The Definition of the Autonomy of the Will and Its Significance in Private International Law

Introduction: within the framework of ongoing discussions regarding the legal nature of the autonomy of the will, various approaches to its resolution have been highlighted. A systematic analysis of these approaches and the scientific positions within each is necessary. This paper notes the ambiguity in interpreting the term “autonomy of the will.” It examines the relationship between the principle of choice of law and the principles of freedom of contract and dispositivity. As a result of the research, the paper emphasizes the appropriateness of using the term “autonomy of the will” to define the basis of dispositivity and freedom of contract within a broad context and, in a narrower traditional sense, to define a principle of private international law. Contradictions in the various interpretations of the legal essence of autonomy of the will are evident. It is viewed as the possibility of choice of law based on sectoral principles, as one of the conditions of foreign economic transactions or other agreements between participants in private international law relations, and as a conflict of laws principle (element of introduction, rule). Conclusions: the autonomy of the will (in the sense of choice of law) differs from other conflict of laws principles and takes precedence over them. The principles of dispositivity and freedom of contract fully apply to private law relations of an international nature. However, these principles should not be equated with autonomy of the will, nor should the latter be considered a component of them. Autonomy of the will, in a broad sense, underlies dispositivity and freedom of contract, but the possibility of choice of law should be limited to private international law relations and regarded as a principle of private international law. Considering the ambiguity of the term “autonomy of the will” and the content of the norms of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, this principle should be referred to as “the principle of choice of law.”