On ideologies and their bearers: revisiting the issue

Introduction. The confrontation of ideologies in the 20th and 21st century

The paper continues a series of works (Volkonsky, 2022; Volkonsky, 2023), that consider major ideological (semantic) factors determining the historical development of peoples and power structures. In order to formulate the aim of the study, we should first describe the current situation in the political and socio-ideological spheres. The above works investigate crucial processes of global historical development of the past century on the basis of the following fairly realistic postulate (or a fairly well-founded hypothesis): since the beginning of the 20th century (perhaps more precisely, since the creation of the socialist state of the USSR), the confrontation between Western countries and countries of non-Western civilizations, or supporters of a unipolar world (UPW) and supporters of a multipolar world (MPW) has become a “semantic core”, a configuration of dominant ideologies that define the majority of other semantic and target structures. The era of confrontation can become very long and contain alternating periods similar to the current escalation on the verge of the “great war” and periods of relatively peaceful coexistence of the West and non-West civilizational poles, similar to the “d tente” of the 1970s (with the continuation of the cold, information and ideological war and occasional local hot wars).

The nature, meanings and drivers of this civilizational confrontation in the 21st century differ sharply from its characteristics in the 20th century. Throughout the 20th century, the main factor in the confrontation was the opposition of the ideological paradigms “socialism – capitalism” (with the temporary dominance of the ideology of Nazism in Europe) and the institutional structures of economic management. In the 1920s, the party and governmental center of the USSR had to build an unprecedented economic system that provided sufficient motivation for the effective work of a huge people without using the capitalist mindset for personal enrichment and without the stimulating role of economic inequality. More precisely, this factor had to abandon its role as the main driving force and remain on the sidelines. Assessment of merit to society became the crucial factor (one of the key factors distinguishing socialism from capitalism). There was no developed theory to build this; the design and construction were carried out largely through trial and error. Basically, this task was completed: an unprecedented management system for the economy and the entire vast country was designed and built according to the type of management of a large company.

Under the influence of several factors, the ideology of socialism was fading alongside a steady decline in the USSR’s economic growth rate. The idea of the need to combine the plan and the market was naturally asserted, and this brought the communist ideology closer to the ideology of convergence, which was developed by the most prominent Western political scientists (in particular John Galbraith). The foundations of Marxist theory needed to be updated. Fundamental problems of dividing capitalist society into classes of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and the class struggle have ceased to rule over public attention. Among the domestic problems, the formation of the ruling elite, for example, has become no less important.

Challenges related to intercountry and crosscountry relations, primarily induced by the confrontation between the West and the USSR, have become much more acute. This confrontation, like all intercountry contradictions, was unfolding not only in the ideological sphere. An individual usually identifies themselves primarily with a particular community or with its center, or governing organization, rather than an ideology. Ideologies are important in the confrontation of civilizations, but the confrontation of their bearers is even more important.

But not everyone could appreciate the severity and inevitable importance of these challenges. The problems of economic and technological development and international cooperation in this area came to the fore. Apparently, it should be recognized that the Cold War was won by Western politicians and ideologists who managed to create the impression in a significant part of the Soviet governing stratum that the West is ready to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal and sovereign member of the “universal” community of developed countries on an equal basis with the countries of Western Europe and North America. In fact, Western (mainly Anglo-Saxon) leaders and ideologists hatched a project to split the Soviet elite and support that part of it that is ready to sacrifice sovereignty and submit (“temporarily!”). Later, this project will be called the “color revolutions”1 method. It was a deception of the Soviet elite, which not only Gorbachev believed, but ... “I long to be deceived myself!” (many call it betrayal).

The demise of the USSR and the socialist commonwealth led to a sharp decline in the role of communist ideology in the world and the importance of the struggle of ideologies as the crucial driving force of history. There is a well-known Leninist formula: “An idea becomes a power when it takes hold of the masses”. Older generations are used to considering ideology as an unconditionally dominant system of ideas and semantic paradigms among the people, as an inspiring image of the Future, as a system comparable to religious faith. They perceive the current situation when ideological factors cease to play critical part in the process of historical development as a “spiritual vacuum”.

Meanwhile, periods when ideology plays such a role and the people show unconditional unity are exceptions rather than the rule. In other periods, the role of ideologies, the processes of their development and confrontation do not act as key factors in the life of society, but are concentrated in its more or less narrow layer, which is called the ruling stratum or elite. It is this stratum (or class) that develops an ideology, protects it from hostile influences, and communicates it to society. It is the main bearer of ideology.

Thus, the work aims to revise the idea of the bearer of ideology that is familiar to a large part of Russians, but is not quite in line with the modern period, and to consider the problems that arise when representing this idea more adequately.

Ideologies and their bearers

The modern historical period is a difficult time for Russia not only because of the special military operation that evolved into a “hybrid war” waged by the Collective West against Russia. The avalanche of sanctions that has fallen on the system of foreign economic relations has produced a range of not only technological and logistical, but also political challenges. Currently, for Russia, one of the critical tasks is to get out of the ten years of economic stagnation. If we look at the 2009–2019 period alone (before the coronavirus pandemic and the SMO), we see that GDP growth at that time was only 9%2. In a multipolar world, civilizational poles in the form of associations are being formed. One of these poles is the Eurasian one with Russia as its center. The goal is to ensure the attractiveness of Russia’s socio-economic structure for those countries that have become or may become friendly or cease to be hostile. The Russia–Africa and Russia–Latin America summits, and the expansion of the BRICS coalition prove that the goal is feasible.

There have been many situations in the history of Russia when the existence of the country depended on rapid and radical transformations.

People are able to cope with a multitude of grave challenges. And the foundation lies in the unity of the people, the revival of their spirits, the rise of passionarity, which depend on their moral state, the viability of their ideology. So far, what we see is a clear lack of passionarity. And we can hardly say that we know how to get the people and their elite to “awake” (as for the possibilities of the social sciences, see the next section). But the continuous study of the socio-psychological life of the people, their system of values and meanings , and methods of influencing this aspect of societal life is a priority task for the government. In addition, in order to address the complex of tasks facing the country, it is necessary, first of all, to specify them and determine priorities for their implementation; what we need is a worldview . In our opinion, the definition of the concept of ideology can be as follows. Ideology is a system of ideas about the world and valuebased and semantic paradigms that dominates in a certain community, promoting and directing the life of its members³. Ideologies can be scientifically substantiated or based on religious faith; they can be clearly perceived by their bearers intellectually, or present a combination of intuitive beliefs and unconscious assessments and aspirations.

In the modern information and knowledge society, in the context of a tough ideological confrontation between the West and the Non-West, the role of ideology is not reduced to the task of socio-economic development; it literally determines the question of life and death, unification or disintegration of society. Since Soviet times, we have been used to the fact that the most important condition for ideology to fulfill its function is its reliance on the social sciences. The possibilities and limitations of the social sciences are discussed in the next section. The major conclusion (lesson)

from the history of the tragic death of the beautiful ideocracy of the USSR is as follows: ideology should not become a rigid lifeless dogma. This thesis has become familiar due to its being repeated a thousand times, but it rarely gives a clear and concrete presentation of what it means in life, in practice. Ideology should be a living ideology , responding to all new events and challenges, always fighting and defending its system of values and meanings. And it should be open to broad discussions and necessary changes. The top officials of the party and government should fully participate in it. Of course, special institutions are needed to develop the sciences of society and ideology, to study its perception and assimilation by society (we should say that the tasks of updating the theoretical part of the official ideology were also very serious). Under a tough confrontation with the information and ideological institutions of the West, the Soviet elite could not create such conditions. Repression and prohibitions had to be used. The dogmatization and the loss of energy and influence of the official ideology was followed by the expansion of the influence of the capitalist ideology – consumerism and the enrichment mindset.

It is advisable to distinguish between two concepts that are named ideology. Society is always guided by a certain set of generally accepted knowledge, principles, moral rules and restrictions, value orientations and semantic paradigms that are not always perceived clearly and that have different extent of influence on the behavior of members of society and groups. This complex will be called deep ideology (DI). It is formed and based on the entire culture of the people, on their mentality and psychology4.

But the formation of national policy and the education system, which is especially important for the upbringing of the next generations, requires an intellectually formalized complex: basic knowledge about nature and society, rules of thinking and conduct, value orientations and semantic paradigms (in particular, an image of the future). Intellectually formalized ideology (IFI) is a kind of stem or core of deep ideology. In Soviet times, this core was represented by Marxism–Leninism and historical materialism5.

Currently, alongside a decline in the political role of ideologies (possibly, the emergence of a “spiritual vacuum”), the importance of IFI turns out to be less prominent than the more complex and multidimensional phenomenon of DI. IFIs can be universal and not related to a specific carrier community, while the dominant DIs in various communities usually differ significantly. An ideology (both formalized and deep) of such a large community as a people does not cover the entire complexity of its internal and external relations, needs, traditions, and culture.

Smaller communities that emerge and function – social strata, ruling groups, financial and political corporations, etc. – remain outside the framework of ideology. Each of them can form its own ideology, which the community uses for its own purposes. All this applies to the ruling stratum, the bearer of the dominant ideology.

The ruling stratum

To understand the mechanism of interaction between ideology and society, it is necessary to consider the formation of its bearer – the ruling stratum. The creators of Marxism have established that the main role in the formation of ideology belongs to the bourgeois class. This ideology reflects the interests of the capitalist class, and its representatives have the opportunity to extend it to the whole society. But the ruling class plays a decisive role not only in the economy. It influences society through power relations. The main instrument of power is the state. Even in the era of rapid development of capitalism, the ruling stratum included not only financial and industrial magnates, but also government officials.

Back at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, Italian sociologists Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto6 showed that the ruling stratum (class), or elite, which has more power than the state, often plays a major role in the social structure, and uses it as a tool to their advantage. This stratum defines the foundations of politics and forms the personnel of the government. The interests of the ruling stratum may coincide with those of the state and society as a whole, but at times they may differ significantly. While the interests and semantic paradigms of both the state as a fairly cohesive community and the ruling stratum may differ from the deep ideology that has developed in the rest of society. Such situations can lead to serious political crises.

Mosca and Pareto studied the political sphere of society and the phenomenon of power. The bourgeoisie constituted the majority of the ruling stratum and enjoyed most of its influence. But the elite, the main social stratum endowed with power, combines different elements according to their origin (inheritance), social status, and type of activity. In 1956, American sociologist and political scientist Wright Mills put forward a clear and quite specific description of the structure of the U.S. ruling elite7 (Mills, 1959). Thus, according to Western sociology, the actor guiding the development of society is in most cases the ruling elite, and the state is the main tool in its hands.

Conclusions about the priority role of the ruling elite in relation to the state were made by Western sociologists based on the study of societies of Western civilization. A comparison of the structure of societies in Russia, China and in the countries of East Asia with the countries of the West indicates profound differences8. In particular, in these non-Western countries, the state has significant independence and much greater authority and power compared to other parts of the ruling stratum. It usually defines the foundations of social ideology and the directions of necessary transformations in society. In the “state–elite” pair, it is the state that turns out to be the actor that forms the elite as a tool for solving the problems of society (in the way it understands them).

We should point out an interesting fact: Chinese historians – ideologists of Confucianism write that in China, in the ideology of society and in real practice, the state does not serve as an expression and executor of the ideas and attitudes of society (the prevailing view in modern developed countries). The state has always been and remains the educator of society; the state can and should develop and adjust human nature “because of its disposition to goodness” (Renaissance..., 2011). In Russia, in most historical epochs, the fact of belonging to the elite (nobility) was inextricably linked to the duty of service to the sovereign. Historians call this type of elite the service class people.

G. Mosca raises the question regarding the reasons for the change of one ruling stratum (the ruling class, the ruling elite) along with its state to another (Quigley later wrote about this in relation to the change of any “tools” of Western expansion). Mosca considers the common reason for the weakening of the ruling stratum to be its separation from society, suppression of any possibility of control by society, elimination of the need to respond to its changing demands and take into account the possibility of loss of power. In the context of social mobility, there should be a gradual (rather than radical) renewal of its composition and its ideology. When separated from society, the ruling stratum begins to feel permissiveness, it becomes infected with moral degradation. The state apparatus is affected by the disease of bureaucracy, corruption is growing.

In the conditions of modern confrontation of civilizations, the reason for the change of the ruling stratum can be found in the transformation of its politics, ideology, and partly its composition under the influence of foreign power centers and their special services imposing their own ideology. Such transformations took place during the orchestration of “color revolutions” by Western centers. In fact, Mosca’s concept turned out to be the theoretical basis of G. Sharp’s “color revolutions” technology.

Splits in the ruling stratum

Mosca, as a historian, makes the following nontrivial conclusion: the stability of the ruling stratum (class) with its ideology is determined by the presence of a “second stratum” that is not allowed to have personal contacts with the governing core of power and therefore acting and making decisions based on the ideology they adhere to9. The “first stratum”, and even more so its governing core, which forms a new ideology and a new power structure, usually represents a too narrow, small group. It uses a much more numerous “second stratum” to connect with a wide mass of potential supporters, to spread a new ideology, and to ensure the stability of power. Thus a split in the ruling class takes place.

One of the most productive approaches to studying the dynamics of elites and their ideologies is presented in a book by Peter Turchin (Turchin, 2023). Based on many historical examples, the author shows a situation where the number of applicants for the status of a member of the ruling stratum is growing rapidly, while the number of “places” in this stratum, in the elite, remains relatively unchanged. “Disappointed” applicants whose expectations to get a “place” in the elite have failed form a counter-elite with an alternative ideology and start fighting the “first stratum” of the ruling class (according to G. Mosca).

Sometimes the split can be overcome without serious shocks, but some conflicts of this kind escalate to coups d’etat and even to civil wars. Bourgeois revolutions are usually an escalation of conflicts between the rapidly growing bourgeoisie (contenders for places in the political elite) and the old feudal elite. P. Turchin calls the reasons for such processes “overproduction of elites”.

His book also provides examples of how to address the “overproduction of elites” without socio-political upheavals. Such an example can be found in a rapid growth of the capitalist class in terms of their number and wealth in the United States in the second half of the 19th century. For example, in 1860–1870, the number of millionaires in the United States increased from 41 to 545 people. The overgrown bourgeois class was unable to effectively perform the functions of the governing stratum – to form and implement a unified policy and ideology. It was still the “second stratum”, while the “first stratum” consisted of politicians and aristocrats.

The period of the 1870s and 1900s, which is called the Gilded Age, was extremely chaotic and contradictory. However, the process of acquisitions and mergers was steadily underway, which made it possible to reduce the number of contenders for elite positions – the top management of major companies. The members of this small community, had real power in society just in virtue of their position as heads of large organizations. Gradually, they joined forces with professional politicians after the model of the English establishment. The remaining members of the capitalist class made up the “second layer” of the elite or joined the middle class. Alongside the processes in the socio-economic sphere, there was a process of revising the old ideology, a struggle of supporters and opponents of strengthening the “second layer” and its unification with the old elite. There emerged the Great Merger Movement (1895– 1904). Business leaders put forward an idea that unlimited competition was harmful to both society and economy. Business circles (containing a small number of members) easily united and acquired more and more power over the legislative and executive bodies of government.

A. Fursov and M. Delyagin, in their works on the history of Britain and the Anglo-Saxons, systematically use a crucial term: the subject of strategic action (SSA). M. Delyagin defines SSA as “an intra-elite group that is united by longterm interests well understood by its members and that possesses tools to reproduce and maintain its influence” (Delyagin, 2023, pp. 8–9). Such a subject is undoubtedly necessary for modern Russia. Only it should not be about interests, but primarily about the ability to maintain continuity for a long time in understanding and preserving the patriotic sentiment as the main transpersonal meaning. At different historical stages the group may include representatives of different social strata, and the image of the future may change. But for Russia in the modern historical situation, the very realization of the need for such a strategic entity seems to be a priority task. Judging by the use of the concept of SSA by A. Fursov and M. Delyagin, in G. Mosca’s model of the ruling class it corresponds to its governing core rather than the entire “first stratum”.

The role of the “second stratum” is especially important when the “first stratum” is decaying, in conditions when the actions of the governing core, its policies, for one reason or another, cease to meet the requirements of society, the dominant ideology. During such a period, the “second stratum” may “become infected with the same disease”. This may lead to a radical change in the ruling stratum, and in the modern era of confrontation between civilizations – to a severe crisis in the country, and turn its development in the other direction (to the victory of a “color revolution”).

However, the presence of a “second stratum” can also provide the opposite effect – help to preserve the ruling stratum, ideology, and the direction of historical development. The “second stratum”, “charged” with the dominant ideology, puts forward a new group that is claiming power and that purifies and renews the ruling stratum and grants it an additional period of rule. Such historical results include the J. Kadar group coming to power in Hungary after the suppression of the 1956 uprising, and the group of L. Svoboda and G. Gusak – in Czechoslovakia after 1968. Without the presence of a “second stratum” in the communist parties of these countries, further development along the socialist path would have been impossible.

In many societies, institutions are emerging and being specially built to distinguish the elite stratum from the rest of society in order to ensure its privileged position, its cohesion and the reliability of its patriotic sentiment. An example can be found in a phenomenon such as the establishment in British society; it is formed primarily with the help of the elite education system (private schools and elite universities) aimed at developing “administrative intelligence and strengthening physical health (Delyagin, 2023, chapter VII). The entire English elite sent their children from the age of six to private boarding schools, where merciless long-term “cramming and training” awaited them. They were actually removed from the family (they visited their families only on vacation).

Examples of the application of the presented concepts to modern problems

Currently, most of the ruling class in developed countries comprises workers of science, education, healthcare, and managers of enterprises and institutions, i.e. a community of people of high intellectual and cultural level. Back in the early 20th century, this rapidly growing sector of the population in many countries was poorly represented in government structures – this is the most important part of the contenders for elite places. In English society, the establishment has lost its socially recognized status of superiority. One of the important reasons, though not the main one, was the discrepancy between elite education and the new tasks and needs of society: university graduates were able to lead a huge empire, but had no scientific engineering, pedagogical or medical knowledge.

Describing this conflict in the UK, M. Delyagin compares it with a similar conflict in Soviet society (Delyagin, 2023, pp. 195–206). The analogy with the British process consists mainly in the composition of the conflicting parties. One side of the contradiction was the party elite (the real government), the other was the intellectual youth working in scientific and high-tech institutions and enterprises. M. Delyagin attaches great importance to this conflict in the destruction of the USSR: it “led to catastrophic consequences” (Delyagin, 2023, p. 195). We find it difficult to agree with this opinion. The youth did not seek power, they needed information and creative freedom. The social mobility elevators continued to operate, although they began to malfunction. Party leaders were restricting this freedom not because they feared that physicists and mathematicians would oust them from government. There was an onset of a period when the energy of transpersonal meanings started to weaken, a period of “ideological vacuum”. Most party leaders and ideologists understood the need to include the energy of a market-based semantic concept, i.e., the transition to a system of “combining the plan and the market”. The ideology of perestroika was oriented toward such a transition.

Since the 1970s, several options for deep reform in the economic and political system have been developing in government structures. However, there is not yet a sufficient amount of open materials about these developments and about the groups that were their carriers. Such a factor as the “overproduction of elites” can explain little in the processes of the late 1980s and the collapse of the Union. Conversely, one of the most important factors (if not the main one) was the influence of information and ideological centers and special services of the West on these processes10. The standard of living in the USSR remained significantly lower than in Europe and North America, and was no longer rising. A significant proportion of the ruling class consisted of people who were convinced that the way out of the crisis for Russia was to become an “ordinary liberal capitalist country” and return to the community of Western countries.

Due to a rapid growth of the social stratum of educated intellectuals, there is always a danger of the emergence of a community of those who claim to participate in the management of society, and a split of the type of “overproduction of elites”. Such a split did not become a serious problem either in the British Empire or in Soviet society. The fact is that in both cases the opportunity was constantly open for dissident passionaries to come forward and climb the ladder of the socio-political hierarchy away from the center, where there is always a shortage of active intellectuals. In the British Empire, these were colonies, in the Soviet Union – regions of Siberia, the Arctic, the Far East, or assistance to friendly forces in Africa or Latin America. More generally, the task of preventing elite splits can be described as creating a political and semantic inspiring perspective for dissident passionaries.

One of these prospects is the implementation of one’s potential in the field of culture, healthcare, scientific and technological research and development, as well as in the field of education – the “production” of the cultural and intellectual part of human potential. A significant part of the highly intellectual and cultural stratum, i.e. the elite, works here. In developed countries, privileged and most attractive conditions are created for the effective work of this valuable part of employees, primarily an increased level of remuneration. Unfortunately, in modern Russia, this does not apply to all of the above sectors. E. Uzyakova (Uzyakova, 2023) provides a comparison of the structure of wage levels by industry for Russia (2021) and for the United States (2019). The work considers the ratio (in %) of nominal wages of employees of the industries in question to the average for the economy as a whole. In particular, in the “Education” sector in the United States the wage level practically coincides with the average in the economy (most likely, private elite education is not taken into account in this indicator), in Russia – 76.7% of the average. In the “Research and Development” sector in the United States the payment is twice the average for the economy, in Russia – 165%.

We clearly see an underestimated level of remuneration for the work of teachers. A lot has been said about the need to improve the quality of the modern education system, which in Soviet times was considered one of the best in the world. This problem is multidimensional, and it cannot be argued that a simple increase in teachers’ salaries will lead to a quick solution. However, it is necessary that this problem should become a most significant and urgent national task.

The theory of Mosca, Pareto, and Turchin about the role of the ruling stratum is based almost exclusively on the historical experience of Western European countries, without relying on the experience of Asian or Eurasian countries. This is due to the profound differences in the social structure and experience of countries whose civilizations differ.

In the countries of Western civilization in the last few centuries, in the “ruling class – state” pair, it was more often the ruling class, the elite, that was the subject forming the state as a tool for its goals and interests. In Russian civilization, the state often formed the ruling (service) class (Sergeitsev et al., 2020). This was manifested especially clearly in the Soviet era: at that time the formation of the ruling stratum became the most important task of the state (party-state apparatus) – the task of forming a human resource to achieve its goals.

Currently, the pivotal factor in the ideology of any country is the role of an unprecedented, allencompassing process of technology development. D. Acemoglu and S. Johnson write: “Every day we hear from executives, journalists, politicians and even some of our colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that we are relentlessly moving towards a better world thanks to the unprecedented development of technology… Of course, problems remain, but talented entrepreneurs and scientists will invent solutions – more advanced robots, artificial intelligence at the human level and any other breakthroughs that will be required” (Acemoglu, Johnson, 2023). The authors list absolutely “unimaginable” and inspiring achievements in connection with artificial intelligence (AI): “Facial recognition software, search engines that guess what you want to find, and recommendation systems that select products for you that you are likely to like, the interaction between human speech and computer. AI programs can recognize thousands of different objects and images and provide basic translation from more than a hundred languages, can invest better than experienced financial analysts, can help attorneys and lawyers”.

The opportunities and prospects opened up by technology development make it an important element of the value-semantic system both in the West and in non-Western civilizational poles. In non-Western countries, it is usually not a goal, but a means to ensure conditions for human life and its improvement. And in the West, it acts as an independent value, as a continuation (with the necessary adjustments) of the highest semantic orientation of the capitalist era – orientation toward the development of production and enrichment.

The main idea of the cited book by Acemoglu and Johnson is to study negative implications and issues that generate transformations of public relations in the uncontrolled (and often rapid) process of developing new technologies, and to criticize an overly optimistic attitude toward technology development (the study is based on the experience of Western countries). The main negative problems are related to the growth of economic inequality, deterioration of working conditions for large contingents of workers (due to automation of production) and the increased control of enterprise managers over employees, and ruling groups over the entire population (the book does not explore threats associated with the progress of military technologies). In general, the authors remain optimistic and are convinced that society should and is able to navigate the development of technology so as it would serve good purposes. To do this, the ideological space should contain an idea concerning the technologies that society and people need, and also which technologies will bring grief or provoke hostility between people. Such changing public perceptions in the book are called visions of a problem or its solution.

The community of historians describing the origin of socialist societies agrees that such societies result from the implementation of socialist ideology, previously developed as a theory and to some extent even as a design project. In other words, the most important role here was played by the IFI, which corresponded well to the deep ideology of the working classes.

The process of formation of a modern societal structure in Western countries is completely different. Their ideology consists of a “capitalist” part – individualistic liberalism plus the goal of enrichment, formed jointly and interconnected with a system of socio-economic institutions, and an ideology of superiority (civilizational or racial), encompassing all social strata in one form or another. It is supported by a really high level of economy, technology and quality of life in Western countries. The unity and stability of both the social structure and this ideology are also ensured by the system of government institutions, which is often called the “deep state”.

The capitalist part of the ideology was formed jointly with the system of socio-economic institutions, consistently advancing in different countries on different sides of public life without anything resembling a general plan or project. The ideology of superiority has existed for a much longer time than the system of capitalism, and is basically a deep ideology. Of undoubted interest are those socio-psychological traits that helped the West to achieve its historical leadership. Let us turn to Oswald Spengler. In his main work The Decline of the West (Der Untergang des Abendlandes) he shows the differences between the worldview of a Western person from the worldview of nonWestern peoples. Here, for example, is how he describes the perception of the same actions related to the expansion and exploration of space. For a Westerner, this is an idea of “conquering space” which implies the physical energy of resistance of the space, “which would be completely impossible to explain to a Greek”. This idea demonstrates the “claim of the soul to rule over the alien”. The metaphysical passion of the Western man strives to overcome “all obstacles to his sense of power” (Spengler, 1998, pp. 449, 517). “The will to power, also in the field of morality, is the desire to give one’s morality universal importance, to force humanity to obey it, the desire to alter, overcome, destroy any other morality… Whoever thinks differently, feels differently, desires differently, is bad, an apostate, an enemy. They must be fought without mercy” (Spengler, 1998, pp. 495, 499).

In the 20th century, an idea of aggressive boundless expansion and domination became the basis of the ideology of globalization. Spengler, in essence, argues that this is not just the result of prevailing historical and geographical circumstances, but the spiritual basis of the “Faustian soul” of Western peoples. The founder of DNA genealogy A.A. Klesov hypothesized that the aggressiveness of Westerners, their inability to come to terms with the dissimilarity, and even more so with the alternative of other ethnic groups, other civilizations, has a genetic character and source11.

The ideology of superiority of the peoples of Western civilization is the most important factor ensuring their unity and activation. However, since the beginning of the 21st century the West has been gradually losing actual superiority; therefore, the preservation of real superiority and the idea of it, rooted in the consciousness of society, becomes an imperative for which Western elites are ready to discard any moral norms and restrictions, and higher values, and the meanings of being. Sociopolitical groups and movements are coming to power, ready to support neo-fascists, provoke local wars in order to weaken countries resisting their dictates, and take steps to escalate the war threatening a nuclear apocalypse.

In the deep ideologies of Russia and China, unlike in the West, the most important meanings are aimed not at achieving superiority, but at ensuring stability and cooperation between different ethnic groups and different social strata. The Russian people achieved the greatest success when they managed to unite for the common cause. Communist aspirations toward revolutionary transformations were mainly aimed at overcoming capitalist ideology, which was alien to the Russian and Chinese civilizational codes. The change of the socialist foundations of the social structure to capitalist ones in the 1990s led to disastrous results. And since the 2000s the process of restoring the system of priorities of the welfare state and the value of historical tradition, familiar to Russian civilization (including a significant number of socialist features in ideology), has begun.

In China, in June 2023, Xi Jinping announced a “new starting point” – a new, clarified formulation of the foundations of ideology. Its main idea is as follows: “The combination and integration of the basic tenets of Marxism with the best traditions of Chinese culture is the path that must be followed to study and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics on the basis of Chinese civilization”12. Given the need for rapprochement between Russia and China, one can be sure that a new step by Chinese ideologists will help the Russian leadership to use the semantic riches of socialism in ideological work. From the very first days of his leadership of the Communist Party and the country, Xi Jinping most often turned to the wisdom of Confucius. Addressing the youth on May 4, 2014, he cited 17 Confucian quotes, in particular: “to reach agreement in the presence of disagreements”, “a noble man considers justice to be the most important thing in all matters”. I think there is no need to prove how close these Chinese ideological paradigms are to the modern deep ideology of the Russian patriotic elite (even if it is not framed as a state ideology).

The elevation of tradition as the most important spiritual value, state support for the study and understanding of history and the creation of its balanced image, without unilateral distortions, corresponding to the “code of the Russian people”, should become one of the main parts of the ideology of society and the state.

What can be demanded from the sciences of society?

Since the knowledge about the world is part of ideology, it should be recognized that ideology has to be scientific, i.e. based on provisions verified by science. However, the value-semantic paradigms that dominate society or its parts do not necessarily have to be transferred to ideology. The ideology of the elite or a part of it can set goals for improving the social structure and shape the image of the Future. The bearer of ideology, who has power, as a rule, sets tasks for science arising from his/her ideological views and directs the development of science.

Currently, due to the monopolization of the mass media and control over the content of social media, it is possible to centrally manage the set of ideas, perceptions, and assessments that we have called an intellectually formalized ideology. The confidence of a significant part of society and the elite in such an “artificial IFI” is supported, in particular, by the fact that its key ideas and provisions are presented as conclusions of science. It is the task of the political struggle to verify and, if necessary, refute such ideas and provisions. This section of our paper provides arguments in favor of the fact that it is not only a matter of using provisions that are not related to science, but that the social sciences themselves are often overestimated, that their ability to reflect actual patterns of social processes is very limited.

Nowadays the provision that science is one of the main driving forces of history is recognized as an undoubted truth. Its development is the basis for the creation of new materials, energy sources, new technology, and, in general, the creation and improvement of the human habitat. Participation of science in the formation of human communities and man as a biological, psychological, and social phenomenon is becoming increasingly active. The impact of science can lead both to strengthening the morality of society, its unity, security, and to increasing threats to its existence – splits and fragmentation (for example, to the orchestration and triggering of “color revolutions”), exacerbation of conflicts, up to wars: cold, hot, hybrid. Obviously, the development of science is associated with serious moral and value-related issues beyond its scope. But it turns out that science itself and its capabilities encounter limitations and doubts related to the problem of verification and reliability.

When it comes to nature and the natural sciences, there arise no doubts and philosophical difficulties. But can we be sure that the findings of the social sciences provide a picture of society that meets the verification requirements? That the fundamental factors determining crucial upcoming events do not remain outside the framework of those patterns that are discovered and described by the social sciences? These questions are answered (negatively!) by A.N. Kolmogorov’s theory of complexity. An apparatus with limited recognition ability cannot understand and distinguish from a pile of randomness the very “information message” that would “scientifically” describe a process that surpasses its recognition ability in complexity. This provision is also called Ashby’s law.

Science is a part of public consciousness. Materialistic philosophers believe that the consciousness of an individual and society (including science) is a reflection of reality. We cannot agree with this provision. Accepting this postulate would mean denying the creative ability of consciousness. But human consciousness, in addition to reflecting existing objects, can create new ones – build new models and projects that do not exist in reality. The discerning ability of one’s consciousness and thinking cannot be greater than the complexity, diversity of one’s thinking and behavior, since consciousness itself is also the subject of comprehension, an object that it must realize. The same can be said about public consciousness and social science.

The task of science is to identify and reveal stable parameters and objective patterns of processes occurring in nature and society. There is no reason to believe that the discerning ability of scientists and scientific organizations researching the life of society is more complex than the object of research, i.e. those actions and ideas that are created by major historical figures, their communities and organizations. For any pattern, there is such a group of members of society whose actions and ideas do not fit into this pattern. Of course, regarding the patterns discovered by the natural sciences, it is also impossible to guarantee absolute reliability. However, possible violations of the pattern are very small or the probability of their occurrence is quite small.

Erich Fromm describes the difference between humans and animals in a similar way (Fromm, 1992, p. 43). An animal adapts to the environment, to its ecological niche and lives in harmony with it or dies. A person often goes beyond the limits outlined for them by nature. And they do not have an inherited instinctive program of behavior for any new situation and are looking for new solutions.

If violations of the pattern can be considered insignificant and unimportant, then the pattern is recognized as verified and scientifically substantiated. Any patterns that are used in practice are based on trust in them. The trust factor is especially important when using the social sciences.

A person has to make serious decisions in the context of uncertainty. Scientific knowledge makes it possible to drastically reduce uncertainty, identify highly probable and almost incredible consequences. The authority of science plays a crucial role when it comes to theory as the basis of ideology. An example is the Marxist–Leninist theory, which largely determined the direction of historical development for the whole 20th century.

An individual and his/her community, their life and development are characterized by such high complexity that the question arises: how is it that for long periods of time (historically calm) not only scientists, but also ordinary people understand the causes of events and confidently predict the state of society for several years ahead? As a result of the cultural and civilizational development of peoples and other communities, institutions such as morality, law, customs, religions and ideologies arise that limit the “infinite” variety of possibilities for human actions and even thoughts (initially limited only by natural conditions). The same institutions can empower a person, but at the same time they are put under the control of the community.

These considerations show that the science of society cannot be required to have the same reliable and universal knowledge as the natural sciences. The patterns discovered by science “exist” for a very short time, because modern society is rapidly changing. They do not look like the “products” of fundamental natural sciences. Knowledge about society can be very valuable, and most often its value and effectiveness is manifested if it is used “here and now”. Long-term strategies have to be built on the basis of current knowledge. But one needs to be ready to constantly check and update both this knowledge and the strategy itself. We can say that, for the most part, the science of society is an applied science.

The use of Marxist science by Vladimir Lenin can serve as an illustration. According to Marx’s theory, which arose as part of the study of the development of Western European countries, the communist socio-economic system can be established only after and on the basis of the development of capitalism. At the beginning of the 20th century, capitalism was underdeveloped in Russia, the bourgeoisie did not play a significant political role, most Marxists believed that the Marxist party should support the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the government whose policies would contribute to the development of capitalism.

At that time, civilizational differences between Russia and Europe had not yet been sufficiently studied and known. But Lenin understood that science could not be directly used as a basis for a plan of action. In particular, in Marxist science, state power does not play a decisive role that it has always played and is playing in Russia. At the same time, he was most aware and felt that for the profound transformation of society, which is the goal of the Communists, in Russia they need the fullness of state power and a powerful semantic, ideological foundation. A new type of party (modeled after religious orders) was intended to become its bearer. Marxist science served as an essential tool for this: it provided the communist Goal and Ideology with the authority of science (at that time, the Marxist trend was one of the most advanced ones). That is, Lenin used science not only and, perhaps, not so much as a theory; he mainly took into account its applied potential.

At the same time, Lenin went beyond those limits that history had built up and that social science had reflected. He showed that the way out is possible by taking and using power. Not the power as a main incentive and motivation for the actions of the majority of great historical figures and ruling elites – the power as a condition for the domination of their social group or their class. And, of course, not the power that Friedrich Nietzsche wrote about as a way for superman to go beyond the “too human” (Sergeitsev et al., 2020, pp. 275– 276). For Lenin, power is necessary not as an end, but as a means of transforming society. The victory of Lenin’s ideas demonstrates that the complexity of man and his history is higher than the ability of social science to “recognize” it.

The value of science in its “applied” meaning for the effective management of society is high. This requires people with great knowledge and charisma, endowed with a special talent (intuition) to understand the key issues of the situation that concern the people they are managing. Many of these qualities can be obtained as a result of learning about the sciences of society. In some cases, natural charismatics can be replaced by professionals.

Personnel for the elite and the problem of inequality

As already noted, in Russia and China, in the “ruling stratum – state” pair, during the phases of normal development of society, the state is the leading link forming the ruling stratum, the elite. The most important task of the state is to create an active, professional, patriotic elite. This section mainly discusses practical approaches to solving this problem.

In the Russian Federation, the modern personnel composition of financial and economic institutions and state sectoral and territorial management bodies was formed to a large extent during the period of the destruction of the Soviet management system. The existing “personnel corps” (including managers and owners of large companies) is far from perfect and arouses a lot of criticism in terms of professional suitability and even in terms of unpatriotic ideological views. Many journalists and political scientists raise the issue of the need to accelerate the process of updating the staff of economic managers, improve the dominant value and semantic paradigms, and the need for the “transformation of the elite”13. This task is implemented by the government. The question is the choice of methods, mechanisms for the “selection and promotion” of personnel for the ruling stratum, as well as ensuring its patriotic life views, preventing the impact of a hostile ideology.

Developed capitalist countries achieved high results at the expense of market competition, due to the fact that the most capable entrepreneurs and “managers” became more financially secure and influential in society. The ability to find acceptable ways in the most difficult market situations is no less valuable than achievements in science or medicine. But when the amount of personal property serves as the main factor determining a person’s status in society, it creates such powerful “spontaneous” forces generating inequality, that the problem of limiting inequality becomes (and still remains) the most difficult problem of humankind14. The civilizational code of Russia and its historical experience are incompatible with the supremacy of capitalist principles. In addition, the excessive gap between the poor and the rich is becoming a serious drag on economic growth, as it hinders the growth of demand from the majority of consumers.

At the same time, the initial simplified view of socialism as a system of complete socio-economic equality is also undoubtedly erroneous. It would create an extremely unstable society fraught with constant danger that some part of the elite would be dissatisfied with their standard of living and social influence. In poor countries the gap between the rich top of society and the rest of the population is usually greater than in rich developed countries. The reason is that the elites of poor countries strive to provide themselves with the same lifestyle and opportunities for social influence as the elite of rich developed countries. And the governments of poor countries do not seriously set the task of limiting the wealth of the elite, since such a policy can provoke a significant part of the elite, i.e. active, qualified, capable entrepreneurs, to leave the country.

Excessive growth of economic inequality became one of the reasons for the rapid (by historical standards) strengthening and spread of the ideology of socialism in the 19th and 20th century and the fact that it became a great semantic complex on a par with world religions. It is now recognized that the socialist system can fully utilize the mechanism of market competition (following the example of the Chinese Communist Party). Russia undoubtedly needs to update the ideology of socialism, taking into account the best features of the Soviet socio-economic system and modern approaches. What Russia needs is an ideology of socialism with Russian specifics.

In Russia, as a result of the transformation of the economic and social structure in the 1990s, the problem of inequality sharply worsened. The ratio of incomes of the richest 10% to the poorest 10%, which in late Soviet times was 6–8 times, remained at the level of 15–16 times in 2010–2020. In terms of inequality, Russia has occupied one of the top positions among developed countries15. At the same time, studies by many Russian and foreign sociologists show that the perception of a high level of inequality by the Russian population differs from the perception of residents of other countries: Russians’ assessment contains much more criticism. The Russian population considers the state responsible for the necessary reduction in inequality (Gorshkov, 2014; Belekhova, 2023).

In rich capitalist countries, as a rule, a significant part of the population considers a certain level of inequality to be a completely normal phenomenon or an inevitable “retribution” necessary to promote a stimulating effect of the capitalist semantic aspiration toward personal enrichment. The “code” of the Russian people contains strong elements of the “socialist aspiration”, which allows for inequality mainly in the form of moral authority and rejects excessive material inequality.

The Russian state finds itself “between a rock and a hard place”. On the one hand, the stalling of the implementation of publicly stated goals aimed at a more equitable distribution generates a decrease in trust in the government, apathy and passivity among the people (Ilyin, Morev, 2022). On the other hand, a dramatic change in the mechanisms of redistribution (seemingly justified by the military situation) in the context of an information and ideological war can lead to opposition sentiments in the stratum of large owners and to its split. If these dangers have at least a small chance of being implemented in real life, then it is necessary to learn to wait, adapting to an unacceptably high level of inequality: to maintain confidence that this is temporary; to create conditions so that the patriotic part of government does not feel poor compared to the oligarchs. Perhaps the best line of policy is a slow, step-by-step introduction of a progressive scale of taxation for income and property. Apparently, the introduction of personal income tax in the amount of 15% for high-income people was the first step in such a project. We will wait for further steps.

Let us return to the task of forming a “personnel corps” for the managing stratum. In the era of classical capitalism, the main mechanism for personnel change was market competition (with the ruin of bankrupt companies and creation of new ones). Now, in the era of the dominance of giant corporations and the increase in the size of the state apparatus of large countries, more significant personnel change processes are taking place within the bureaucratic structures governing these organizations. Accelerated personnel rotation by dismissing those who failed and appointing new ones most often faces the problem of strengthening the power of clans, dominance of kinship and friendly ties, ignoring the business and moral qualities of applicants for the position. As a result, a new composition of the management structure often turns out to be worse than the previous one.

The method that can be described as a design method proved to be the best back in Soviet times. A contingent of employees and managers, as well as organizations involved in the implementation of a long-term project of priority importance for the economy or society (for example, a system for designing and building nuclear power plants for domestic and foreign customers), stand out and begin to act according to special rules that differ from the generally accepted ones, and use special opportunities. These differences, for example, may include the obligation of any Russian companies and government agencies to fulfill, as a matter of priority, requests for information, orders for certain types of equipment from the project participants.

The fact that the participants of such a project are aware of the paramount importance of their common cause for the country and the people inevitably becomes a factor uniting them and forming their semantic paradigms. Participation in a project has a particularly strong spiritual impact if the participants are united geographically or often communicate with each other due to their working together. Another important quality of the project is its long-term, strategic nature.

In this sense, projects for the creation and development of territorial production complexes (TPCs) can serve as a model. A number of TPCs in the fields of the Urals and Siberia were created back in Soviet times and were expected to be further developed over several generations. For example, initially, the extraction of metal-containing ores is established through the supply of mining equipment from other regions; then machine-building plants are constructed so as to satisfy their own needs and to supply products to other regions. Roads and energy facilities were built ahead of schedule in the expectation of future construction of factories with increasingly complex products. The inevitable rapid growth of settlements, then cities, and the development of the personnel training system – from schools and kindergartens to branches of the country’s leading universities – are taken into account16.

Treating a certain project (which may include both public and private companies) and its team as privileged puts it in a monopolist situation and eliminates competitive incentives for development. Lack of incentives can lead to degradation of the project’s management system17. In such a situation, the state naturally assumes the main role in creating incentives, developing opportunities and long-term prospects for the development of the project. It can use a variety of tools: influence price ratios, subsidy systems, government orders, public investments, etc. The key importance, of course, will belong to the parameters of the strategic national economic plan. In the context of the economic war caused by sanctions, which destroys free markets, it is the state that can and should create conditions when import substitution turns out to be the most promising (more than finding ways to circumvent sanctions restrictions).

Many large financial, industrial and other corporations have the ability to create a spiritual and semantic unity of members of a large community and boost their labor activity. The country can and should take advantage of this.

So far, stability is more valuable than new horizons

At the beginning of the paper we listed many tasks facing Russia. Many of them require serious and, if possible, rapid transformations in the economy and other sectors. Journalists and scientists prove that it is necessary to constantly monitor and, when required, improve the ideology that guides the people, concretize the image of the Future for the country, introduce a progressive scale of taxation, create a special body that develops strategic plans… Putin’s management center understands the need to solve most of these tasks. But he hesitates, why? After all, we are not talking about urgent actions that are impossible during the special military operation. We are talking about problems that came to light long before it began. Should we say, as we are already used to hearing (from both opponents and supporters), about the “lack of political will”? After such decisions as the admission of Crimea to the Russian Federation, the beginning of the SMO, the inclusion of new constituent entities into the Russian Federation, such an explanation is completely unacceptable.

The following explanation seems to be the most convincing. Recent years have shown that the monopoly possession of means of influencing public consciousness is a powerful weapon in the hands of the Western “deep state”. In the context of the confrontation between the Collective West and nonWestern countries, which has turned into a real war in the information and ideological space, any radical changes can create splits in Russian society.

Although significant splits are unlikely to occur now, the risks associated with them are too high. During the period of aggravation of confrontation with the West, any changes and transformations must be carried out in compliance with the rule or requirement of maintaining stability of the basic structures of society and principles of life, unity and mutual trust between different social strata, between the government and society.

Conclusion

Let us summarize the main problems and provisions contained in the article.

• 1.    The article defines the concept of ideology and suggests its “dual” structure: deep ideology (DI) – a set of knowledge, principles, moral norms and restrictions (not always clearly understood) that guide society in its life, and intellectually formalized ideology (IFI).

• 2.    The main carrier of ideology is the ruling stratum, the elite, in Western countries, as a rule, directs the development of ideology and uses it for their own purposes. In Russia and China, the leading link is more often the state, which largely forms both the ideology and the ruling stratum.

• 3.    Consideration of the problems of modern development proves the paramount importance of the ruling stratum for the development of society. For the Russian state, the most important problem is to improve personnel selection mechanisms and create privileged conditions for the ruling stratum in a situation of existing unjustified inequality. Approaches to the practical solution of this problem are considered.