanity: Philosophical, Religious and Methodological Aspects of the State Ideology of Future Russia]. Moscow: LENAND.
  • Sysoev T. (2022). The USA has much more at stake than Russia (materials of an interview with the historian and philosopher A. Teslya). Ekspert, 10, 28–29 (in Russian).
  • Novokmet F., Piketty T., Zucman G. (2018). From soviets to oligarchs: Inequality and property in Russia, 1905–2016. Journal of Economic Inequality, 16(1).
Еще
Статья научная