From “Munich-2007” to “Valdai-2023”: sixteen years that changed Russia and the world

October 5, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the 20th session of the Valdai International Discussion Club; the speech was characterized by many experts as a continuation of his Munich speech delivered February 10, 2007.

In his speech, Vladimir Putin noted: “The world is too complicated and diverse to be subjected to one system, even if it is backed by the enormous power of the West accumulated over centuries of its colonial policy... Lasting peace will only be possible when

Experts on Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Valdai Forum, October 5, 2023:

• 1.    “The scale and significance of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 20th meeting of the Valdai Club can be compared only with those of the 2007 Munich speech ... In the 2000s, Russia was just returning to the arena of big politics, but 16 years later Moscow is setting global trends around the world. In the mid-2000s our leader outlined the vector of Russia’s national interests and was the first among the leaders of the countries to speak out against the arbitrariness of the West; today Putin sets the guidelines for the future development of all humankind, the architecture of the global world order, which billions of people around the world want to see”¹.

• 2.    “The speech of Russia’s President at the plenary session of the 20th session of the Valdai International Discussion Club was announced as very informative and very important, which raised expectations comparable to the 2007 Munich speech and the 2014 Valdai speech. And such expectations were not unreasonable” ².

• 3.    The concept of international relations presented by Vladimir Putin is “seriously prepared, well-elaborated and deep-felt” ³.

• 4.    “The president remains true to himself; he always delivers very significant speeches. This speech gives an idea of how Putin and the entire Russian leadership sees the world around them, how we will build our international relations in the near future, what is important for us, what positions are important in foreign policy... a lot of attention was paid to the issue of civilizations: how they will interact with each other and coexist. All this, of course, will be discussed over the next year by experts at the international level and in Russia”⁴.

everyone feels safe and secure, understands that their opinions are respected, and that there is a balance in the world where no one can unilaterally force or compel others to live or behave as a hegemon pleases” ⁵ .

In fact, the assessment of the world situation given by Vladimir Putin can be considered the quintessence of the geopolitical processes and events taking place before our eyes since the beginning of the special military operation (SMO).

The SMO has been going on for 18 months, and against this background, the contours of a multipolar world are becoming more dynamic and more clearly manifested:

V following the six countries that will become new BRICS members as of 2024, more than 40 States have expressed interest in joining the BRICS, of which 22 have already submitted official applications ⁶ ;

V 130 countries and 30 international organizations took part in the 3rd Belt and Road International Forum held in Beijing on October 17–18, 2023. Moreover, the Russian President was the guest of honor at this event, and of all the countries of the so-called Collective West only Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban participated in the forum.

At the same time, the situation on the battlefield in the course of achieving the goals of the SMO – the main “trigger” of global changes and the

“This process is based on objective reality. The multipolar world is creating by itself, as a matter of fact. We can speed up this process or someone can try to slow it down and maybe even achieve some kind of reduction in the pace of building a multipolar world. Anyway, its creation is inevitable. It is happening on its own because of the growing potential of many countries, including, not least, the growing potential of the People’s Republic of China. India is growing in Asia, Indonesia is also growing, many other nations in Latin America like Brazil, and Russia is getting back on its feet and gaining strength. Our countries do have their problems, and what countries don’t? There are always problems of some kind. But it’s not about that, i t’s about growing our potential, and this growth is evident, including in the economic sphere” ⁷ .

“Major global events should be interpreted through the prism of the rise of multipolarity and the decline of unipolarity... Russia holds the front, and this is very important for a multipolar wave. Maybe more important than anything else. After all, it was Russia that was the first to enter into direct military conflict with the stubborn unipolar globalist system, which the Biden administration and the Neocons guiding it are desperately trying to save”⁸.

formation of a multipolar world – continues to remain under the control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

However, the real situation in the world indicates that the global hegemon and its satellites are still very

“The Ukrainian authorities had planned a spring offensive campaign, followed by a summer and now an autumn campaign, but they have not achieved any notable success in any of them... Overall, the situation appears stable and secure. The troops are acting professionally and displaying heroism on many fronts. They are confident that they will not only hold their positions, but also continue to implement the plans we have outlined” ⁹ .

far from recognizing the objectivity and inevitability of the onset of multipolarity. The outbreak of military conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh ¹⁰ and the Gaza Strip ¹¹ , attempts to once again find a “Russian trace” in the explosion at the Finnish gas pipeline Balticconnector ¹² , transfer of long-range ATACMS missiles to the “Kiev regime” by the United States ¹³ – all this indicates that the Collective West continues to desperately regain the power it is losing; this ultimately leads to numerous human casualties and increasing destabilization of world security, not only in the Middle East, but also within the countries of the Collective West itself (against the background of the conflict in the Gaza Strip, “Europe was swept by a wave of protests in defense of Palestine” ¹⁴ ).

According to Russian experts, the United States “has created at least five points of tension, each of which can escalate into a global conflict: the Russia– NATO conflict in Ukraine, the conflict in the Middle East, the intervention of the American administration in relations between China and Taiwan, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and finally, the situation around the Korean Peninsula” ¹⁵ .

For Russia itself, the desperate attempts of the Collective West to prevent the objective process of the onset of multipolarity pose a special threat.

Partly because Russia continues to remain “in the epicenter of geopolitical turbulence”.

Partly based on the historically established “philosophy”, the “paradigm” of the Collective West to “crush” any country that shows at least some signs of strengthening sovereignty.

“In February 2022, with the launch of Russia’s special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine, a deglobalization of the global geopolitical space (GGPS) began. Since then, Russia has been in the epicenter of geopolitical turbulence and has become the main actor in the Non-West coalition”¹⁶.

Experts note that in the course of the war with Russia the Collective West “can blow up the situation in the South Caucasus at any moment if it decides to open a second front... especially in light of the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive” ¹⁷ .

Attempts to destabilize the global situation and the continuing threats to national security for our country indicate that the “lasting peace” that

Vladimir Putin spoke about at the Valdai Forum will come very soon. And while Russia is still “in the epicenter of geopolitical turbulence” the situation inside the country continues to play a key role in its stability and external security; the willingness of the general population to support the course of foreign and domestic policy implemented by the RF President, despite economic sanctions from the Collective West or the ever-growing threats to military security.

From the point of view of global processes and Russia’s role in them, it is necessary to analyze the results of one of the most important internal political events – election, which is the most representative tool for measuring society’s attitude toward power and which has a direct impact on the situation regarding political forces in the country.

The results of the federal elections over the past 20 years (presidential, parliamentary, as well as the results of the all-Russian referendum on amendments to the Constitution, which were initiated by the head of state in January 2020 ¹⁹ ) show that the majority of the country’s population supports the course of domestic and foreign policy pursued by Vladimir Putin and United Russia, the current party of power which has a constitutional majority in the State Duma.

Thus, in the latest presidential election (March 18, 2018), the share of votes cast for Vladimir Putin was 77%; his initiative to amend the Constitution of the Russian Federation was supported by 79% of voters (Tab. 1) . The United Russia party received 50–54% of votes in the last three parliamentary elections (in 2011, 2016 and 2021) (Tab. 2).

Between the key (federal) elections, Russia annually holds regional and municipal level elections, the importance of which is determined, on the one hand, by the fact that they represent an intermediate “slice” of society’s assessment of the activities of authorities (formed taking into account the current political and economic situation in the country and in a particular region); on the other hand, by the fact that they affect the local level of public authority closest to people’s specific problems, expectations and needs.

Table 1. Dynamics of Russian voters’ support for the current course of domestic and foreign policy in federal elections (presidential elections)

	Presidential elections										All-Russian vote on amendments to the Constitution June 25 – July 1, 2020
	March 26, 2000		March 14, 2004		March 2, 2008		March 4, 2012		March 18, 2018
	people	%	people	%	people	%	people	%	people	%	people	%
Number and share of votes cast for Vladimir Putin *	39 740 434	52.94	49 565 238	71.31	52 530 712	70.28	45 602 075	63.60	56 430 712	76.69	57 747 288	78.45

* Including the number and share of votes cast for Dmitry Medvedev in the presidential election on March 2, 2008, as well as for amendments to the Constitution initiated by Vladimir Putin in 2020.

Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation .

Table 2. Dynamics of Russian voters’ support for the current course of domestic and foreign policy in federal elections (parliamentary elections)

Elections to the RF State Duma December 7, 2003 December 2, 2007 December 4, 2011 September 18, 2016 September 17–19, 2021 people % people % people % people % people % Number and share of votes cast for United Russia* 22 776 294 37.56 44 714 241 64.30 32 371 737 49.31 28 527 828 54.20 28 064 200 49.82 * In 2003, party head was B. Gryzlov; in 2007, 2011 – V. Putin, in 2016, 2021 – D. Medvedev. Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation .

19 Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly on January 15, 2020. Available at:

It is precisely because of these two features that the results of regional and municipal elections are of particular interest in terms of assessing the current state of society itself, in particular its psychological stability and readiness to continue to endure certain hardships against the background of external challenges and related internal restrictions that Russia has faced since the beginning of the SMO.

Every year elections are held under certain external and internal political, economic, social and psychological conditions that influence the opinion of voters and are ultimately reflected in the voting results. For example, on September 14, 2014, regional and municipal elections were held against the backdrop of the “Crimean spring” and the currency crisis caused, among other things, by Western economic sanctions against Russia. The regional and municipal elections of September 9, 2018 ²⁰ were held against the background of negative perception of the pension reform by the majority of Russian voters; the draft law on the reform was submitted to the State Duma by order of RF Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on June 16, 2018.

September 10, 2023, the Single Voting Day was held in Russia. According to experts, it became “the major one in several years and the last before the presidential campaign of 2024” ²¹ .

Election campaigns and local referendums of various levels were held “in 85 out of 89 constituent entities of the Russian Federation” ²² in very specific conditions associated with an unprecedentedly higher level of threats to Russia’s national security, including ongoing hostilities in the course of achieving the goals of the SMO, terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Russian regions, sanctions, an attempted armed coup carried out by Evgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, on June 24, 2023, etc.

This predetermined the general leitmotif of the vote: “One of the key features of this election campaign can be considered that it took place in the conditions of unprecedented consolidation of society, unification around the president and the flag ” ²³ . In addition, awareness of the scale of threats to national security influenced the final election results: “Turnout has become a record for ten years – since 2013 at this level of elections, without taking into account federal votes… All the current governors, as well as the acting ones, retained their posts. Of these, only two heads of regions were elected from the Communist Party, all the others were from United Russia” ²⁴ .

However, without downplaying the significance of the main results of the last vote it is necessary to pay attention to its individual nuances, which also reflect the attitude of society toward the authorities and which represent a kind of “signals” that must be taken into account in order to have an adequate and complete picture of the situation in the country.

First, the last elections demonstrated an increase in support not only for United Russia, but also for other (opposition) parties. Experts noted: “United Russia reported on gaining top positions”, but, as it turned out, not only the party in power was successful. The Communist Party, the LDPR, “Just Russia – For the Truth” (SRZP) and even “Yabloko” reported their relative achievements ” ²⁵ .

Second, a significant increase in turnout, compared with the previous elections, took place only in a small number of territories. Thus, in the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities the share of people who took part in the vote significantly increased only in four out of 21 RF constituent entities (Tab. 3; Inserts 1A–2A).

A similar situation is typical for regions’ centers: in the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities, the turnout significantly increased in five municipalities and decreased in nine (Insert 1B) . At the legislative elections, a significant increase in turnout is noted only in three regional centers, a decrease is noted in ten (Insert 2B) . At the elections of deputies of representative bodies of municipalities, the turnout increased in four municipalities, decreased in seven (Insert 3) .

We should note that one of the important factors influencing the dynamics of people’s participation in elections is the standard of living and quality of life. This is evidenced by official statistics. For example, in the regions that showed the largest increase in turnout for the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities in 2023, the share of the population living below the poverty line is

“This season, special attention is paid to turnout indicators. Apparently, because in six months they will need to be given special importance in view of the March 2024 presidential election”26.

on average 8–9%; in regions where turnout has significantly decreased – 10–12% (Tab. 4) . The indicators of retail trade turnover in the territories that demonstrated an increase and decrease in turnout are, respectively, 173 and 142 thousand rubles per capita. The volume of provision of paid services to the population in regions with an increased turnout grew from 59 to 64 thousand rubles per capita; in regions that showed a decrease in voter turnout – decreased from 63 to 55 thousand rubles.

Table 3. Dynamics of turnout for the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities in regions with an increase in turnout by 10 percentage points or more, % of voters

Territory Single Voting Day September 9, 2018 Single Voting Day September 10, 2023 Dynamics (+/-) Moscow Oblast 38.59 60.53 +22 Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 40.51 56.01 +16 Kemerovo Oblast – Kuzbass 66.47 81.01 +15 Moscow 30.94 43.18 +12 TOTAL 44.13 60.18 +16 Source: calculated according to official data of the CEC of the Russian Federation .

Table 4. Dynamics of indicators of standard of living and quality of life in the regions that demonstrated the maximum increase and decrease in turnout in the 2023 elections

Group of regions	Share of the population with per capita money income below the poverty line, % of the total population			Retail trade turnover per capita, thousand rubles			Volume of paid services provided to the population per capita, thousand rubles
	2018	2022	(+/-)	2018	2022	(+/-)	2018	2022	(+/-)
Regions with the maximum increase in turnout in 2023 compared to 2018*	9.33	7.48	-1.85	183	173	-9	59	64	+5
Regions with the maximum decrease in turnout in 2023 compared to 2018**	12.33	10.38	-1.95	128	142	+14	63	55	-9

* Moscow Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast – Kuzbass, Moscow.

** Magadan Oblast, Altai Krai, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Omsk Oblast (for more details see Insert 1).

Source: calculated according to official data of the CEC of the Russian Federation .

Insert 1

Source: calculated according to official data of the CEC of the Russian Federation .

A significant (more than 10 percentage points) increase in turnout for the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities is observed only in four regions (Moscow Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast – Kuzbass, Moscow) and five regional centers (Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Kemerovo, Moscow, Blagoveshchensk). For comparison, a decrease in turnout for these elections was noted in eight regions and nine regional centers.

Insert 2

At the elections of deputies of legislative bodies of RF constituent entities, the turnout significantly increased in two regions (Smolensk and Kemerovo oblasts) and three regional centers (Ufa, Kemerovo and Smolensk). In ten RF constituent entities and ten regional centers, voter turnout for these elections decreased.

Insert 3

At the elections of deputies of representative bodies of municipalities, the maximum increase in turnout was noted in Maykop (by 9 percentage points, from 22 to 31%). In general, the turnout increased in four cities (Maykop, Krasnoyarsk, Belgorod, Volgograd); it decreased in seven cities.

Third, the 2023 elections were accompanied by a number of changes in the voting procedure itself, and these features also contributed to the final increase in turnout and support for United Russia in 2023 compared to 2018.

V For example, a multi-day voting format was introduced: in most RF constituent entities elections were held from September 8 to 10 ²⁷ .

V In 25 RF constituent entities the format of remote electronic voting (REV) was used, and in 18 regions – for the first time ²⁸ . According to RF Central Election Commission Chair E. Pamfilova, “more than 3 million voters took part in remote electronic voting” ²⁹ .

In the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities, the average turnout for elections in electronic form (96 percentage points in % of the number of voters registered to participate in REV) significantly exceeded the average turnout in the region (45 percentage points in % of the number of voters; Tab. 5). However, the support for candidates from the United Russia party was slightly lower (77 p.p. according to the results of REV against 80 p.p. on average in the region).

V Finally, in 2023, new Russian regions took part in the elections for the first time – the DPR, the LPR, the Kherson and Zaporozhye oblasts, which showed a higher level of turnout and support for United Russia than the average for other constituent entities and municipalities of the Russian Federation (Tab. 6) .

Table 5. Results of the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities on September 10, 2023 in the territories that used remote electronic voting

Territory	Turnout		Share of votes cast for the United Russia party
	REV, % of the number of registered persons	For the region on the whole, % of voters	According to the REV results, % of turnout	For the region on the whole, % of turnout
Altai Krai	88.56	31.04	79.25	76.12
Voronezh Oblast	86.00	51.08	59.81	76.78
Moscow Oblast	88.22	60.53	79.23	83.60
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	86.91	56.01	81.80	82.69
Novosibirsk Oblast	85.48	31.86	71.66	75.67
Pskov Oblast	90.55	37.8	87.76	86.17
Moscow	98.22	43.18	77.05	75.16
TOTAL	95.62	44.5	76.65	79.46

Source: calculated according to official data of the CEC of the Russian Federation .

Table 6. Comparison of election results on September 10, 2023 in the context of new regions and other constituent entities of the Russian Federation

Election results In the context of new RF constituent entities In the context of other RF constituent entities Dynamics (+/-) In the context of new RF constituent entities compared to other regions Legislative elections Turnout, % of voters 71.14 38.31 +33 Share of votes cast for United Russia, % of turnout 77.52 56.52 +21 Elections to representative bodies of municipalities of regional centers of RF constituent entities Turnout, % of voters 63.54 33.14 +30 Share of votes cast for United Russia, % of turnout 77.46 50.68 +27 Source: calculated according to official data of the CEC of the Russian Federation .

Thus, the local successes of the opposition parties, which experts note, and the calculations that we conducted using official data of the RF Central Election Commission, and the innovations in the voting procedure that characterized the 2023 elections and that affected the increase in voter turnout, allow us to agree with the assessment of experts who argue that the results of the last elections are “a much more complicated phenomenon” ³⁰ than just a “consolidation effect” or “unity around the flag”.

In fact, the results of the Single Voting Day on September 10, 2023 prove that against the

“Of course, in the electoral sentiment was greatly influenced by anxiety caused by the SMO; the demand for stability and predictability became more pronounced, even concerning the things that are closest and most understandable, the life “behind the fence” ...

In a country where mobilization took place in just one year, major failures occurred at the front, a military mutiny failed, and in the rear the prices for essential goods and food were going up dramatically. Yet, there were a lot of positive things, but it is these phenomena that most often put pressure on the voter and provoke a reassessment of the situation regarding the command and political link ”³¹.

background of the general consolidation of the majority of the population (quite naturally caused by the urgency of external and internal threats that Russia faced after the start of the SMO), a request to the authorities to bring the behavior and specific actions of the elites in line with the publicly declared rhetoric of the state continues to accumulate in society.

Russians support the general course pursued by the RF President and the party in power and aimed at protecting Russia’s sovereignty and national interests; however, the people do not find an answer to the question of how some facts that characterize Russia’s current public administration system relate to the image of the future that is actively declared by the authorities, namely, the image of a social state based on traditional cultural values and possessing full national sovereignty.

Insert 4 provides examples of the facts under consideration. We should note that science, culture, economics, and the system of public administration contain many such cases, for example the article by V. Garbuzov, director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies, “On the lost illusions of the passing era”, or a book by the writer D. Bykov* (recognized as foreign agent), the information about which is presented in the governmental newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta.

End of Insert 4

These examples proceed directly from the fact that the Russian elites (not only political, but also cultural and economic) still preserve the “liberal

“Three decades ago, the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of Russia, the highest body of state power, were shot. The consequences of this event are still being felt – it actually predetermined the trajectory of Russia’s evolution for these thirty years. And it will continue to do so if we do not condemn this crime and do not draw the appropriate conclusions…

The main disadvantage of the authoritarian system of power is the irresponsibility of officials who, in exchange for loyalty to their superior, allow themselves to abuse their official powers in favor of personal interests. Such systems are characterized by corruption and incompetence , which are the natural result of recruiting personnel according to the criterion of personal loyalty . As a result, the so-called “thug capitalism” , well-known from the experience of the third world countries, is formed; it is an authoritarian-oligarchic government regime devoid of incentives for development and headed by persons close to the supreme ruler… Without correcting the malfunctions in the activities of various branches of government it is hardly possible to win over an enemy that is many times superior in its financial and economic power ”⁴⁰.

fog” that enveloped Russia after the October 1993 coup d’etat and that has lingered for 30 years before the SMO. The fog has taken the form of “thug” capitalism, which today represents an actual threat to the achievement of SMO goals and a threat to the very existence of Russia as a country. Moreover, this is not only because the officials disregard the President’s instructions, but also because such behavior contradicts the image of the future of Russia officially declared by the authorities and the RF President; consequently, society becomes unstable and vulnerable to external informational and ideological influences.

The feeling of helplessness, misunderstanding, or treacherous sentiments is noted in the assessments of representatives of elite circles (business, government, science) regarding the current course implemented by the head of state. This is indicated by the results of VCIOM opinion polls conducted among the participants of the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, which was held on June 14–17, 2023 ⁴¹ :

V 49% of Russian entrepreneurs and officials find it difficult to answer the question “Do you think the current economic policy of the Russian Government corresponds to the concept of sovereign development of Russia?” (Fig. 1) ;

V 30% believe that “the country’s authorities should strive for the lifting of sanctions, even if this means making some concessions in foreign policy” (Fig. 2) .

Figure 1. Do you think the current economic policy of the Russian Government corresponds to the concept of sovereign development of Russiat?

(closed-ended question, one answer, % of respondents)

Figure 2. Should the Russian authorities seek the lifting of sanctions, even if it means making some concessions in foreign policy?* (closed-ended question, one answer, % of respondents)

14.5

Sooner should

Other

Sooner shouldn't

It's difficult to answer

* The exact wording of the question: “There is an opinion that Russia’s authorities do not need to pay attention to Western sanctions, but should stick to the current course in foreign policy. Another opinion is that Russia’s authorities should strive to lift sanctions, even if this means making some concessions in foreign policy. Which of the opinions do you most agree with: should Russia’s authorities rather seek the lifting of sanctions or should they rather not?”

Source: Sovereignty as a path to prosperity. VCIOM analytical report. 2023. Pp. 11, 15.

These facts indicate that there is still a split among the Russian elites in understanding the essence of the current situation and in the attitude toward it. Despite the fact that the head of state continues to make decisions aimed at supporting the participants of the SMO and strengthening the information and ideological agenda in the current and future generations of Russian society that corresponds to the spirit of the SMO

(Insert 5) , many experts point out that Russia has not yet formulated a holistic ideological project that could be translated to the key participants of today’s geopolitical processes and that would be a unifying idea for all strata of Russian society.

It seems that without such an ideological project aimed primarily at the domestic Russian audience (and especially its elites), it will be extremely difficult to implement more specific management decisions needed today to strengthen the Russian economy and increase its ability to develop effectively in the face of internal and external challenges (Insert 6).

“ The President of Russia has taken initial steps to correct the most obvious flaws of the political system that developed after the coup of 1993. The Constitution abolished the presumption of international obligations over national legislation, noted the importance of traditional family values, mentioned God. This implies the need to restore an ideology based on traditional values .

It is necessary to take the next step – to establish the principles of personal responsibility of officials and political responsibility of the executive power for the objective results of their activities...

In order to gain the Victory in the global hybrid war, we need to quickly get out of the destructive quagmire of irresponsibility, incompetence, corruption and immorality, in which we were stuck for a long time as a result of the coup d’etat in the fall of 1993 ”⁴³.

Insert 5

и ы to ь о и Я Q d и s£ и о S g=i н ь ь н о 42 to Pd о ^ Q ы о н Н 4 ОТ 2 ей 5 1° ^ 5 и 1“ ь ^ зЗ Q 4 Si от Z У to |° Рч и 2 е 5 5| Eg Н г. ей Z ОО о d н во от о ей z

^ ”5 “ ■е я у М >■ ОНО h а гп §2 о ” $ К to .2 "га 2 я д у у ■в у у „8га * 8 а ю 45 и 5    43 © св 2 5 8 5 я а а ® ” о о Н .& и Й Я У ,о 2 Я я у 2 о * to я 8 .& ® Р с 2 см о ад г « ©уф ^ $1 Л) я S -О 8 -е ^ «2 Я 8 Е m ад Я QO Ф © © Ф © ^ 18 1 to R 60 ° © 45 я 2 н За' = 51 Ф я 2 ^ я 5 У Г4 у 5 О № о СМ § 5^5 8-8 2 я 8 5 5 2 я i z Р О 2 1 2 - 5. S № м и м 6 , у — ^84 8 1 I у я 5 а у to У  а от и у ® to 6

© я сл Ф я-£“ Я Ф- ад я о 'я ф о © я 1 .2 я S © о 5 я © 8 О о Q wN wN Ф и ф а ф со

я Н © (О и © 6 © 2 О © © © а а "я ■5 © 8 я я "я 'ад я '© © © 8 © © 5 ад 11 р to "я -© ь 00 6 1 © я а -У ад О

и? н Z 2 И сл ой Z 22 §3 tn У У Z К ей у У О о < Z У У ® р У У ё й в° ё§ el R “ Is ё z ip О б Й Q У Ы О У у у У о ? о О у У У S

0) © н 5 N Я йЗ Z о У ^ а „м О ш 2 "а ■е у © ад Р5 О & ев ^ S о а У о У о 1 я о О Q ® 1 5 R ‘о « .2 а о С = г а Я см О м о а У С1 1 и -ф гЯ Q Я я у Я 8    2 8 1 й о я 5 m У 8 5 2 я у -я а 8 -Я Qua 3 & L Я ’Л и — ' у 2 8 О й 00 § оо .2 2 11 .8 ф V 44 f 1 •« а о V2 у 23 За S О

у -О см у у % У « О а § g . а    О Й О Я  " а у  । z        8 8 2 я у а Я  У  а 'С Я Ф й    >—< 5 2 2 и я я "а    а а 'Я я - оо" у S у Ё я        1/1 S у S Я 2 У a g у £ 44 со ^ ь щ Й -а 2 о о й .2 8 о   к Й 2 °    S -о У i  у £ 2 a, SU   д "Я S бо у .2 .я § к      2 щ « 5 = ° 5 У Й я .2 ® й щ а Я У а дг я .5 С а я) § У    м й ” У to   а      - 8          $ .2 § ев 45          "53      "уЗ ь а У 5   S 2 а д          я я .2 © й   5 о 2 -Я а О g   У 00 о О о у я У И $ .й д -Я я 4   я .2   - а Я а ф     О .4 ф Он 5 2 2 а ° О § О jl §    У   д     R "я ^ 5 .5 Д а" У я Я О\ У я Я о я      м .2 о S Q о оо" 2 га а Я So у а 5 ° я О -^ Я О    у Я а ^ н2    ° а . 2 Ё я 2 У 5 to 2 °      й а S 5 .2 о 2 1                             -fl ■   ф      ф ад £ 8 а "Я д Я У 1   У я   Я а a U га U 2 ° 5га й     с В о 5 я О 2 а ® & а га > 2 О 2 У a g S а 8 S S 4 а У to '5 У О О

55 ^ ф С Ф ° g to)     а й ■й у & у 2 2нё Su ° У У 4 Е У 4 га С С й О "Я g 2 8 5 2 ° я V) св hJ Ф Ф с s ^ .2 ТУ -у- св S § у Е 55 Ф ф Ф Й X 43 ад ф ф ф с ад -о * а св с ©       -г У й О 1 а 2 8 я С й ф Mtoi g у to о * 4 2 о § 2 2 6 я .2 U 2 a g а = Я S о Я © § VD Ф *^      и-fl .Д Я Ф О у g а-8 у ^ Я S У 3 у 2 £ 4 5 о § $ А Д о у <2 2 и 6 я я .2 _ о о я ® 5 у to я -И 5 У Я а Я Ё ^.2 8 я 4 га Q а я Е я 5 Я 2 а Я гл а дз U я g -О я У op g у у      ° и 2   " Уд - -й Q га $ Я <Ч S а .Ь R О   С у я у га | 31 2 д а ф О 45 С

45 to to 'св 'ад 5 ф к у У Я У Й С я га га a to Я У о га я 4 о У to -® ” S to О а Д га а" 4'4 Е я 8 ” to 'Я я а Я й CZ 7 2 a to я 2 Я 2§ 8 Rato я я у О Я га й § -^ У   Я 0 g У О to Sa Д Ф ” 4 а 0 Я а га о у to 'Е to о to у 2 а § 2 to ® я .2 я а Я О 4 Я га .2 ” га О л S га a S я S ад я л § с 4 ” я^| ° У О 4 ад О а ад а 4 U

Insert 6

Е о в

ф ti л

Pd

ti ф

«

ы> в •S

Е в

в

ф М) М)

ф е.

р

9'

к о t о к о

з

=<

о

о

к о Е р р

Е о к о

р

8 О

S

к

3 S

к

3 о

3 ^

3 о S

3 •8 S

К S О к

р

О

к 3

3 к

о

к

=4

5 к

I

В

-О

О'

Е

8 3

8 В

-О

р к к з

§ 8

S

S ЁР

р з

р

О'

о

в •Е с-

к 3

S

"с?

р

к

р

s:

t: о

о

о

к 3

о о о о

к 3

о

О'

р

к

к

к з з'

S

Е о

о р

Е

к о S

,Е

з

^

3 о

S

Ъ

О р

к о Е

^ к 3 Е

8 О Е

Е о к о

О'

3 Ъ

s: о

о s: о

-о

В

в

SJ в 3

в

6S

•Е 60 •Е Е в в

Ьо

в

S 3

к

В

§ 8

,Е в

р к к з

В

р

Е Е о

В I Е

•Е 60 ,8

в

к

S

S

6о в -5

8 В

В

в

к

о з р к

3 S

в §0

Е

Е о к о

р к о

Е ЁР

-О

к .3

Е о о

,8

Е

ьо

к 3

О'

о

§

Е

Е о в

.^

о

к

О' к

•S 8

s: о

к 3

р

к

о

к 3

§

Е

Е о в

ъ

р

Е'

к 3 8

§3

О' s:

к 3 р

8 О S

Е о в

8 3

В

о

<<) s: о

о

3 8

О' о Е з о

О'

к о

к 3

Е Е о

О'

О'

В

«

8 В

в .8

В

8 3

60 8

р 3' Е р

ьс 8

S 3 р к 3

г о

s р

3 о

s:

О'

о: з о

§0

р

к

к 3 о

.3 о 8 3 8

3 8

О'

О

к 3

о I

о

Е р

к

Е о к о

О'

■3 к

о

§0

к 3 о о о

р

ЁР

о

•о

3 Е

о =Ц

р к о

Е 3 р

=<

р

■^г к S

О'

р

к 3

8 О Е р р

Е о к о

о1

§3

о

Е' о к о

f

к

о

о

§ Е в

В

в

В

f

■3 8 В

ьс 8

S

8 3

а.

О!' О о р

§ в

8 о

ьс 8

2 в

В

I в 3

В

О' s:

Е р

3 S р 3 3

s:

к

Е Е о

о

S к 3

О' s:

Е

о

8 3

о s: о

о о

р

р

О1

S

к

Е

р

к 3 S

к

о

О'

о

р

К 3

s: о

р

о

о •о о

О'

к:

О' р р

Е

Е о к о

S

р 8s О

S 3

"о1

46 Glazyev S.Yu. Crime without the statute of limitations. Available at:

Excerpt from the speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club on October 5, 2023 ⁴⁷

6 points of the image of the future multipolar world:

First. We want to live in an open, interconnected world, where no one will ever try to put artificial barriers in the way of people’s communication, their creative fulfilment and prosperity...

Second. We want the world’s diversity to be preserved and serve as the foundation for universal development. It should be prohibited to impose on any country or people how they should live and how they should feel…

Third, Russia stands for maximum representation . No one has the right or ability to rule the world for others and on behalf of others…

Fourth, Russia stands for universal security and lasting peace built on respect for the interests of everyone: from large countries to small ones. The main thing is to free international relations from the bloc approach and the legacy of the colonial era and the Cold War…

Fifth, we stand for justice for all. The era of exploitation, as I said twice, is in the past. Everyone should be given access to the benefits of today’s world, and attempts to limit it for any country or people should be considered an act of aggression.

Sixth, we stand for equality, for the diverse potential of all countries. This is a completely objective factor. But no less objective is the fact that no one is ready to take orders anymore or make their interests and needs dependent on anyone, above all on the rich and more powerful. This is not just the natural state of the international community, but the quintessence of all of humankind’s historical experience”.

Russia as a civilization-state:

“In Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, our country is characterized as an original civilizationstate. This wording clearly and concisely reflects how we understand not only our own development, but also the main principles of international order, which we hope will prevail… there are many civilizations, and none is superior or inferior to another. They are equal since each civilization represents a unique expression of its own culture, traditions, and the aspirations of its people… The essential characteristics of a civilization-state encompass diversity and self-sufficiency, which, I believe, are two key components... Relying on your civilization is a necessary condition for success in the modern world, unfortunately a disorderly and dangerous world that has lost its bearings.

A truly effective and strong state system cannot be imposed from the outside. It grows naturally from the civilizational roots of countries and peoples, and in this regard, Russia is an example of how it really happens in life, in practice”.

Perhaps the six points of the image of the future multipolar world, as well as a clear understanding of Russia as a state-civilization, which Vladimir Putin formulated in his speech at the Valdai Forum in 2023, can become exactly such an idea that unites all layers of Russian society. Some experts called this combination “the concept of civilizational synergy, clearly and completely contradicting the concept of Great Reset advocated by modern globalism” ⁴⁸ . However, one cannot but agree that the viability of this concept will largely be decided “on the ground”, “on the battlefield”.

“The ‘main dish’ was the concept of civilizational synergy, which clearly and completely contradicts the concept of Great Reset advocated by modern Western globalism. Which of them is more in line with the ‘logic of the circumstances’ of the modern world, will be decided ‘on the ground’, ‘on the battlefield’; but now, very likely, an alternative has been announced to all humankind, backed up not only by the power of Russian weapons, but also by the power of the Russian idea”49.

That is why it seems important not only to keep record of the consolidation processes taking place in Russian society against the background of the SMO, but also to pay attention to internal threats that can hinder their development, including those that became evident according to the results of the 2023 election campaign: the more conscious and “civilly mature”⁵⁰ our society (namely, this trend was shown by the increase in voter turnout), the stronger will be its request to the authorities to replace the managerial elites who are unwilling or unable to meet the country’s national interests in the new conditions that have come with the beginning of the special military operation.

Today it is obvious that in the 16 years that have passed since Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech, Russia’s course to strengthen national sovereignty is not just inevitable, but is the only possible one , as well as the vector of transformation of the entire world architecture from the unipolar hegemony of the Collective West to the formation of multipolar relations of sovereign civilization states. This can be called the result of the past period and the main result of the RF President’s work.