Empirical Verifi cation of Game-Theoretic Models of Corruption Based on Materials from Criminal Cases

Th e article addresses the issue of verifying game-theoretic models of corruption based on the analysis of real criminal cases. Th e author examines the limitations of existing approaches to studying corrupt interactions and demonstrates the potential of game theory in understanding the mechanisms of corruption within various organizational structures. Th e study is based on an analysis of 30 criminal cases initiated under Articles 290 and 291 of the Russian Criminal Code between 2021 and 2025, identifying three main categories of corruption schemes: basic, internal network, and external network models. Particular att ention is given to the role of intermediaries as a strategic element in the architecture of corrupt relationships. Th e intermediary performs not only the function of transferring funds but also coordinates actions among participants, minimizes risks, and ensures transaction confi dentiality. Th e article emphasizes the need for methodological tools to empirically verify theoretical corruption models using materials from actual court proceedings.