Is constitutional procedural liability an independent institute of legal liability?

The authors examine the problem of legal nature of constitutional and procedural liability. Scientific analysis opens with the coverage of problems of understanding legal procedure and constitutional procedure, since the definition of constitutional and procedural liability, the inclusion of certain measures and norms in its composition depends on their understanding. The authors draw a conclusion about the expedient "narrow" definition of legal and constitutional procedure, as an independent institution of legal liability. From this point of view, the position of scientists who, trying to justify the independent legal nature of constitutional and procedural liability, refer to it measures that are not peculiar to it, thus eliminating constitutional liability does not hold up against criticism. On the contrary, if relying upon a narrow understanding of legal procedure and constitutional procedure, one can conclude that constitutional and procedural liability as an independent institution of legal liability is only at the formation stage. At present, it is possible to state that there is a sub-institution of constitutional procedural liability, which is part of the institution of procedural liability. The definition of constitutional and procedural liability, originating from a broad understanding of legal and constitutional procedure, effectively neutralizes constitutional liability, since there is an almost complete transfer of traditional measures of constitutional liability to constitutional procedural ones.