The legal category of "obligation" in the political and legal doctrines of Russian conservatism and European liberalism of the 19th century

The study of the interpretation of obligation in the political and legal doctrines of Russian conservatism and classical European liberalism is relevant due to the special role of the Institute of obligations in the system of legal regulation. In the context of considering the views of the leading thinkers of liberalism and conservatism, the author analyzes the phenomenon of legal obligations, which is differently revealed in the provisions of the studied political and legal doctrines of the 19th century. It is concluded that liberal thought focused on law as the only regulating and disciplining system that puts rights in the first place, not obligations, and not their complex interaction. On the contrary, the political and legal doctrine of conservatism questioned the absolutization of human rights, justified the primacy of obligations over rights, and put forward a theory of moral law that raises the function of law over state coercion. In the conservative doctrine, the convergence of moral duty and legal obligation was embodied in the obligation of moral law, which has attributes of the two phenomena.