About public danger as a scandal (scandalum) or an emotivist concept of crime

The aim of the work is to form theoretical foundations for an emotivist understanding of social danger in criminal law. The article criticizes the view of social danger from the position of objectivism. Objectivism is a cognitive attitude focused on the reality of objects of knowledge, regardless of reason and human will. The idea is expressed that in science and practice there are no such criteria that would determine the validity of the objectivist concept, except for the ideological premise that the knowledge of crimes does not depend on the mind of the legislator, that the legislator is able to reflect public danger as an objective given. This position does not stand up to criticism on the basis of the interpretation of human actions and their dependence on the context of perception, secondly due to the lack of criteria for the precise definition of socially dangerous acts. The idea is given that the acts themselves are not socially dangerous, but become so as a result of the value interaction of society and individuals. Actions that violate public order are regarded as denying existing values, and therefore generating a scandal (scandalum) - an emotional reaction to the violation of the norms of the hostel. The public danger is most clearly defined by the concept of crime, in which the emotional reaction reaches the level of retribution (revenge) for the committed act. Analyzing the history of the development of ideas about the scandal, the author notices a logical line that runs through the works of canonists of the Middle Ages and remains relevant up to the present time. Scandal and social danger in the emotivist concept are equal in meaning concepts that should be evaluated through the prism of the value nature of human interactions and reactions to their violation. The article has sufficient scientific value, since it offers a new look at one of the traditional problems of criminal law - social danger.