On an approach to building a cognitive model of social reality

The paper deals with the problem of the relationship between individual consciousness and society in the context of the lack of a single and convincing theory of consciousness. In such a situation, the nature of social reality cannot be effectively studied since its explanation turns out to be a reduction of one unknown to another unknown. To solve this problem, a reductionist model of consciousness is proposed that analytically excludes unexplained aspects and therefore can be applied in sociology. Within the framework of a model reduction that claims not to reveal the essence of the phenomenon but only to simplify it, which is convenient in some respects, consciousness is defined as the epiphenomenon of memory functioning. The reductionist approach to consciousness plays an important role in describing social phenomena as it primarily identifies the nature of social reality. It can be interpreted as a set of causally related memories that are equally represented in the minds of individuals belonging to different groups. A cognitive model of social reality can be described by the following expression: C (I1 (M1 (I1 … Ix) … My (I1' … Iz')) … Ik (M1 (I1 … Ix) … My (I1' … Iz'))) where C is a set of causal links between M-objects which are a common memory of the sets of I-individuals and exist only within these sets; k, x, y, z are the indices characterizing the number of the corresponding sets. Although very simple, this definition provides opportunities for explaining such phenomena as the boundaries of societies, endogenous social changes, and social norms.