Lies, integrity in civil law and proceedings

Purpose: To consider the inadmissibility of lying in the process as a continuation of the principle of good faith in civil law. Methodology: Logical, systemic, formal-legal, as well as comparative-legal methods were used. Results: The principle of good faith does not allow the existence of a «right to lie.» Procedural law and practice should be amended to provide effective protection against lies in the process. In particular, according to the author, the judicial acts based on lies in the opening of new evidence of lies should be reviewed for newly discovered circumstances. Novelty/originality/value: The article has high scientific value and practical significance, as it addresses an important problem that is long overdue and requires its resolution. The author analyses the reasons for the lag in procedural legislation from material legislation with regard to the prohibition of lies and deception in legal relations. According to the author, the discovery of the fact of lies should lead to the possibility of reviewing the judicial act.