On the role of the category "nothing" in ontological systems: from Parmenides to F. Nietsche

Based on historico-philosophical material, the article shows how, after the deontologization of nonbeing by Parmenides, its prohibition is overcome by some philosophers who include nothingness and numerous transformations of this concept (non-existence, emptiness, lack, etc.) into ontological studies to resolve some problems. The atomists' search for ontological foundations of phenomenal world led them to use nothing to conceptualize not corporeal, but still real space containing atoms, allowing their separation, change and movement. Criticism of the sophists leads Plato to search for similar grounds for false speeches, his doctrine of the mutual involvement of the great kinds. The The Platonic distinction between two entities (o^a) (one of which is arbitrarily declared to be an existent, while the phenomenal world is its deprivation, absence) continues with theology, which poses the problem of man's involvement in the created world of the finite, phenomenal, as something that makes it difficult to know the infinite, noumenal. Descartes is engaged in explaining the alienation of God in creation and human being (who participates in the “idea” of non-existence, which explains his possibility of making mistake) but this will be fully done only by Hegel. Finally, Nietzsche overturns tradition - becoming, the sensual living world, contrary to Platonism and Christianity, is declared by him to exist, and the world of ideas is that nothing, drawn from which the ideals have significance only as the service of life, as the affirmation of the will. So, “nothing” is used to explain the existence of movement, time, lies, multiplicity, creativity, matter, history, values. With the end of the classical period, the category loses its ontological and acquires an anthropological meaning.