Cuban missile crisis vs Berlin crisis: the problem of mutual influence

The article examines the interconnection between the crises around Cuba in 1962 and Berlin in 1958-1963. The author critically assesses the widespread misconceptions, i.e., the one on the alleged Feklisov-Scully “saving the world” Cuba-West Berlin gambit, the Cuban Missile Crisis resulting in Western victory, and the alleged hardening of the U.S. stance on Berlin/German matters in its aftermath. The author indicates some unresolved issues relating to this settlement. He poses the following questions: was the removal of missiles from Italy a part of the settlement? Why were the Mace missiles in West Germany excluded from the discussion?). The author also emphasizes the impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the developments in the Federal Republic of Germany (the Spiegel affair, the embargo on the pipeline export to the USSR, the revitalization of the Rapallo ideas). In conclusion, the author underscores that the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis paved the way to ending the Berlin crisis, and contributed to the sizable reduction of tensions in Europe and eventual normalization of the Soviet-West German relations.