Concepts in legal science: methodological issues of essence

The article discusses the main approaches to the definition of the methodological essence of the notions of legal science, as well as to their distinction with related methodological phenomena (indefinite description, idea, ideal object, concept and theory). The author suggests an approach to understanding legal scientific notions as reproduced in legal scientific knowledge of subject-meaningful forms, which reflect the main essential features, attitudes and patterns of functioning and development inherent in the phenomena and objects of legal reality and methodologically grounded. It is substantiated that language and the rules of logic are instruments for displaying legal scientific concepts in scientific reasoning, but not the reason for such a display; as such, the substantive representativeness of legal science, as well as general grounds (principles), methods, methodological approaches, criteria and concepts of scientific jurisprudence, i. e. - the methodology of legal science. It argues the conclusion that legal scientific concepts are a form of reflection of scientific knowledge of law, and in this sense cannot be identified with the views of the subject of knowledge on the subject under study, with the phenomena of reasoning per se invariant external (with respect to the subject of knowledge) reality.