Cognitivism in ethics. The subjectivist approach
Автор: Klimovich Alexander P.
Журнал: Вестник Пермского университета. Философия. Психология. Социология @fsf-vestnik
Рубрика: Философия
Статья в выпуске: 4 (28), 2016 года.
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The article provides an overview of morality substantiation problems in philosophy, considering a subjectivist approach to solving them. The main representatives of this approach and the fundamental principles have been studied. The article stresses the importance of morality substantiation through considering the role of morality in the social and philosophical context. The strengths of subjectivist approach are considered, the analysis and evaluation of subjective methodology are given. The basic concepts used in modern subjective ethics discourse are described. We consider both the theoretical and practical meanings of these concepts in relation to the realities of modern society. Using the illustrative examples we show the current value of the input definitions and terms. Comparing various rational behavior strategies we establish the criteria for achieving a fair organization of the social order. Basing on the concept of the classical authors we establish the connection with the fresh theoretical approaches in the sphere of social ethics and political philosophy. Besides, we dwell upon the scale of subjectivist approach problems. The critical assessment shows the applicability of the ethical paradigm under consideration. We also assess the risks of subjectivity as the only and non-alternative instrument of ethical substantiation. We warn about the possible negative consequences of rational egoism abuse. The danger of morality instrumentalization and ethical discourse reduction to moral conformism is identified.
Morality, ethics, substantiation, cognitivism, non-cognitivism, subjectivism, objectivism, sociological diagnosis, justice as fairness, commutative principle, distributive principle
Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/147203139
IDR: 147203139 | DOI: 10.17072/2078-7898/2016-4-44-49