Atomism, «summa theologica» and B. Libet's experiments: contradictions in solutions to the problem of the subject's free will

The article deals with the contradictions that arise when solving the problem of the subject’s free will. A thesis is put forward that these contradictions are caused by the discrepancy between the views on free will and the ontological foundations from which they are derived. This thesis is consistently proved on the basis of both the historical and philosophical material and the modern discussion that unfolded after the discoveries of B. Libet and his followers. An analysis of the ideas of Thomas Aquinas reveals a number of insurmountable contradictions indicating the impossibility of combining the free will of a subject and the theological principle of providentialism. The approaches of the philosophers of the Renaissance and the New Age to the indicated problem are considered, these being associated with an attempt to overcome this contradiction and again turn philosophical thought to natural philosophy. The dialectical approach of Immanuel Kant is presented as taking a certain step toward resolving the contradictions through linking free will with the concept of morality and duty. The philosophical interpretation of B. Libet’s experiments is analyzed and the idea of conscious decisions of a person as determined by the activity of his neurons is refuted. Such an erroneous thesis is derived from the «flat ontology» paradigm. The popularity of this approach is due to the difficulty in resolving the psychophysiological problem and the lack of understanding of the mechanisms for the transition of biologically determined processes of the material substrate to the field of the ideal. The groundlessness of such a conclusion is explained by biological reduction and the vulgar materialistic approach of modern authors, similar to the ideas of Democritus or Epicurus, who derived free will from the movement of atoms. All the examples considered in the article clearly demonstrate the fallacy of attempts to derive free will or its absence from something external to a person. The thesis that free will must be immanently inherent in man is substantiated. To solve the problem of free will, it is necessary not only to rely on the data of scientific discoveries but also to approach their interpretation dialectically.