Grammatical and communicative interpretation of predication in H. Putnam’s theorem

Putnam’s theorem in which the author volens nolens opposes communicative and logical-grammatical predication, shows that the natural verbal subject-predicate construction becomes sense-generating just as a communicative act, but not as the Aristotelean judgment deprived of a communicative actionality. The actual verbal sentence is interpreted by a speaker and then by an interpretant as the action in the communicative space. The reference (which is searched by Putnam) is fixed by the very action which is identically thought by a speaker. A starting point of the communicative interpretation is the imaginable communicative syntagm which contains the numerous data established by a speaker and posed outside verbal forms. The communicative approach to predication gives an opportunity to interpret the predication in the cases which are traditionally not available for the logical representation of predicativity (including the concept of actual division of an utterance). In the article the point of view is provided Putnam’s theorem is sooner proved towards the logical-grammatical predication. However, the natural predicativity is in fact not regarded by him. Natural verbal data "are not grasped" with the logical-grammatical tools due to the "sign-meaning" concept accepted within the logical-grammatical interpretation of predicativity.