Аристотель и западная рациональность

By providing a new interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of man as rational and, more importantly, as noetic being, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle was a genuinely Hellenic and Platonic philosopher, that is, something more than a mere representative of European and “Western rationality.”1 Accordingly, in reading his various works, we should keep in mind that the basic concepts of logic, ontology, psychology, ethics, politics, and all areas of human experience, are expressed in words which are, as Aristotle often emphasized, pollachos legomena (i.e. ambiguous and poly-semantic terms with more than one meaning).

Such a reading will also provide us with the key to understanding Aristotle’s philosophy correctly and evaluating it perhaps more judiciously. For his views on God and man, nature and polis , poetic and noetic activity, ethics and politics, personal virtues and the common good, domestic relations and political associations are, for him, all ontologically connected as parts of an organic whole held together by a kind of philosophic attraction and sympathy. This whole complex can be methodically explored with the effective method of dialectic as developed by the Platonic Socrates and perfected by Aristotle, the Philosopher .²

For Aristotle, and other Platonic philosophers, a search into any of the above mentioned subjects will inevitably lead to all the rest with which it is ontologically connected. For instance, determining the ultimate ethical/political telos (that is, the end, aim, goal or good) of man understood as a political animal and citizen of a Hellenic polis, would call for an inquiry into the nature of man qua man (the what-it-is-to-be-human). This will lead to psychology, to ontology, to cosmology, to teleology and, ultimately, to natural theology. For Aristotle, “the good of man” is identified with the wellbeing of each citizen and all the citizens who, collectively, make up the political community of a free Hellenic polis, the classical city-state.3

Consequently, as Aristotle envisioned it, the organization of the Hellenic polis as a whole should make it possible for each and all of its citizens to actualize their potential as human beings naturally endowed with certain physical, psychic, logical, and noetic capacities. In this way, the naturally and culturally best among them would be able to rise to perfection.⁴ This road, as is dialectically mapped by Aristotle, leads to the summit of human perfection and enlightenment. It is to be followed primarily by the genuine philosopher, the ideal citizen of a Hellenic polis , as he heroically traverses the ontological distance separating the man-goat (or satyr of Hellenic mythology and drama) from the man-god (or sage of Platonic philosophy).⁵

It will become clear, in the light of my advanced interpretation, that the Platonic Aristotle, like the Platonic Socrates6 and like Plotinus later on, had a high opinion of the power of philosophy to perfect the human being. He was convinced that, (working slowly upon the soul and mind of the ascending philosopher, who has climbed step by step the scala amoris), the true love of wisdom will bring in contact the human and the Divine. What is divine in us, the nous (the intuitive mind, the noetic light shining in the human micro-cosmos), and the Nous (the Intellect of the macrocosmos) are of the same essence.7 At such privileged moments of noetic contact and enlightenment, it would appear that the energized human intellect acquires both self-knowledge and knowledge of “The Other,” the divine Noetic Being. Thus, man becomes beloved to the Supreme God,8 the eternally active Intellect, which moves the cosmos by the irresistible power of its erotic attraction, as if in a rhythmic dance orderly and eternal.9

In this way, a kind of philosophic apotheosis seems to take place at the end of the long road of Peripatetic dialectic. At this point, logos (discursive reason) must yield to intuitive and superior power of energized human intellect ( nous ). There, the human being, conceived here as a living, sensible, reasonable, noetic, communal, political, poetic, and potentially divine being, becomes divine actually, suddenly, and even self-knowingly. Thus, philosophically perfected, the ideal citizen of the Hellenic polis becomes fully enlightened.¹⁰ That is to say, the actualized and active human intellect suddenly grasps, as in a flash of self-awareness, the truth that in its very nature the human being is homoousio n, that is, of the same essence or ousia , as Divine Intellect.

Following along the path suggested by Aristotelian dialectic, we can then see that the eternally energized Divine Intellect and the dialectically perfected (and, thus, noetically transformed) mind of the true philosopher are identified as being essentially the same. So, at the end, they are recognized as closely related beings, as two beloved friends.11 This is the road to enlightenment, which my Platonic interpreta- tion of Aristotle’s philosophy will reveal fully in what follows. It may be called properly the Aristotelian via dialectica.12

In this new light, Aristotle's philosophy and the Platonic tradition to which it belongs, would appear to be closer to Eastern ways of thinking (especially the Indian), than to the narrowly defined “Western rationality.” By this expression is usually meant the kind of calculative and manipulative ratio, which is in the service of utili-tas. For it serves utilitarian, technological, and ideological goals, which characterize much of modern and post-modern philosophy in the West under various masks, such as: British “logical analysis,” Baconian “scientific method,” and Marxist “scientific socialism.”¹³

In the same light, as a genuine Hellenic and Platonic philosopher, Aristotle will appear to be something very different, better and nobler, than the caricature of a

“servant philosopher,” into which he has been compressed in the West. For he has been presented alternatively but equally narrowly, either as the scholastic logician and rationalist thinker in service of dogmatic medieval theology, or as the empirical and analytic thinker in the service of technocratic modern science.14

This double portrait of Aristotle, whether Medieval or Modern European, clearly does not resemble the historical Hellenic philosopher in his dialectic fullness. For his philosophic mind wanted to accomplish all of the following diverse tasks: see noetically the entire kosmos ; understand the form and the function of every kind of substantive being; grasp the telos of man as citizen of the Hellenic polis and his multiple creations; admire the eternal beauty of the Cosmos; and find in it the proper place for God (understood as the Cosmic Intellect) and man's noetic self. For this human-noetic-self or nous was seen as a microcosmic god in the making, being potentially present in the well-endowed human soul. Clearly, then, the Western picture of the Philosopher does not fit the acuity of Aristotle’s dialectic in all its flexibility and complexity as displayed in his texts.¹⁵

It is this “other side” of Aristotle's Platonic philosophy that my thesis will attempt to bring to light and to revive because it is needed now, and will be needed even more in the near future than ever before. For, at the present, the global failure of the Marxist “scientific socialism,” in the communistic praxis of the so-called “dictatorship of the proletariat” in its Leninist and Maoist versions, is a historical fact. With its collapse and as the dreadful divisions of mankind (along the familiar lines of tribal nationalism, monotheistic intolerance, and sectarian fanaticism) begin to re-surface globally,16 the need to revive the lost spirit of Hellenic philosophy becomes apparent. The spirit of religious tolerance, philosophic pluralism, and Hellenic humanism is needed now and its need is felt deeply by sensitive souls and far-seeing minds.17

Let this suffice, as an introduction. It is now time to turn to Aristotle and the available textual evidence, which will help us substantiate this challenging thesis as outlined above.

Aristotle’s Move from Logos to Nous

For anyone wishing to discover the roots of “rationality,” as it is understood in the West, Aristotle would seem a reasonable terminus a quo. For, as we saw in the first two essays, European historians of philosophy believe that Hellenic philosophy, whose characteristic trait is assumed by them to have been the logos in the sense of discursive reasoning, reached its climax in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. They were closely related as teacher and student.18 Besides, whatever little the Medi- eval Western World knew about Ancient Hellenic philosophy was related to parts of Aristotle’s logic, the famous Organon.19

For such an inquirer, therefore, and for these reasons, the following questions are of special interest: Was Aristotle the “first cause” of the rising of rationalistic and technocratic science in Europe in the last few centuries, as has been alleged? Does “Western rationality,” in the above-specified sense, really have its beginnings in Aristotle's philosophy? Can Aristotle’s philosophy without distortion, and his dialectic method without misapplication, provide justification to claims of cultural superiority and hegemony that have been advanced by the European powers in order to justify their colonial exploitation of Africa, America, and Asia? Last, what do the terms “reason” and “rationalism” mean, and is Aristotle the root of “Western rationality?”20

The answer to these complex questions cannot be simple. It may be affirmative or negative depending on the sense which is attached to the word ratio, which was itself a clumsy attempt to render into Latin the poly-semantic Hellenic word logos. In the language and literature of Ancient Hellas, the word logos has as many meanings and shades of meanings, as Proteus has faces, forms, and shapes. Basically, it means meaningful or significant speech, that is, the richness of hu- man (preferably Hellenic) language and the human mind with all its concepts, thoughts, feelings, and visions, which can be symbolically expressed orally or in writing by the power of this specifically human tool, the human logos.21 In this broad sense, not only great Hellenic philosophers, but every human being, who is unimpaired and prepared to make careful and meaningful use of the innate logos, is naturally a logical and rational being.

As an epistemic concept, employed widely in modern theories of knowledge and epistemology and extensively discussed in the histories of “Western philosophy,” rationalism is contrasted to empiricism and to intuitionism. Its method is called deductive because it supposedly moves from general, self-evident, and axiomatic principles to implications, which follow necessarily from such principles, if and when they are combined in proper syllogistic forms, according to specific logical rules of inference. In this sense, Pythagoras, Descartes, and Russell, for example, who were mathematicians and philosophers, are considered as “rationalists.” They were willing to follow the hypothetical and deductive method of reasoning as the only correct way of obtaining reliable scientific knowledge. As pure rationalists, they did not trust the evidence provided by sense experience. In this respect, they differed radically from the empiricist philosophers, like Democritus, Epicurus, and Hobbes, for example. For the latter, the senses are the only source of trustworthy information about the real world which, for them, was identified with the sensible world.

Where, then, did Aristotle stand on this epistemological division? Was he a rationalist and “the root” of Western rationality, as some scholars and historians of philosophy have maintained? Or was he to be found in the opposite camp of the empiricists, where Kant, among others, had placed him?22 It would be closer to truth to say that he was both an empiricist and a rationalist, because he was a dialectician with common sense. His common sense and his open mind allowed Aris- totle to see that each side was correct in some specified sense, but neither had the whole truth. On this matter, as in many others, Aristotle was the antithesis of what is called a “dogmatist.”23

Being critical of the dialectical deficiencies of the various previous theories of knowledge, Aristotle was able to simultaneously praise the senses and criticize em-piricism.24 He was also able to define syllogism and the deductive method used in mathematics but, at the same time, admit that induction and intuition played an important role in ascertaining the first principles and the major premises of valid deductions.25 Above all, he was able to conceive of truth as being neither revealed dogma nor private property of any human being regardless of his philosophical accomplishments. On the contrary, for the open-minded Hellenic philosopher, the truth was a “common property” belonging to mankind as a whole. It was a kind of “commonwealth,” to which all persons more or less contribute, even when they are in error, since others may learn how to avoid such errors and find truth.26 The fol- lowing statement is characteristic of this and reveals Aristotle's mind and method of inquiry:

Now our treatment of this science [Ethics] will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision, which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike, anymore than in all the products of the arts and crafts.... For it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.27

There is no need to add more passages like the above in order to make the point that dialectical flexibility, sharpness of questioning, and moderation of expression are characteristic of Aristotle's method.28 He had learned from his teacher Plato and from Socrates the importance of dividing and defining, of clarifying and qualifying, of distinguishing and analyzing the terms involved in a given question or a proposed problem. With unsurpassed confidence and acuteness, he practiced the method of dialectic to the best of his ability in the service of truth and humanity. As a critical philosopher, Aristotle wanted to ascertain the facts in each case and “to save the phenomena.” He also wanted to review “the received proverbial wisdom” of the many and the opinions of the few “wise men” and to suggest solutions, which might pass the test of time and, more importantly, the test of competent criticism and selfcriticism in seeking consistently “the truth.”29

The flexibility of Aristotle’s dialectic method, which can embrace reasonable discussions of questions related to the foundations of the practical (e.g. Ethics and Politics) and the theoretical sciences (e.g. Physics and Metaphysics), is impressive. His honest search for human truth by human means, and the sharpness and openness of his mind are such that they have made Aristotle one of the best representatives of Hellenic philosophy. Carefully following the flexible, though slippery, path of dialectic, he succeeded in embracing the claims of empiricism and rationalism, as well as the claims of the intuitive and noetic vision ( noesis ).

Aristotle was able to accomplish this task as a philosopher because he did not limit human experience to sensations and sense data, as modern empiricists have done; nor to cogitation and rationalization, as modern rationalists did. For him, besides the basic realm of aisthesis (sense perception) and the realm of practical human logos (discursive reasoning, rational discourse, meaningful speech), there is the realm of divine nous (intuitive, intellective, immediate grasp of first and true principles; non-discursive reason, intellect, intelligence). The door to this realm opens, at certain privileged moments, to dedicated Hellenic lovers of wisdom, who may follow the long road of Aristotelian dialectic and inquiry to the very end.³⁰

More significantly, for Aristotle as for fellow Platonists, the Hellenic philosopher considered as an intellect, which is engaged in theorizing about the cosmos and the nature of things, was not alone in this noble pursuit.31 For them, the philosophically conceived cosmos was orderly, beautiful, and intelligently governed at the highest level by the Divine Nous (the eternally energizing and active Intellect, or Aristotelian God). For these philosophers, there was a plurality of other and lesser intellects too, including the one in us, in the human soul, the nous.32

So, in order to bring the question closer to us, we may ask: What can Hellenic philosophy possibly mean to post-modern men and women, as they try to cope with “the absurdity” of their lives? Even if their lives are not always as “nasty, brutish and short,” as Hobbes would have them be, they are certainly mortal and seem meaningless to many Westerners, including some “philosophers.” As they drag their existential Angst along a Sisyphus’ pathway, life on earth, and the earth itself, looks to them like an “old bitch.” And to think of it, it is the same earth which ancient poets, philosophers, and common people respectfully called “Mother Earth!” and “Sweet home!” It will emerge, from our discussion of Aristotle’s road to enlightenment, that part of the suggested answer to the above question would relate to the double loss which Europe had suffered, that is, the loss of philosophical contact with (a) the divine spark in us (the nous within) and (b) the divine Nou s in the cosmos. This would seem to have occurred, when the two “aberrations” of genuine Judaism, namely Christianity and Islam, introduced into the Mediterranean world, especially into Western Europe, the monomaniac monopoly of the One God and the myth of “the chosen people.”

By reducing all the ancient gods and goddesses to one masculine God, Christian and Muslim theologians have, perhaps inadvertently but unwisely, pointed the way to the abyss of “No-God,” which Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre and other post-Modern atheists and nihilists followed blindly, in their furious rebellion against the despotism of dogmatic Catholicism and the fanaticism of puritanical Protestantism in Europe. Hence, the need to rediscover and reconnect with our roots in pluralistic and polytheistic Hellenism, in polyphonic philosophy, and in the Hellenic emphasis on “harmony in diversity.”

• ³² The affinity of this Hellenic thought to Chinese and Indian philosophies is evident from passages like the following: “Silent, isolated, standing alone, changing not, eternally revolving without fail, worthy to be the mother of all things. I do not know its name and address it as Tao. If forced to give it a name, I shall call it ‘Great’;” “What is God-given is what we call human nature. To fulfil the law of our human nature is what we call the moral law” (Lin Yutang, 1942, 596 and 845); and “The real which is at the heart of the Universe is reflected in the infinite depths of the self” (Radhakrishnan–Moore 1973, 38). It would seem that the Aristotelian relation, between Nous and nous , is analogous to the Indian relation between Brahman and atman, of which the Upanisads speak. On this relation and the corresponding double intuitive knowledge ( vidya ), of human self and the Divine Self, the Vedanta system of thought is based. See, K. Satchidananda Murty 1991, 3-7. Professor Murty renders vidya as “science.” But its meaning may be something more than this. A better translation would be “intuitive knowledge” or “intuition” to capture the meaning of “seeing” which is at the root of the Indian word vidya , as it is in the equally beautiful Hellenic and Platonic word idea . The same Ancient Hellenic word [ nous ], has also been used for something divine in us by Hellenic poets from Homer to

Consequently Aristotle was simultaneously the philosopher who invented the syllogism, systematized logic for the Hellenes and, perhaps more than any other Hellenic philosopher, practiced and perfected the Socratic method of dialectic. Yet the same man did not hesitate to describe the cosmic God, the highest Intellect, in poetic language which would have pleased even a demanding Hellenic poet, like Aeschylus or Pindar.

For Aristotle’s God is noetically conceived as the inexhaustible source of pure noetic energy, which erotically attracts and harmoniously moves everything in the cosmos, as we will see in the next section. It is the Great Beauty, with which the entire cosmos seems to be in love. It is the Great Light and cause of enlightenment for the mind of the true philosopher in the triple Socratic manifestation. The first is identified as lover of Hellenic mousike ,³³ that is, the practitioner of the art of poetic rhythm, harmonious sound, and audibly appreciated beauty. The second is identified as lover of Hellenic eidetike, that is, the practitioner of the art of visible patterns, symmetrical forms, and optically appreciated beauty. The third is identified as lover of Hellenic dialektike , that is, the practitioner of the art of logic, ordered form, principled life, rational discourse, intuitive grasp of principles, and noetically appreciated truth.³⁴

Aristotle on Divine and Human Beings

The above perception and interpretation of Aristotle certainly differs from that of the scientific thinker and logician, with whom the Western world is accustomed. For it is framed around the Hellenic word nous (mind) which is not easy to translate into English.³⁵ Besides, the noetic affinity and friendship which exist naturally between (the philosophically conceived Aristotelian) God and the perfected human being (that is, the Hellenic philosopher who is engaged in noetic vision and understanding), are expressed by him in a strange language. It is more poetic, noematic, and enigmatic, than the logical discursive reasoning ( logos ), with which he is identified in Europe.³⁶

I would like, therefore, to allow Aristotle to speak on behalf of his noetic philosophy and in support of my unorthodox thesis. He will provide us with sufficient textual evidence for the consideration and enlightenment of any non-prejudiced person regarding this Platonic aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy and its potential political implications for the following triangle of relations: West/Hellas, Hellas/East, and East/West. Consider, therefore, the following three paradigmatic cases of Aristotelian texts, which point the way to Hellenic philosophic enlightenment.

• A.    Ousiological Questions Lead Aristotle to Cosmic God

We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessor of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than the man of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes. Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which is Wisdom…37 The subject of our inquiry is substance;38 for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part; and if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession, on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity… There are three kinds of sub-stance--one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and another is perishable; the latter is recognized by all men, and includes e.g. plants and animals), of which we must grasp the elements, whether one or many; and another that is immovable… On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its activity is also pleasure. And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in it-self, and which is thinking in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with, and thinking, its object, so that thought and object of thought are the same… If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better, this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.39

• B.    Psychological Questions lead Aristotle to God Within

Holding as we do that, while knowledge of any kind is a thing to be honored and prized, one kind of it may, either by reason of its greater exactness or of a higher dignity and greater wonderfulness in its objects, be more honorable and precious than another, on both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul. The knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of nature, for the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties…40 Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it… What has soul in it differs from what has not, in that the former displays life. Now this word has more than one sense, and provided that any one alone is found in a thing we say that thing is living. Living, that is, may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and growth. Hence we think of plants also as living [besides animals and human beings]… Certain kinds of animals possess in addition the power of locomotion, and still another order of animate beings, i.e. man and possibly another order like man or superior to him, the power of thinking, i.e. mind [nous]… Thinking, both speculative and practical, is regarded as akin to a form of perceiving; for in the one as well as the other the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something, which is. Indeed the ancients go so far as to identify thinking and perceiving… Thus that in the soul, which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body… And in fact mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state of light; for in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors. Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to passive factor, the originating of force to the matter which it forms). Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time. Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal, and without it nothing thinks.41

• C.    Ethical Questions Bring Together the Two Divinities

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been defined to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends ...42 Now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man ... But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the intellect [nous], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself actually divine, or as being relatively the divine part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already that this activity is the activity of contemplation ... Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect [nous] is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and in value it far surpasses all the rest. It may even be held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the dominant and best part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should choose to live not his own life but the life of other than himself. Moreover what was said before will apply here also: that which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best and the pleasantest life for man, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything else is man; therefore this life will be the happiest.43

The above and similar passages of the Aristotelian corpus, if read in the context of his philosophy as a whole and in its relation to other Hellenic philosophies of nature and polis , provide a clear picture of Aristotle’s conception of God and man, and their respective place in the cosmos. The kind of life of which man is optimally capable, as well as the communal and political arrangements, which would make possible the flourishing of such a life for the best qualified citizens, are recognized by Aristotle. They are not considered as the arbitrary recommendations or commandments of some divinely inspired and dogmatic prophet, but as the fulfillment of an entelechy, that is, as the telos (end), which is present in the human soul and human nature qua human. For the same intelligent ordering principle, which pervades the entire cosmos, is also potentially present in the individual human soul. It can manifest itself in the rational structuring of various forms of natural and political associations, such as the family and the polis , as well as the perfected human life by philosophia . Accordingly, in order to understand Aristotle’s Politics correctly, one should place it in the context of his Metaphysics, De Anima , and Ethics. I will try to do so, in a synoptic way, in the following sections.⁴⁴

Distinguishing Between Ontology and Ousiology

Aristotle’s model of the cosmos is perhaps more complex than any of the other models, which were advanced by his predecessors from Parmenides to Plato. In fact, it is the antithesis of the Parmenidean absolutely immovable One Being. By Aristotle’s time, the Parmenidean “theory of being” had been transformed by a series of revisions of the original formula either “It is” or “It is not.” For Parmenides the disjunction, “Being or non-Being,” was an exclusive disjunction, for between the sphere of Being and the abyss of non-Being, nothing else could possibly be. Being was to be conceived and thought of as one whole, eternally immovable, and internally undif-ferentiated.45 In the history of Hellenic philosophy, it was probably Anaxagoras who first set the two spheres apart, the “sphere of material being” apart from the sphere of pure Nous. Thus, matter and mind, that is, the material world and the noetic world, were distinguished. Like a powerful ruler, the Divine Mind or Nous ruled the material cosmos from afar.46

To simplify the process by which Plato attempted to correct and to complete the Parmenidean conception of cosmic Being, it may be said that in him we find each of the old divisions, Being and non-Being, but each of them is subdivided once again and made double. So we have two spheres of each, Being and non-Being. By mixing two of the divided spheres (one sphere of Being and one of non-Being) Plato was able to create the sphere of Becoming. This is interposed between the sphere of pure Being (the noetic world of Forms or Ideas, the model or paradigm of the cosmos) and the sphere non-Being (formless matter). The sphere of Becoming, which is the world of sense experience, the copy, image, or icon, is the result of the mixing of certain images of the Platonic Ideas or Forms with that part of non-Being, which receives them, the Receptacle. The multiplicity of perceptible entities, which populate the visible cosmos47 and the cosmos itself, were brought into being by the Platonic Demiurge.48

With this background in mind, we can see that Aristotle’s conception of the cosmos differs significantly from those of his predecessors, although he borrows from them and builds upon their foundations. In a sense, the Aristotelian cosmos is like the Parmenidean sphere, since it is one, non-generated, indestructible, and eternal; but it is movable and ultimately moved by the Unmoved Mover (Divine Intellect). Thus, it is dynamically or organically unified whole, whose parts are functionally differentiated, but interactive and even partially interchangeable.

This conception avoids the fragmentary randomness of the Democretian model of cosmos, as well as the artificiality of the Platonic/Pythagorean model. Its orderliness is not explained in terms of chance (tyche ) and necessity, as in the former; nor in terms of techne (art) and persuasion, as in the latter; but in terms of physis ( nature), life, and nous (the active, intuitive, self-knowing intellect), as if it were a living being.⁴⁹

However, the process by which Aristotle moved dialectically from ontology to ou-siology , in his account of the cosmos, is rather complex and in need of further elabo-ration.⁵⁰ For, according to Aristotle, the Hellenic word for being ( to on or einai) does not have only one sense; that is, it is not a mono-semantic word as it was for Parmenides. For it does not mean the “One-Being” in its uncompromising and aloof antithesis to non-Being. Rather it is predicated in many ways and, therefore, it has many different “categorical” meanings.⁵¹ In Aristotle’s view, it has as many meanings as there are kinds of things, which have categorically a claim to be, in some sense.

As a matter of fact, Aristotle specified as many senses of the word “being” as there are items enumerated in his tenfold list of categories.⁵² The tenfold division of beings is simplified by radical reduction into a twofold division, substance and accidents (or properties). Under the latter are subsumed the kinds of beings, which belong to any of the other nine categories as determinations of substance or ousia . They are: being qualified (quality), being quantified (quantity), being related (relation), being in position, being in possession, being in place, being in time, being active and being passive. Aristotle has specified that the most important of the ten generic categories is the category of ousia (substance). On it all the other categories depend ontologically .⁵³

Furthermore, even within the limited sphere of the individual primary substances, there are important subdivisions. In fact, it was the search for the most primary among the primary substances that led Aristotle to discover his God and the linkage between God and man qua man, that is, the human species in its essence or “essential being.” In his view, the best specimen of man is the philosopher, that is, the man whose potential has been fully actualized by the acquisition and exercise of an excellent (that is, ethical, rational, and noetic) self. Thus traditional ontologia , the theory of being qua being and inquiry into the nature of reality, was transformed by Aristotle’s dialectic into ousiologia , the theory of substance and inquiry into the nature of ousia .⁵⁴

Accordingly, the Aristotelian cosmos is populated by a great number of primary substances (ουσίαι), which are classified in terms of the following pairs of contraries: either perishable or imperishable, temporal or eternal, organic or non-organic, sensible or non-sensible, movable or immovable, mortal or immortal, and potential or actual.55 To a concrete human being apply the first terms of each pair, the less valuable; to a divine intelligence apply the second and more valuable terms of each pair. God is thus conceived as a very special primary substance, unlike any other being, in that it is not composite, but simple. God is a living and eternally active Intellect (Νous), that eternally energizes other divine Intellects, and occasionally even the nous (intellect), which is potentially present in each human soul.56

According to Aristotle, therefore, the soul or psyche of man is a complex system of powers or faculties. These psychic powers range from nutritive and reproductive powers (which are actually shared by all living beings); to sensitive and kinetic powers (which are shared with other animal species); to logical powers (in the double sense of logos , as the capacity to reason and as articulate speech). Best of all, though, are the intuitive or noetic powers of human soul, not only as a potential, but also as an actualized nous or intellect, which are shared with other divine intellects.⁵⁷

By the stimulus of philosophy and the appropriate education ( paideia) , to be offered by the well-organized Hellenic city-state ( polis ) freely to its competent citizens in accordance with the principles of right reason ( orthos logos) , the human potential can be actualized and some human beings at least can flourish optimally. They can, thus, become enlightened personalities and God-like human beings, in so far as an optimal outcome is possible for the composite substance of human beings.⁵⁸

Therefore, at the end of our analysis and by following the long and meandering road of Aristotle’s dialectic, we have reached the place where the “end of man,” understood as the ultimate ethical telos or goal, and the supreme human good are located. This is the well-ordered polis, as the result of the proper function of the difficult art of Hellenic politics, which Aristotle calls “the architectonic art.”⁵⁹ The rest of our brief discussion will be devoted to this aspect of his philosophic theorizing.

Perfecting the Aristotelian Political Animal

The raison d’ etre of the Hellenic polis , as Aristotle conceived of it, was the securing for all of its citizens the conditions not simply of life, but of “the good life,” according to their respective merit. In this way, the optimal actualization of human natural and educational potential would be fully accomplished.⁶⁰ The citizens, who may entertain hopes of reaching such politically desirable peaks, would have to have extraordinary natural endowments, as well as an excellent or good paideia ( education).⁶¹

An ideal citizen would have to be all of the following, in a complete course of life from childhood to maturity and to old age. First of all, he would have to be naturally well endowed with the necessary powers of the body, the soul and, especially, the mind. He would have to be educationally well trained, in music and gymnastics, acquiring a good physique, good habits, and the excellences of character and intellect. He would have to be personally well ordered, so that the soul would rule over the body wisely, and the rational part of the soul over the irrational part gently. The noetic part would enlighten the rational part of the soul, by providing the appropriate principles of thinking and acting virtuously. He would also have to be domestically well equipped with wife, children, servants, parents, and moderate property. Finally, he would have to be politically well organized with other friends and well disciplined, so that he can learn how to rule and be ruled with justice by his equals in turns.

At the end of his life, if all went well, he would have: (a) survived the just wars in defense of the polis; (b) seen his sons take his place in the hoplite ranks; (c) freed some of his domestic servants, if they could take care of themselves;62 (d) dedicated himself (and perhaps his graciously aging wife) to the service of the many gods and goddesses of the city-state; and (e) occupied himself with philosophic theoria of the Supreme Nous, the magnificent cosmos, and the divine nous within the human soul.63

In this connection we may recall that, according to Aristotle, the nature of the ideal polis in the Hellenic sense of a city, which was also the center of a measurable state, is not artificial, conventional or simply man-made, as European political theorists have maintained following the “social contract” theory.⁶⁴ It is as natural as the union of male and female, the growth of the family tree, and the formation of a small village which, with the passage of time, may branch out and give birth to other small villages. When these villages of common ancestry would unite politically for better protection, exchange of goods, self-sufficiency, and the good life of virtue, a Hellenic polis would come “naturally,” according to Aristotle, into being and political life begin.⁶⁵

In his view, the defense, protection, and well-being of the naturally constituted political community necessitates the division of labor among males, in an analogous way as the survival and preservation of the human species has naturally necessitated the different roles of male and female, and those of father and mother.66

Domestically, the wife was to play the role of “the queen” of the house. The man’s main duty qua citizen was the politically assigned task of “protecting the family” as a whole and its property by the art of war, in times of war, and by the art of politics in times of peace.

These activities were to be undertaken in friendly co-operation with other citizens of equal political status as heads of families.67 Since the art of war and the art of politics at that time were rather demanding, in terms of physical and mental powers, the males who could not measure up to prevailing standards were assigned the “servile role” of assisting in domestic production.68

The master/servant relation (as understood by Aristotle, and strange as it may sound to post-modern ears) was for the good of both parties involved. In this respect, it differed from the husband/wife and parent/child relations, which served exclusively the interests of the protected parties. Enslavement by force is to be condemned, in Aristotle’s view, and so is “equality” among unequals. Equality among equals, that is, the citizens of a polis, and what he considered as “natural servitude,” was approved.⁶⁹

But it should be obvious that such thorny issues as natural slavery and political equality and inequality demand extensive treatment, which cannot be provided here.

Conclusion

In the light shed by our synoptic analysis of the Aristotelian road to enlightenment, we may now see clearly the nobility of this Hellenic conception of the human telos and his ability to assign to human beings a privileged place in the cosmos, mediating between gods and beasts. Above all, his readiness to acknowledge man’s affinity and potential friendship with the philosophically conceived God (the Divine Intellect that erotically attracts and noetically governs the cosmos) is apparent here. Evidently, he made a heroic philosophic effort to conceptually grasp the entire cosmos, in all its multiplicity of accidental and substantial beings, including the complex human being and the divine ousia . In his attempt to provide a reasoned account of all human experiences (aesthetic, logical, noetic, ethical and political), Aristotle succeeded in developing a comprehensive system of rational thought. This system naturally reached beyond the Western “rationality” of discursive reason (logos ), moving towards the noetically intuitive nous , and even towards the intelligible and divine realm of Nous.

Because of this solid basis, there is no doubt that Aristotle’s system is one of the most complete and influential philosophical systems, which the Hellenic minds, produced. For our synoptic discussion has shown that the reasoned account of the Aristotelian road to enlightenment ( via dialectica ) is based on sense experience ( empeiria ) and discursive reasoning ( logos ). But it, significantly, includes the intuitive and self-validating activity of the mind, that is, the respectively (eternally and temporally) energized intellects of God ( Nous ) and of man ( nous ). Thus, the conventional gap separating the human and the divine realms of intelligent activity, as well as the gulf allegedly dividing the East and the West culturally, has been here dialectically and satisfactorily bridged.

In this important sense, then, Aristotle would seem to have been something more than a mere “rationalist,” simple, cold, and dry. If this be so, I would like to think that I have done my “peripatetic duty” of defending Aristotle against the unfair charges of those who like to dump on him the accumulated intellectual and other waste of the Western world in the last two millennia. Neither Aristotle, nor any other Platonic and genuinely Hellenic philosopher, would have approved of what the Modern European man, in his greedy desire for profit and his demonic will to power, has made out of Hellenic philosophia, forced to serve theocracy and technocracy, sometimes together.

For, in the eyes of the Ancient Hellenes, genuine philosophers (as opposed to Sophists) were supposed to contemplate the cosmic beauty, not to deform it by changing it. They were supposed to comprehend the cosmic order and to live in harmony with it, not to pollute it by exploiting it. Above all, hey were expected to provide prudent suggestions for the appropriate organization of human affairs so that the free spirit of inquiry and the flourishing of the human life of excellence would become possible for the human being as citizen. This being was conceived as living, sensitive, reasonable, communal, political, noetic and, (potentially, but essentially), a god-like being.70 Hence the urgent need felt by the few philosophically minded persons in Europe and the West today to return to their primordial philosophic roots, which were pre-Christian and pre-Islamic. The Platonic Aristotle, and the Hellenic philosophy in general, perhaps can guide their steps towards this noble goal.71