The analysis of mechanisms of distribution of fund of financing by means of the program RDS complex

The two-level system “customer-contractors” is considered. Customer is financing several kinds of works that make up a common job. The funding Fund is limited. Each contractor is monopolist, which has no competitors in the relevant field. The customer cannot redistribute the work between the contractors. Each contractor wants to increase the amount of funding for own work and get the maximum profit from this work. When determining the amount of funds for the contractors, the customer can use one of the distribution mechanisms: a mechanism that provides all performers with the same profitability or a mechanism of linear combination of minimum and maximum profitability. To use these mechanisms, the customer has to know the information about cost of the work. The customer receives this information from the contractors. Knowing the mechanism of distribution of fund, the contractors can distort the requested information about the costs in order to obtain more funds, because it is assumed that the exact amount of costs to the customer is not known. The customer wants to get accurate information about the costs of the contractors. For each mechanism, conditions are formed in which profit of the contractors is decreasing if information is not true. It is shown that these conditions are fundamentally different from each other. Verification and confirmation of the theoretical findings is based on simulations. The effectiveness of mechanisms of distributions in the situation of Nash equilibrium is estimated. The description of the program complex developed at the V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences for simulations is given.