Concept of “Anat man” in Buddhism and Vijnanavada’s theory of “Alaya-vijnana”

The article deals with one of the most difficult problems in the philosophy of Buddhism - the theory of “atman/anatman”. In Buddhism, the concept of “anatman” appears in contrast to the central concept of Brahmanism “atman”, and develops into a doctrine denying the existence of a self, proclaiming the non-existence of separate and independent individual. There are two extremes in understanding the atman/anatman problem. The first is that from the standpoint of Brahmanism, things exist constantly, have a substantial nature, and the self - atman is unchanged. The second extreme is presented by in Mahayana philosophy as Madhyamika Prasangika - a nihilistic understanding of emptiness - nothing exists, there is no individual self. Taking into account the fact that in Madhyamika the middle way is proclaimed, i. e. the rejection of extremes of views, neither one nor the other extreme is true. The introduction of the concept of “alaya-vijnana” into the philosophical field by the Vijnanavadins eases the tension that arises in solving the problem under consideration. But the theory of “alaya-vijnana” from the position of the Buddhist “anataman” seems ambiguous. The article attempts to answer the question whether alaya-vijnana is the rejected Brahmanistic atman, or is it something else