The provision of indirect military support by US administration to the Afghan Mujahideens in the 1980s

This article presents the analysis of the US involvement in the process of providing indirect military and other kinds of support to the Afghan mujahedeens. The author also presents a brief overview of the main methods and means of US military aid to the Afghan rebels in the 1980s, as well as a detailed consideration of the process of providing such assistance. The author identifies three stages in the process of interaction between the US administration and the US intelligence agencies, on the one hand, and the Afghan insurgency, on the other hand: the first stage (1978-1979) refers to introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, where the US assistance to Afghan rebels was extremely cautious and measured; the second stage (1980) is marked by a considerable build-up of military assistance to Mujahedeens, but the United States sought to conceal their participation in this process; and during the third stage (since the election of Ronald Reagan up to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan), the assistance to Mujahedeens increased in several times, and the US stopped hiding this fact. The author briefly discusses the role and place of such countries slong with the US as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and so on in the structure of rendering support to the Afghan Mujahideens. The author also studies the US role in Afghanistan’s transformation into a “nest” for cultivating Islamic extremists.