Norms of morality in the system of interpretation of criminal law evaluative concepts

The article considers the functional role of moral norms in the process of interpretation of criminal law evaluative concepts. It is indicated that moral and ethical (including ethic and aesthetic correlating to them) norms and values, being an integral part of legal reality, are, on the one hand, an extra-legal basis for interpretive assessment, containing and simultaneously substantiating the nature and, in particular, the degree of actually expressed the state of the object (object, phenomenon, circumstance, etc.) signified by the evaluative concept, and on the other, by an objectively existing verifier of the results of interpretation (law enforcement) of such a concept. In addition, attention is focused on the moral-axiological variety of evaluative concepts, for which the nature of cognition of their content-axiological side is concretized, as a result of which the types of interpretive comparison are distinguished: moral-content correspondence and derivation. It is concluded that the presence of a moral and ethical component in criminal law is essentially necessary and functionally justified, especially for moral and axiological evaluative concepts, the interpretation of which is simply impossible without this sense-orienting component.