Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols AKI, ARPKI and OPT using ProVerif and AVISPA
Автор: Amol H. Shinde, A. J. Umbarkar
Журнал: International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security(IJCNIS) @ijcnis
Статья в выпуске: 3 vol.8, 2016 года.
Бесплатный доступ
In recent years, the area of formal verification of cryptographic protocols became important because of the active intruders. These intruders can find out the flaws in the protocols and can use them to create attacks. To avoid such possible attacks, the protocols must be verified to check if the protocols contain any flaws. The formal verification tools have helped in verifying and correcting the protocols. Various tools are available these days for verifying the protocols. In this paper, the two verification tools namely ProVerif and AVISPA are used for analysis of protocols - AKI (Accountable Key Infrastructure), ARPKI (Attack Resilient Public Key Infrastructure) and OPT (Origin and Path Trace). A comparative evaluation of the selected tools is presented and revealed security properties of the protocols selected.
Formal Verification, Cryptographic Protocols, ProVerif, AVISPA, Comparison of Tools
Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/15011508
IDR: 15011508
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