The truth of being and the problem of movement

The article examines the connection between M. Heidegger’s idea of the truth of being and the problem of movement. In Heidegger’s works, one can often find expressions referring to the ideas of action and movement. However, Heidegger’s interpretation of movement has not been considered in sufficient detail by researchers (although such authors as M. Okrent, W. Brogan, and others pay attention to it). As we show, his understanding of movement, inextricably linked with the idea of an event (Ereignis), also determines his interpretation of the truth of being. First, Heidegger significantly rethinks the idea of movement in the context of his interpretation of an event (Ereignis); in the article, we reconstruct this interpretation. Second, we clarify how his interpretation of movement determines the concept of the truth of being. Heidegger understands movement as self-realization, which makes other forms of movement possible - in particular, those discussed by Aristotle. In this connection, the truth of being appears as an instance which, on the one hand, makes self-realization possible, and on the other, deprives it of stability and constancy, introducing it into history.