Analysis of strategic interactions in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the prism of the game theory

Introduction . The paper attempts to analyze possible and probable strategic moves of the primary and secondary actors in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Methods. To analyze this conflict the author uses the mathematical theory of games and some mathematical models and methods. The main methods and models include the following: Nash equilibrium, sequential game, Zermelos theorem, Zermelo-Kuno algorithm, and games with commitments. As the publication is an analytical and computational work, it mainly includes literature related to methodology and theory. Analysis . The publication not only contains the analysis of the strategic interactions between Armenia and Azerbaijan as primaryactors, but also includes Russia as a secondary participant. Results . As a result, the author has drawn several conclusions. Firstly, the strategic interactions between two actors differ from strategic interactions among three actors in terms of possible payments and preferences. Secondly, in the strategic interactions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the most likely interaction profile will be “A2, B1-C2” (not recognizing the independence of Nagorno Karabakh and not declaring war on Armenia) with a payment of “0:0”. The third conclusion is on the qualitative difference between the sequential game and the game with commitments among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. In the second case, the Nash equilibrium consists of not recognizing the separatist regime by Armenia, not supporting Russia’s desire for Armenia to recognize and not declaring war on Armenia: SPNE = { E 2, R 4, A8}. However, unlike the first option, the equilibrium obtained in the game with commitments takes on a more stable structure in relation to different political processes.