Army Air Defence in the Donbas in Spring 1943 (Case of 1257th Army Anti-Aircraft Air Defense Artillery Regiment)

Introduction. The article analyzes the history of the Soviet air defence of army rear services during the Great Patriotic War. The efficiency of the anti-aircraft artillery is investigated together with the measures taken for its increase in defending the stationary rear objects in the period of stabilization of the frontline. The author, on the one hand, reconstructs the course of the combat action, and on the other, retraces the changes in the structure of a certain anti-aircraft artillery unit while estimating its efficiency in quantitative equivalents in different conditions. Methods and materials. The paper is based on the archival materials of the 1257th Army Anti-aircraft Air Defence Artillery Regiment and of several higher headquarters, which are analyzed for the first time in the historical science. The combination of systems historical analysis with chronological and quantitative methods offers an effective way to achieve the stated goals. As no previous study has investigated the actions of the Soviet air defence units during the Great Patriotic War, the references of this paper include general works on the development of the air defence troops. Analysis. The 1257th Army Anti-aircraft Air Defence Artillery Regiment is quite typical of an anti-aircraft artillery unit, which could be used for both air defence of the troops on the frontline and in the rear and air defence of military and civil infrastructure objects in the combat zone. Chronologically, spring 1943 on the Soviet-German front was a period of accumulation of forces and resources before the decisive fight and of relative positional stability. The choice of the Donbas region is determined not only by a knowledge gap in the history of the question but also by modern political circumstances. Results. The complex analysis of the sources permitted revealing the causes of the low effectiveness of the lowaltitude anti-aircraft artillery (no aircraft was shot down). That was the result of the lack of training of the Red Army commanders and personnel and of the use of medium and high altitudes by the Luftwaffe. However, the mission of the air defence of troops and various objects by massive barrage fire preventing targeted bombing was accomplished to the fullest extent. Different means were used for improving the air defence efficiency, including organizational and staff changes. The results of the present research may be used in teaching military history and the history of the Great Patriotic War in the institutes of higher education as well as in the study of forms and methods of air defence warfare.