Peter van Inwagen's five theses of being and his controversy with the existential-phenomenological tradition
Автор: Gusev Maxim A.
Журнал: Вестник Пермского университета. Философия. Психология. Социология @fsf-vestnik
Рубрика: Философия
Статья в выпуске: 2 (38), 2019 года.
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The article considers P. van Inwagen’s theses about being, including the thesis «being is not an activity». In formulating that Inwagen argues with the existential-phenomenological tradition. The article aims to investigate the causes of the misunderstanding between Inwagen and the existential-phenomenological tradition. It is shown that Inwagen treats this tradition as if it were an «objectivist» approach, just like the analytic tradition but presenting another answer to Inwagen’s meta-ontological question. Ignoring the radical difference between the existential-phenomenological approach and the analytical, «objectivistic» approach leads Inwagen to misunderstanding of Heidegger’s statements about being. From the «objectivist» analytical standpoint, the question of existence has nothing to do with the course of our experience, with fact something has been given to us, or with giving meaning to something, etc. That is why Inwagen wonders how existence can be associated with an «activity» at all. For the same reason, Inwagen does not understand why the existential-phenomenological tradition’s adherents talk about some differences in such «activities». From Inwagen’s point of view, all the differences lie in the «nature» of things, not in being. From the «objectivist» point of view, it seems exactly like that, because it is impossible to understand «from the outside», for example, the convergence of awareness and being-in-the-world. Within Inwagen’s objectivist position, Heidegger’s philosophy can only be comprehended as anthropology or psychology, which are studies limited to the topic of human beings or their inner world. The article concludes that although one can deny the phenomenological approach in general, but it is possible to show from the inside of that approach that what Heidegger says in his philosophy is, firstly, meaningful and, secondly, relates to ontology and not to anthropology or psychology.
Ontology, metaontology, being, existence, inwagen, heidegger, analytic tradition, existential-phenomenological tradition
Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/147227499
IDR: 147227499 | DOI: 10.17072/2078-7898/2019-2-180-193