Pure abstraction's critique

Classical philosophy considers the concepts of abstraction and concreteness and as categories of logic, and as an immediately given, sensuously perceived and represented whole. These categories are opposed to each other as some existence of the object of “simple” and the object of “complex” both for their perception in sensation and for understanding in thinking. At the same time it is assumed that there is a certain object of the “original” “simple” element of all that exists, on the basis of which conditions are created for the manifestation of signs of a change in the states and properties of the existence of all that exists, and which “gives rise” to the emergence, development, improvement of objects in a given field of existence in possibility and reality. In this hypothesis signs of contradiction between the possibilities of representing the existence indefinitely small “simple” object (element) and the inability to know about the existence indefinitely large “simple” object (element). Therefore both the categories of the logic of the concept of concrete and abstract have the character of a relative judgment that provides an explanation of the properties of thinking in the processes of experiences of the being of the thinker. However those who think in the given field of existence in the possibility and reality are able to feel and think the signs of their existence in the experience of sensory perception and verbal thinking, and for their limited changes in properties and states, observations and thoughts about the concept of the object of “pure abstraction”, and all objects accessible to o b-servation and thinking for them exist specifically. Object existing in this field, available for experience, is concrete, and object existing outside of experience is “purely abstract”. To attempt to introduce the concept of the object matter of “pure abstraction” is necessary to “get out” of the idea of the existence of a specific space of the object in the experiment and the “look” on all things like a “point of view” of all that exists in the “absence” of his being a thinking observer. In the presence of an observer, everything observed becomes, in his representations, a clearly ordered and formalized concrete concept.