Issues of Russia's transition to the new stage of its nation-building

Автор: Ilyin Vladimir Aleksandrovich

Журнал: Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast @volnc-esc-en

Рубрика: From the chief editor

Статья в выпуске: 5 (41) т.8, 2015 года.

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ID: 147223774 Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/147223774

Текст ред. заметки Issues of Russia's transition to the new stage of its nation-building

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in a situation when all the ties existing between the republics of the Union were broken, ethnic relations deteriorated sharply, the social consequences of political and economic crisis aggravated. All this plunged millions of people into despair and led to an unprecedented differentiation of the society into the rich and the poor; it also caused an upsurge of social and political tensions, an increase in mortality, including mortality from suicide, which meant that Russian people were psychologically unable to adapt to the new conditions of life. In fact, the current “hybrid warfare”1 against Russia was waged in that very period.

Many people link the new stage of the Russian history to the consequences of the “Crimean spring” (when Crimea and Sevastopol joined the Russian Federation) and to President Putin’s successful foreign policy (especially in relation to the U.S. and the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria). However, in our opinion, this new stage started back in 2000, when, as a result of compromised decisions of various political forces, Vladimir Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation2, which was followed by efforts to overcome degradation processes in Russia’s economy and to eliminate profound consequences of the “turbulent 1990s”.

The period of stabilization of the political and economic situation allowed the Russian society to accumulate a critical mass in anticipation of change, to relate the Western values that penetrated into Russia in the early 1990s to the Russians’ own mentality. In our view, this was a crucial and an integral part of the new stage of Russian statehood.

After a while, the policy aimed at stabilization ceased to meet the demands of the people – the society needed new ideas and actual steps that would make people proud of their country, just like the people of the past were proud of the achievements of the USSR: social protection, outstanding achievements in science, sport and art, and, of course, the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the contribution of Soviet scientists to the exploration of outer space3.

The evidence that the post-Soviet society was developing a need for national identity became clear in 2007 when Vladimir Putin delivered his speech at the Munich Security Conference (February 2007). In the speech, the President of the Russian Federation for the first time “demonstrated the fundamental will of Russia, as a planetary geopolitical power, to participate in shaping the future world order”4.

We can assume that the second step was Vladimir Putin’s speech at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in September 2013. It was “the first large-scale attempt on the part of Russia’s authorities to formulate a new political ideology for Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and to consider from a critical perspective the issue concerning the values that must make the foundation of the new Russian identity, Eurasian peace and international relations”5.

After that, public attention was focused on the successful performance of the Russian team at the Olympic Games in Sochi (February 2014), accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation (March 2014), armed aggression against the Donbass population launched by the Ukrainian authorities. All these events could not but strengthen the consolidation of different social groups and adherents of various political viewpoints.

It was not only the idea of revival of the “Russian world” and restoration of Russia’s status as a major center of multipolar world order that has consolidated the people of Russia. Consolidation of the society was facilitated by concrete measures that the President took to “return Crimea and Sevastopol to their native harbor”6, and by the successful efforts on the part of Russia’s authorities that managed to implement successfully and in the shortest possible period the mega-project for building the sports, transport and tourist infrastructure in the framework of t he Winter Olympics in Sochi.

In the middle of 2010s many scientists said that Russia was on the threshold of a new stage in its development: after almost 15 years of waiting, a “new resurgent” Russia at last made the transition to a new – “bright and optimistic” – age7.

The new stage of Russia’s history is largely connected with the events unfolding on the world stage. This leads to the realization of the people’s need for national identity and for the return of the former greatness of the USSR that prior to its collapse was one of the two global superpowers.

Speaking at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, Vladimir Putin quite clearly outlined the possible consequences of this strategy of building relations with international partners: “It would suffice to look at the situation in the Middle East and North Africa... An aggressive foreign interference has resulted in a brazen destruction of national institutions and the lifestyle itself. Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress, we got violence, poverty and social disaster. Nobody cares a bit about human rights, including the right to life”10. Russian President stressed that such behavior represents an attempt to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the UN, which is an extremely dangerous act that can lead to the collapse of the entire architecture of international relations.

Besides, Vladimir Putin openly stated that in order to counter the spread of terrorism, Russia provides military and technological assistance to Iraq, Syria and other countries that fight against terrorist groups in this region. The subsequent military operation of the Russian air force in Syria carried out at the formal request of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has shown that Russia in its fight against terrorism does not intend to do nothing but call for the establishment of an international coalition. Russia is willing to take real action on a legitimate basis.

Thus, if Vladimir Putin’s 2007 Munich Speech carried a message that Russia was capable of acquiring the status of one of the centers of multipolar world order, then eight years later, as it follows from the speech of the President of the Russian Federation at the Anniversary Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2015, it is already clear that each of his conceptual messages has concrete actions behind it, or, at least, actual readiness for such actions. The accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation, President Putin’s firm position concerning the Ukrainian and Syrian issues, the establishment of relations with foreign partners in compliance with the inner understanding of ideological development that is supported by the vast majority of Russia’s population, the pursuit of international politics from the position of equal partner (somewhere “walking a fine line”, but always within the framework of international law) – all these facts implement the need of the Russian society for national identity and are, perhaps, the main element in the current support of the President.

It is no coincidence that, in the opinion of the population, the head of state is most successful in “strengthening Russia’s international standing” (table) . According to the polls conducted by ISEDT RAS, 56% of Russians are proud of the country’s position in the international arena and 73% are proud of its military power.

However, if foreign policy becomes the unifying aspect that brings together representatives of various political forces and finds support in various strata of the Russian society, then the internal contradictions, which cha-racterize a very low level of

Table 1. In your opinion, how successful is the RF President in coping with challenging issues? (as a percentage of the number of respondents)

Indicator

2000

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Dynamics, 2015 г. +/- to

2000

2007

2014

Strengthening Russia’s international standing

Successful

42.3

58.4

55.1

49.5

49.9

46.2

43.1

45.6

50.4

51.4

+9

-7

+1

Unsuccessful

30.9

24.9

23.7

30.4

29.3

33.7

37.9

36.2

32.4

31.2

0

+6

-1

Imposing order in the country

Successful

31.4

53.2

48.2

39.1

41.1

36.6

35.4

39.4

48.0

50.1

+19

-3

+2

Unsuccessful

49.2

34.0

34.2

43.5

42.5

50.0

50.7

47.5

39.1

37.9

-11

+4

-1

Protecting democracy and strengthening the citizens’ freedoms

Successful

23.5

44.4

39.9

36.7

36.3

32.4

28.8

31.8

37.5

40.3

+17

-4

+3

Unsuccessful

43.8

37.0

35.9

41.5

42.6

48.3

52.3

51.0

45.4

41.0

-3

+4

-4

Economic recovery and increase in the citizens’ welfare

Successful

25.6

47.2

36.7

31.6

33.5

30.7

28.5

31.3

34.8

34.8

+9

-12

0

Unsuccessful

52.9

39.1

46.0

52.4

51.6

56.1

57.9

56.8

53.4

51.6

-1

+13

-2

administration in the socio-economic system, are still at the initial stage of their resolution and they make this system ineffective.

The late 1980s – early 1990s witnessed the establishment in Russia of an “oligarchcomprador” administration system; according to experts, it “aggravates the dramatic systemic crisis and expands it to the sphere of internal policy”11.

The change of technological modes and centuries-old cycles of accumulation is inevitably accompanied by a deep restructuring of economy on the basis of fundamentally new technologies and new mechanisms of reproduction of capital; this restructuring is the reason for the current escalation of international military and political tensions. Critical dependence on the imports of foreign technology can be overcome with the help of large-scale programs for import substitution that take into account material, financial and human resources available. This cannot be done within the existing system of economic regulation, which abandoned planning methods, the preparation of balance sheets, goal programming, science and technology forecasting or system design12.

  • 11    Gubanov S.S. Kompradorskii rezhim derzhitsya na voloske istorii: interv’yu S.S. Gubanova gazete «Biznes Online» ot 24.02.2015 [The Comprador Regime Is Hanging by a Single Thread of History: an Interview with Sergei Gubanov in the Newspaper “Business Online”, February 24, 2015]. Ofitsial’nyi sait gazety “Biznes Online” [Official Website of the Newspaper “Business Online”]. Available at: http://www. businessgazeta.ru/article/126419/

  • 12    Glazyev S.Yu. O neotlozhnykh merakh po ukrepleniyu ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti Rossii: doklad na zasedanii Soveta bezopasnosti 15.09.2015 [On Urgent Measures to Strengthen the Economic Security of Russia: a Report on the Meeting of the Security Council, September 15, 2015]. Biznes Online: delovaya elektronnaya gazeta [Business Online: the Business Online Newspaper], 2015, September 15. Available at: http://www.businessgazeta.ru/article/140998/

Fused interests of the bureaucracy and business create a profoundly unjust state in which there is a redistribution of the most important resources from the groups that make efforts to modernize the society to the highest ranks that strive for unlimited personal enrichment.

Unfortunately, the entire hierarchy of executive power, including the current Government of Russia, continues to pursue the liberal course that hinders the country’s transition to the path that would promote actual movement toward a modern, dynamic and efficient economy. “Those who destroyed the Soviet Union have not disappeared, they have not even left the historical scene. Of course, some left, some died, some realized their mistake and are now trying to expiate their historical guilt. But many of them have remained in the halls of power”13.

In May 2015, summarizing the three-year performance of the Government (half of its constitutional term), Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Dmitry Medvedev clearly demonstrated that the views of Russian officials are inconsistent with the actual situation in the country14. The same can be said about his September article headlined “The new reality: Russia and global challenges”, which, as a matter of fact, is a mere sequel to the article “Go forward, Russia!” and in which the Prime Minister “evades the talk about actual causes of economic problems... he advocates and justifies unpopular measures and reforms in education, healthcare, pension system... thus an obvious weakness of the text is its reticence and unwillingness (or inability) to be frank with the audience up to the end”15.

In recent years, the assessment of economic situation by the Government has been contrary to the opinion of experts16. While the

Government pointed out that the change was “very good”, the change was “for the better”17; experts predicted a “tangible reduction in the standard of living and quality of life for the majority of the population... the return of the Russian society to the level of poverty that it had 10 years ago”18.

Moreover, the assertion that it is all the fault of Rosstat’s deficient methodology is gradually becoming less convincing; in other words, the Government’s understanding of economic situation in the country is not an error but a conscious strategy. In the middle of 2014, Sergei Gubanov, Chief Editor of the journal “Economist”, said that the imperfection of the statistics is Rosstat’s misfortune rather than its fault19. In early 2015, space of uncertainty and risks; weak responses to challenges (crisis management plan), while negative external factors are acting with the same force. The result is an economy which is sliding downhill” (source: Mirkin Ya.M. Vnezapnyi povo-rot [Sudden Turn]. Zhurnal novoi ekonomicheskoi assotsiatsii [The Journal of the New Economic Association], 2015, no. 2 (26), p. 197.).

he was much more explicit in his assessment: “Lies have become part of the system. In turn, erroneous and distorted analytical data obviously cause the adoption of wrong public decisions that make the situation even worse”20.

However, the reality is inexorable, and today it, so to say, “pinned down” the officials, forcing them “to admit that their economic calculations are flawed”21. However, on TV programs we still hear statements that “the situation has become tougher, but nothing terrible has happened”22 and “no matter how the situation may develop, all social obligations will be fulfilled as they have always been”23 (although it is planned to strengthen the principle of targeted social support to the most vulnerable categories of the population, and this, according to experts, is “a euphemism designed to soften the blow from a possible suspension of the indexation of pensions and the raising of the retirement age”24.

The position of the Government again raises controversy: it agrees with experts that Russia’s economy is in a critical condition, but, at the same time, the people are informed that its performance is good. Moreover, “if we listen to the statements made by the financial block of the Government, and other reputable personalities in the Russian economy, we can note a remarkable fact: almost all of them link the future to the weak ruble, and the strong ruble, on the contrary, was one of the factors that prevented the Russian economy from moving forward”25.

“A generally recognized postulate of Russia’s economic policy is that it is based on dogmatic, false and harmful notions concerning the usefulness of market self-organization mechanisms and non-interference of the state in regulation issues. Based on false assumptions from the very beginning, the policy of presentday monetarists and monetarism has already caused economic stagnation and recession and deprived the economy of the prospects and impulses for development... As the national economy is deteriorating, the welfare of those who pursue this policy and those who thrive on it – the offshore oligarchy – is growing”26.

In addition, in recent years, the quality of public administration is reflected in numerous instances of corruption, as evidenced by a series of investigations against the directors of RUSNANO, SKOLKOVO and Oboronservis; the arrests of the governors Vasilii Yurchenko, Sergei Bozhenov, Nikolai Denin, Aleksandr Khoroshavin, Vyacheslav Gaizer, vicegovernors Vadim Lukoyanov, Aleksandr Ivanov, Nikolai Sandakov, Viktor Nechaev and others. There are still “hundreds of less notable cases against government officials, deputies, city heads. These cases can pass unnoticed under a superficial glance from the federal level... Members of this “group of cronies” often ask their Moscow patrons for protection; criminal proceedings are ceased after the interference of certain influential persons”27.

A special anti-corruption unit was created within the power structures. Like in the 1930s – 1940s, it was done “due to a pressing necessity to purge the elites when the country was facing the threat of war... There were party bosses, former civil war gunmen who had to be put down, and the elite that had to be purged and very quickly too”28.

Today, charges are brought not only against individuals, but also against organized groups, thus indicating a deep moral decay of the elites. The operations that aim to expose illegal actions of administrative elite have a wide public resonance and are a factor that promotes the growth of trust in law enforcement agencies.

According to Levada-Center, the level of trust in the national security agencies in the period from 2014 to September 2015 increased from 46 to 50%, the level of trust in the police increased from 21 to 29%. During this same period, the share of the Russians who trust the Government decreased from 46 to 45%.

According to sociological polls conducted by ISEDT RAS, in the period from February 2014 to October 2015, the level of trust in the Federal Security Service increased from 36 to 40%, in the police – from 35 to 41%, while the level of trust in the authorities did not change: the RF Government – 48–49%, the

Federation Council – 40%, the State Duma – 33–35%, the Vologda Oblast Administration – 36–37%. Among all the state institutions the level of trust increased only in relation to the President of the Russian Federation (from 57 to 60%), which is no doubt connected with his political strategy on the international arena.

However, according to experts, the fact that financial authorities focus on the interests of financial and currency speculators and offshore oligarchy aggravates the contradictions between the ruling elite and the people, making these contradictions antagonistic. This undermines people’s confidence in the state power institutions and weakens its two pillars – bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies29. The inconsistency of action is also proved by the fact that the punishment lasts just as long as the attention of the public is locked on the case30. Many people who make, to put it mildly, “ineffective” management decisions, remain in key positions for decades during their whole “productive” life, and they only change the names of organizations or parties in which they work31.

Thus, nowadays Russia is at the crossroads of its development. In the transition to a new stage of Russian statehood there arise comprehensive and systemic problems that do not allow experts to make clearly positive forecasts32.

The challenges that Russia faces at the present stage of its history can be organized in two groups.

First, it is international relations in which Russia is playing an increasingly important role and which are becoming more and more strained due to frequent breakouts of armed conflicts.

Second, it is the current system of public administration , which, according to experts, is “incompatible with life interests of the production sector and population”33 and becomes a formidable obstacle to effective interaction between government and society34.

We see that domestic policy is lagging critically behind global political achievements. The President enjoys obvious successes in enhancing the international status of Russia. However, the liberal wing of the Government hampers the solution of national security issues of the 21st century. There are not two but even three principal ways out of this conflict situation: “revolution from above”, “revolution from below” and “revolution from outside”. Given the scope and significance of Russia in the global division of labor, we cannot hope that “everything will somehow turn out fine on its own”35.

As for the Russians themselves, their expectations can be described as “restrained uneasiness”. Almost half of them are characterized by negative social and psychological feeling (a quarter of them feel anxiety, one in five is experiencing apathy, irritability, less often – anger)36. “The citizens realize the gravity of the situation in the economy and do not believe the authorities are able to pull the country out of the crisis. But those very citizens support Russia’s foreign policy that helped regain its glory”37.

the Plan of the Revolution from Above: Around the Report “On the Urgent Measures to Strengthen Russia’s Economic Security”]. Zavtra [Tomorrow], 2015, September 24. Available at:

Commenting on the situation, we can compare it with socio-cultural transformation, which, according to RAS Academician Viktor Polterovich, is going on all over the world: from collectivism to individualism and further to collaborativeness; from centralism to competition and cooperation, from socialism – through liberalism to “cooperation philosophy”38.

Just as centralism and collectivism prevailed in the USSR during the Communist regime, just as the competition and individualism of the “turbulent 1990s” ruled after its collapse, today we are talking about collaborativeness and “cooperation philosophy”, i.e. a moderate but necessary intervention of the state in economic and social processes management”39.

The willingness to cooperate is an essential principle in dealing with international issues. Every head of state regularly talks about it, although not all of them demonstrate this willingness under specific circumstances and in specific actions. As for domestic politics, it has much more controversy. Having declaring a policy of rapprochement with the society40, the authorities are content with making promises, forecasts and unsubstantiated statements. All this resembles a simulation of cooperation, which Jean Toshchenko described as “the substitution of activity in all its manifestations”, “the fruit of activity (conscious or unconscious), when artificial conditions for processes and phenomena are created in order to meet specific (selfish) group and corporate goals that are presented as socially significant”, “the result of the lack of clear strategic goals and science basis, the result that fits in those conditions when there is no stable feedback with the people, when their opinion is disregarded and their proposals ignored; when it is suggested that the people should follow the decisions made by those in power”. The very imitation, according to Jean Toshchenko, is the reason for social apathy, distrust in the government, low electoral turnout and the overall anomie of the society41.

It is known that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. And since the “ideological power is in the same hands, we can expect nothing useful from these people anymore; they prevent Russia from moving forward; today we need a new paradigm, we need new ideas how to improve our country; we need new carriers of these ideas...”42.

According to Valerii Fadeev, Chief Editor of the journal “Expert”, “there is no doubt that in the near future a new political configuration that will ensure a breakthrough will be created”43. However, more than two years passed and still there is no solution to this problem, and there are fewer and fewer reasons for optimism.

Obviously, without solving key problems “at home, in our own country”44, the results achieved in the international political arena cannot have a solid foundation, so today, at the crossroads of a new stage of Russia’s history, the main challenge facing the society, science and government is to bring national macroeconomic policy “in line with the common understanding of the principles of social justice and truth, and to make it useful for the development of the production sphere”45; to improve public administration for the purpose of restructuring the economy on the principles of vertical integration; to fight corruption, to undertake real action to reduce outrageous social inequality and all that really hinders the realization of the presidential program and complicates the pursuit of an independent sovereign policy.

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