Международная социалистическая солидарность: помощь Берлина Ханою (1950–1975)

,

,

Historically, Vietnam and Germany had no common border, no colonial ties, and no traditional direct trade relations. However, the end of the Second World War in 1945 led to the establishment of a new world order, in which the Cold War influenced all aspects of global affairs. A confrontation between capitalism and socialism occurred not only in Europe but also worldwide, leading to the division of both Vietnam and Germany into two separate territories with opposing regimes, even directly confronting each other in ideological conflicts. The establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in 1945 and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949, both part of the communist bloc, resulted in closer ties between Hanoi and Berlin. Both the GRV and the DRV were regarded as outposts of the communism bloc in the East-West confrontation. As a result, both nations endured the harsh fate of serving as the primary theatres of rivalry between the two hostile systems, with the USA on one side and the USSR and People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the other. Therefore, it is understandable that a larger proportion of Vietnam War studies focus on the relations between the DRV and its two “big brothers” – the USSR and the PRC rather than the connection among smaller communist countries. While the influence of Chinese and Soviet aid to the DRV during the Vietnam War is well documented, assistance programmes sponsored by East Germany remain much less known. The relationship between minor players in the Cold War, such as the direct connection between the DRV and the GDR, seems to attract less attention in studies of international politics. The connection between the DRV and the GDR during the Cold War can primarily be seen in East Germany’s efforts to build international relationships with Third World countries, including Vietnam, to expand its political influence and demonstrate socialist solidarity through humanitarian programs [Hong, 2015]. Quinn Slobodian revealed that both East and West Germany engaged with the Bandung Conference (1955) and its aftermath to establish relations with non-aligned countries, including Vietnam, as part of broader Cold War diplomatic strategies [Slo-bodian, 2013]. Young-Sun Hong explores the GDR’s efforts to build solidarity with the Global South, including North Vietnam, by providing health and humanitarian aid, as well as other forms of support [Hong, 2008]. Although focusing on exhibitions in the Arab world, Katherine Pence also references East Germany’s broader international strategy during the 1950s and 1960s, including its relationship with North Vietnam as part of its socialist solidarity efforts [Pence, 2012].

Few books and articles examine the direct relationship between the DRV and the GDR during the Cold War. Drawing on German archival documents, Martin Grossheim was the first to reveal the relationship between the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) and the DRV during the Vietnam War. The study delves into the role of East Germany, a secondary actor in the socialist bloc, in aiding Vietnam’s efforts to build its security apparatus, modern technical capabilities, and conduct counter-intelligence operations [Grossheim, 2014]. Also based on documents from the East German archives, Martin Grossheim explores how “revisionism” was debated and managed in the

DRV during the Cold War [Grossheim, 2005], focusing on ideological struggles among the Hanoi leadership under pressures from the Sino-Soviet split. It examines the Vietnamese leadership’s efforts to balance Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy with practical governance and foreign relations, often through policies and purges targeting those accused of deviation. These debates and conflicts significantly influenced Vietnam’s unique approach to socialism amidst Cold War pressures.

Not only during the Vietnam War, but the GDR also supported the Hanoi government’s socialist modernization through political, economic, and cultural exchanges during the postwar era. The long-standing relationship between Berlin and Hanoi presented the GDR’s efforts in Vietnam as a microcosm of Cold War era socialist solidarity, characterized by both idealism and practical limitations [Schaefer, 2015]. While primarily focused on postwar migration, Christina Schwenkel references the roots of the GDR-North Vietnam relationship during the war and the foundations of labour cooperation established during that period [Schwenkel, 2014]. The GDR’s reconstruction efforts in Vietnam represented a poignant example of socialist internationalism, also portrayed the material and emotional legacy of the GDR’s contributions to the reconstruction of postwar Vietnam, particularly focusing on the city of Vinh [Schwenkel, 2015]. Christina Schwenkel also pointed out that the coffee mutual aid between Vietnam and East Germany served as evidence of Berlin’s goodwill practices and solidarity with liberation struggles in the Global South [Schwenkel, 2022]. These are excellent works for anyone who studies the Hanoi-Berlin relationship. However, the aspect of the relations between the GDR and the DRV has mostly focused on the connection between Hanoi and Berlin during the postwar period. Therefore, the connection between these minor players during the Vietnam war should have received more attention in research.

This paper draws on recently declassified documents from Vietnamese National Archive No. 3 (Trung tâm Lưu trữ quốc gia 3), which contains important memorandums exchanged between the prime minister’s office, the vice prime minister, and the ministers. These archival documents were tapped from collections of the Prime Minister’s Office (Phủ Thủ Tướng), the State Planning Committee (Ủy ban Kế hoạch Nhà nước), and Ministry of Health (Bộ Y tế). Additionally, the research is based on reports and recommendations from negotiations and meetings between Vietnamese officials and leaders of other socialist countries. These resources offer unparalleled insight into the GDR’s aid to the DRV from the Vietnamese perspective, tracing the interaction between two minor players in the Cold War, as well as each country’s strategic calculation. The paper argues that aid was used as a contribution to international socialist solidarity, portraying itself as part of the global Cold War. The paper highlights that the GDR’s assistance was not merely about improving economic, health, and education conditions in North Vietnam, but also about promoting East German political and ideological influence. The GDR’s effort in the Hanoi government was a microcosm of Cold War-era socialist solidarity, characterized by both idealism and practical limitations. In turn, the DRV also took advantage of Berlin’s assistance to mobilize international resources for Vietnamese unification. All of these aid initiatives reflected the GDR’s strategies in building an image of “solidarity and legitimacy” in the international sphere, as well as the DRV’s efforts to take advantage of its communist allies for unification.

The official diplomatic relationship between the DRV and the GDR was established in 1950, at the height of Vietnam’s anti-French colonial resistance, and just a few months after the GDR declared its establishment. The East Berlin government was one of the first countries in the world to officially recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the Hanoi authority. Although the newly established GDR was still facing many difficulties, Berlin gifted 429 boxes of medicine to the DRV through the East German Embassy in the PRC [Đào Đức Thuận, 2013, p. 52]. There was no official aid agreement between the government of the DRV and the GDR at that time.

After the Vietnamese people defeated the French army at the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ in May 1954, the victorious Việt Minh troops returned to Hanoi and officially took control of the northern part of the country. Vietnam had been temporarily divided at the 17th parallel, with the North under the control of the DRV. Northern Vietnam’s economy suffered severely after years of the bloody and protracted First Indochina War. The conflict serverely damaged irrigation infrastructure and drastically reduced rice production. As if this wasn’t bad enough, in 1954, there was little rainfall and heavy flooding in the North, leading to a devastating food shortage. As a result, the Red River Delta and central Vietnam experienced a severe famine. More than 12,000 people had died from famine or other causes in these areas by the end of 1954. Approximately one million people were impacted by the famine in the spring of 1955, when it was at its worst [Szalontai, 2005, p. 404].

That urgent situation compelled the DRV leadership to prioritize the rehabilitation of its economy and the improvement of citizens’ living standards. A key foreign policy of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) during this period was mobilizing material assistance from its communist allies. The Hanoi government primarily focused on strengthening solidarity with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries to secure support for nation-building 1. The DRV’s foreign policy during this time emphasized deepening and consolidating its relationships with these socialist nations [Vietnamese Communist Party, 2002, p.103].

In 1955, both the DRV and the GDR officially established their embassies in Hanoi and Berlin, respectively, marking the beginning of a deepening bilateral relationship. On 17 March 1955, the GDR extended technical and financial assistance to support the DRV’s postcolonial nation-building efforts under the leadership of Hồ Chí Minh, with the goals of “healing the wounds of war, developing the economy, and aiding the Vietnamese people’s struggle for national unification” 2. Subsequently, on 30 January 1956, the DRV and the GDR signed their first aid agreement, which covered the years 1955 and 1956. This agreement reflected the GDR’s commitment to contributing to “building the foundation for an increasingly prosperous economy and improving the lives of the Vietnamese people” 3. The DRV expressed deep appreciation for this support, recognizing the assistance from the GDR, the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist nations as crucial to the success of the 1956 development plan and the political struggle for national unity, further strengthening the relationship between Hanoi and Berlin 4.

On 2 June 1956, the GDR government signed another aid agreement, committing 60 million rubles to support the DRV. Of this total, 30,250,000 rubles were allocated for equipment, 14,050,000 rubles for retail goods, approximately 8,000,000 rubles for the transportation sector, and 2,000,000 rubles for contingencies 5. The GDR supplied equipment for laboratories, glass factories, printing facilities, studios, telephone systems, fishing boats, and transportation infrastructure.

It is important to note that during the period of 1955–1956, North Vietnam had only recently emerged from the protracted and devastating Franco-Vietnamese War. Agriculture, the backbone of the national economy, was severely damaged. The system of dams, dikes, and irrigation infrastructure had been extensively destroyed, leaving nearly two thousand hectares of paddy fields without access to water. As a result, the threat of widespread famine loomed over North Vietnam [Hồ Chí Minh, 2011, p. 273]. In that urgent situation, President Hồ Chí Minh of the DRV directly led a state-level Vietnamese delegation to visit many socialist countries to request more aid from its allies. On 25 July 1957, President Hồ Chí Minh made an official state visit to the GDR, marking a significant milestone in the friendly cooperation between the two nations. The GDR immediately allocated substantial resources to assist Vietnam, including materials for Phủ Doãn Hospital valued at 5,000,000 Marks, equipment for a clinic in Nam Định worth 85,000 Marks, materials for producing artificial limbs for Vietnamese war invalids valued at 140,000 Marks, additional resources for Hanoi High School worth 10,000 Marks, tools and equipment valued at 30,000 Marks, and teaching materials worth 170,000 Marks 6. Moreover, on 3 November 1958, the GDR supplied 6,817 yards of fabric to support Vietnam 7.

The climax in the relationship between the GDR and the DRV was also marked by the visit of Chairman of German Council of Ministers Otto Grotewohl to Hanoi on 21 January 1959. It was a signal to affirm stronger support from the GDR to North Vietnam. After the visit, the National Executive Committee of the German Democratic Front sent gifts to the DRV, valued at a total of 587,335,000 VND 8.

Thanks to this generous aid, the GDR was able to establish a strong relationship with the DRV and earned deep sympathy from Hanoi’s leadership. According to the DRV Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng, these projects played an important role in building up the initial material and technical foundation of socialism in Vietnam 9.

In the 1950s, the symbol of East German aid to North Vietnam was the Phủ Doãn Hospital, the only surgical hospital in the country. During the colonial period, Phủ Doãn Hospital had represented the modern French Empire. However, the East German leaders sought to dismantle one of the most powerful symbols of the colonial empire and transform it into an emblem of solidarity and partnership between the two socialist nations. For the GDR government, turning Phủ Doãn Hospital into a modern and well-equipped medical facility staffed with dedicated physicians demonstrated its commitment to fostering socialist cooperation in healthcare.

In February 1956, a medical delegation of nineteen German doctors was dispatched to Hanoi to assist in building of this hospital 10. Over the course of nine months, these experts played an active role in the installation and operation of medical equipment donated by the GDR, ensuring its effective use. Additionally, the German doctors provided medical examinations and treatments to Vietnamese patients at major hospitals such as Hospital C and Hospital 108. They also trained physicians at two clinics in Vĩnh Linh and Phú Quý and organized an orthopedic workshop in Hanoi.

On 28 July 1956, the Ministry of Health of the DRV officially inaugurated the “Bệnh viện hữu nghị Việt-Đức” (Vietnamese-GDR Friendship Hospital, formerly known as Phủ Doãn Hospital) which had become renowned through East German assistance. The hospital was well-equipped with modern equipment donated by the GDR, symbolizing the strengthened healthcare cooperation between the two nations 11. This medical facility was to play a major role in providing care to the Vietnamese elite and, later, to victims of American bombings.

In December 1956, the Ministry of Health of the GDR also deployed thirty-two medical professionals, including doctors, nurses, and technicians, to Vietnam for a nine-month mission. Their primary objectives were to train medical staff, assist in operating the Vietnamese-GDR

Friendship Hospital in Hanoi, and procure essential medical equipment. Key contributors to this initiative included the GDR Solidarity Committee, Charité University Hospital in East Berlin, and Berlin-Friedrichshain Urban Hospital. These units were the main suppliers of medical equipment for the Vietnamese-GDR Friendship Hospital. Additionally, these institutions also contribute to training Vietnamese medical staff and regularly dispatched German professionals to Hanoi to provide further assistance to the DRV [Schaefer, 2015, p. 97].

The GDR played an important role in maintaing and developing the Vietnamese-GDR Friendship Hospital. On 28 October 1965, the DRV and the GDR signed a cooperation agreement in medical aid, marking a significant expansion of East German support. Under this agreement, East Berlin increased its aid to Hanoi, allocating 2.1 million rubles for the purchase of medical equipment and the renovation of the Vietnamese-GDR Friendship Hospital, with an additional eight million rubles designated for pharmaceuticals 12. This cooperation extended beyond financial assistance, as the GDR medical delegations continued to provide organizational support for the hospital in subsequent years. For instance, in 1967, the GDR sent seven medical experts to establish the trauma and maxillofacial departments at the hospital. In 1969, the GDR further expanded its contributions by assigning two specialists in herbal medicine and a dermatologist to train physicians at the Institute of Medicinal Materials Testing. In the same year, GDR experts played a pivotal role in the design and installation of essential hospital infrastructure, including electrical and water systems, electrical transformer conversions, waste incineration facilities, as well as physics and optics equipment.

The collaboration encompassed both the provision of medical supplies and the exchange of professional expertise. Medical professionals from the GDR were deployed to Vietnam to mentor local healthcare personnel, while Vietnamese medical staff were invited to the GDR for specialized training. Notably, in 1963, Dr Herbst from the Leipzig Heart Institute led a team to Vietnam to provide technical assistance in tropical medicine, disease prevention, and hygiene. Similarly, in December 1968, Dr. Bethaman along with a GDR delegation sponsored by the “Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam”, travelled to Vietnam to support various medical initiatives 13.

From 1956 to 1965, the GDR trained 147 doctors, 122 nurses, 69 pharmacists, nine technical professionals, and 115 medical students for DRV 14. There were also 31 Vietnamese medical staff members in the GDR for specialized training, primarily in medical and pharmaceutical centers. Between 1966 and 1970, an additional 90 doctors, 112 nurses, 69 pharmacists, four technical professionals, and 90 medical students took part in short-term and long-term training programs in the GDR 15. In 1973, a group of twenty Vietnamese medical professionals was sent to the GDR for academic training. Similar exchanges took place in 1974 and 1975, with twenty professionals participating each year. During this period, the GDR Ministry of Health extended annual invitations to two Vietnamese scientists to attend medical conferences. Additionally, the GDR also provided medical treatment for approximately twenty to forty Vietnamese patients in Berlin. This sustained support from the GDR to the DRV significantly strengthened Hanoi’s healthcare sector. Through improvements in medical personnel competencies, infrastructure, and medical equipment, GDR assistance played a pivotal role in the restoration of healthcare systems and the advancement of medical development in the DRV.

Moreover, the hospital also served as a “small industrial fair”, showcasing East German modern medical technology. For all of these aims, the GDR Foreign Ministry publicized its role in modernizing the North Vietnamese public health system by providing tours to delegations from India, Indonesia, and Cambodia. These visits allowed representatives of these countries to compare the achievements of East German socialist medicine in the Third World with those of their Eastern European allies and competitors [Hong, 2015, p. 123]. Clearly, the East German medical aid programs not only provided substantial scientific support to the North Vietnamese, but also highlighted the image of GDR within the Third World.

The aid programs with the DRV played an important role in shaping how the young GDR state perceived itself both internally and internationally, as well as within the socialist world. It appears that the GDR also inspired the German people to unite in a propaganda campaign for their unification by fostering “socialist friendships” among them. The “Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam” was established on 11 November 1954 and remained operational until 1958. The Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam not only distributed money and goods but also brought distant peoples closer together. On that day, the GDR believed that they were standing side by side with Vietnamese and Korean people, whose war-torn countries shared the same fate. With the slogan “Helping Korea and Vietnam is contributing to solving the German problem,” 16 the Committee’s primary goals were to strengthen the friendship between the three nations, inform the people of the GDR about the lives and struggles of the Vietnamese and Korean people for national reunification, and inspire German patriotism in the fight for peace and the reunification of one Germany. The support for Vietnam – a nation that suffered the same fate as the GDR, grew into a sizable movement in East Germany. To encourage East German people to join this organization, the Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam organized numerous fundraising campaigns in enterprises, government agencies, and schools. As soon as it was founded, on 11 November 1954, the Committee delivered 43 trucks filled with medical supplies, agricultural equipment, textiles, and several other items to the people of Korea and Vietnam 17. In the GDR, many people from all social groups actively worked overtime to donate tools and supplies to be sent to North Korea and Vietnam as part of missions to aid these countries. To help build a children’s centre and nursery in Vietnam, the women in the Potsdam and Halle regions raised 27,000 Marks, or more than 35 million VND. This first nursery was built at the Tien Bo printing factory in Hanoi 18. A total of 140,000 Marks was collected by the children, students, and teachers in Potsdam to construct two 16-class schools, one of which was given to North Korea and the other to Vietnam 19. Other educational supplies given to schools in Hanoi included desks, chairs, and toys for the children. For children in the DRV, workers from numerous factories and mills in the GDR donated 7,500 Marks along with tables, chairs, and educational tools 20. Additionally, farmers in Cottbus and Schwerin raised 31,637 Marks to aid the Vietnamese 21. During the World Youth and Student Congress in July 1957, the students in Leipzig launched a campaign to raise funds to help Vietnamese students build a school with ten to eighteen classrooms 22.

From November 1954 to December 1955, the Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam attracted almost all German social groups and raised 2,008,532.80 Marks for the DRV. Only in 1956, was the aid valued at around 4,300,000 Marks ²³. The Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam encouraged individuals to donate and deliver a significant amount of supplies, worth 11,087,808 VND, to the DRV during the three years from 1955 to 1957 ²⁴. There were also heartfelt stories of people donating in support of the Vietnamese people. One such story was of Hugo Opitz, who donated his late wife’s ring to the Vietnamese people with a letter that read: “My wife passed away. I would like to give her ring to the Vietnamese people who fought long and hard for the purpose that my wife always wished for” ²⁵. In recognition of these outstanding efforts, President Hồ Chí Minh presented the Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam with the First Class Independence Medal on behalf of the government of the DRV ²⁶.

With the full-swing of the United States involvement into the war in both North and South Vietnam in 1965, a dedicated “Vietnamese Committee” was established within the state-run solidarity framework of the East German mass organization “National Front”. For a considerable time, the DRV became the centerpiece of large East German solidarity donation campaigns like “Bicycles for Vietnam” , “Blood for Vietnam” , “Sewing Machines for Vietnam” , and “Kali for Vietnam” that mobilized almost the entire GDR society and economy. In all cases, the GDR Solidarity Committee solicited and collected donations, organized transportation, and worked with local partners in Vietnam [Schaefer, 2015, p. 96].

It is clear that the GDR was one of the major socialist providers of assistance to the DRV. Ideological, political, and economic factors were crucial in underpinning GDR assistance to the DRV. For Berlin leaders, aid was a way of contributing to the construction of a new socialist international order. In fact, it preferred to use terms such as “economic socialist assistance” rather than “aid”, which was associated with the neo-imperialism of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) [Howell, 1994, p. 305]. Politically, the assistance policies of the GDR in the 1950s and 1960s aimed to gain international recognition as a sovereign state [Ibid., p. 306]. Similarly, East German assistance programs played an important role in the GDR government’s efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people.

At the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, a series of events fundamentally changed the situation in Vietnam. US troops were directly deployed to the South, while sustained bombing campaigns were initiated against the North. Consequently, the war expanded into both regions of Vietnam. The American war in Vietnam was more and more bloody and traumatic. Since the year 1965, with the full-swing escalation of the Vietnam War, the North was devastated by American air strikes. In just three years, from 1965 to 1968, the United States Air Force dropped more than one million tonnes of bombs on North Vietnam – twice the total it used throughout the Pacific during the Second World War [Vietnam General Statistics Office, 2004, p. 243].

The devastating consequences of US bombardment created a massive demand for resources to support the war effort in the North and to provide essential supplies for the South. Therefore, the

DRV government depended much more on foreign aid to sustain its economy. On 26 May 1965, DVR Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng (also known as Comrade Bá Linh) sent a letter to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, formally requesting additional non-refundable aid for Hanoi from Berlin 27. Subsequently, Deputy Prime Minister Lê Thanh Nghị officially visited the GDR and met with Berlin leaders in June 1965 to call for further support for Hanoi’s struggle 28.

In response, Berlin leaders approved assistance totaling seven million rubles, which included transportation and communication equipment, electrical devices, and medical instruments. Furthermore, on 18 June 1965, the GDR granted additional non-refundable material aid valued at five million rubles following the DRV’s supplementary requests. Shortly thereafter, the GDR provided an extra supply of goods worth approximately two million rubles, based on the DRV’s needs and East German’s capacity 29. On 5 October 1967, the GDR extended significant aid to Hanoi, amounting to 38 million rubles, of which 34 million rubles (89.5%) were allocated as non-refundable aid and loans. This included a substantial increase in light industrial equipment, information systems, electrical devices, and automobile tires. Notable contributions included five cooking oil refineries, and 5,000 kW of diesel power for constructing five backup power clusters with complete accessories, a microwave relay information system, and an information system for Hải Phòng port.

The GDR increased economic aid to Vietnam to express its position in the strategic battle in the East-West confrontation. East Germany wanted to use the war in Vietnam to create a strategic balance between itself and West Germany in the global influence campaign. Therefore, since 1965, the aid from the GDR was shifted indirectly to directly. Berlin officials not only focused on building its image through aid initiatives but paid attention to providing material aid.

To assist Vietnam in rapidly restoring its economy following sustained US bombardments, the GDR supported the construction of 58 projects in 1973. Notable examples included the Gia Sàng Steel Rolling Mill with a capacity of 50,000 tons, the Đạo Tú Concrete Structure Factory covering an area of 50,000 square metres, and the renovation of the Hải Phòng Glass Factory with a capacity of 21,400 tons. In 1974, the GDR arranged for the continuation of eleven additional projects, such as the Fine Porcelain Factory with a capacity of 1,600 tons, the Mechanical Measuring Instrument Factory, the Paper Factory with a capacity of 300 tons per year, and five Cooking Oil Refining Factories. Moreover, the GDR provided equipment worth 11 million rubles, distributed across various sectors, including transportation (2.5 million rubles), healthcare (3 million rubles), fisheries (16 fishing boats), and electricity (10,000 kW) 30.

According to documents compiled from the Collection of the Vietnamese Prime Minister’s Office, between 1955 and 1973, the GDR provided the DRV with a total of 284 million rubles, primarily through non-refundable aid and long-term or low-interest loans. Of this total, 164 million rubles were allocated as non-refundable aid, while 120 million rubles were provided as long-term or low-interest loans. On 21 April 1974, the GDR signed an aid agreement with the DRV, providing goods valued at 39.1 million rubles, which included long-term non-refundable loans (18.3 million rubles) and direct aid (10.8 million rubles). In addition to this agreement, the GDR allocated further funds for two specific projects (6.5 million rubles) and equipment costs for the urban planning of Vinh City (3.6 million rubles), with the remainder directed toward the provision of regular goods 31.

It is noticed that the period in which Vietnam received the highest economic aid from the GDR was also the period in which the US combat troops were directly involved in Vietnam at the highest level. During the period from 1969 to 1972, the GDR’s aid reached its highest amount, totaling 165,2 million rubles, which accounted for more than half total aid. The GDR ranked third, after the Soviet Union and China, among the communist countries providing economic assistance to the DRV 32. When the Vietnam War became a large-scale war, and the first US combat troops arrived in South Vietnam in 1965, the GDR increased to provide massive assistance to the DRV. When Berlin leaders became more concerned about the rising security threats from the escalation of the war by the United States, the GDR increased its support for Vietnam.

Although East German leader Walter Ulbricht acknowledged that opposing West German revanchist forces had created “many complex and difficult problems” and made the struggle “very costly,” 33 the GDR consistently maintained its commitment to supporting the DRV. The Chairman of the State Council of the GDR affirmed that East Berlin was “always ready to help Vietnam” and “would do whatever was within its capability to support the government of Hanoi” 34. Therefore, the GDR not only supported the DRV in building the foundations of socialism, but also sought to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people through its aid initiatives. Through these efforts, the GDR agained even greater sympathy from its Vietnamese comrades. DRV leaders acknowledged that assistance from the GDR, as well as from the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries, was vital for implementing state plans and sustaining the political struggle. East German aid contributed to further strengthening the friendship between the peoples of Vietnam and Germany 35. The significance of the GDR’s aid to the DRV was affirmed by Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng. His letter to the Chairman of the GDR’s Council of Ministers stated that Vietnam’s path to reunification and socialism was significantly supported by the German people and the GDR government. This assistance has always been deeply cherished and remembered by both the Vietnamese people and government 36.

The GDR’s socialist solidarity projects in the DRV exemplify Cold War soft power policies aimed at ‘winning hearts and minds’. Berlin’s intent to build an ‘unbreakable friendship’ with the Hanoi government involved navigating a complex web of relationships, not only through economic aid but also through medical and educational support. It is evident that the GDR consistently provided the DRV with substantial assistance in all realms during this time. This demonstrates how the GDR’s foreign policy remained consistent in aiding the Vietnamese people, even during times when internal conflicts arose within the socialist bloc.

It appears that international socialist solidarity played a significant role in building strong diplomatic relations between the GDR and the DRV throughout the Cold War. The East German grants took the form of capital, commodity, technology, and even human resources. Both the East German and North Vietnamese governments benefited greatly from these aid initiatives. On the one hand, the economic assistance was particularly beneficial to the Hanoi government, as it was an underdeveloped, war-torn nation lacking infrastructure. On the other hand, the East German leadership needed “socialist friendships” to make a legitimate claim of statehood, position itself in the international arena, and carve out a place for itself within the larger international communist movement. Therefore, the alliance with Hanoi, which “struggled” for its socialist values and sovereignty, was one of the most significant collaborations for the GDR. “Strengthen state alliances and reaffirming political friendships” was one of the objectives of the GDR government assistance [Schwenkel, 2015, p. 285]. Establishing relations with the DRV gave the GDR more international influence and internal unity.

From its position in the Cold War confrontation, the GDR’s support was a manifestation of noble international solidarity and held great historical significance. Helping Vietnam successfully fight against the US also contributed to consolidating the socialist system, protecting its prestige, and strengthening the GDR’s national security. It was believed that when Vietnam was the focus of the Cold War, attracting the attention of the US and the world, the conflict between East and West Germany was less intense, allowing the GDR more room to focus on its national development. Moreover, through aid to Vietnam, the East Berlin government sought to stimulate national spirit and internal solidarity among the German people.

For Vietnam, a country that had just emerged from the protracted and destructive war of resistance against French colonialism, the assistance from socialist countries in general, and the GDR in particular, was beneficial. Even in a fight with a massively powerful adversary such as the US, the Hanoi government had to seize the mantle of nationalism and rallied support behind the idea of socialist solidarity. Hanoi needed to expand its relations within the communist world and realized that it would benefit from its partnership with East Berlin.

Both the North Vietnamese leadership and the East German administration believed that international alliances were crucial to this cause, and that this assistance brought benefits to both sides.