Potential of distributed list technologies in cost reduction and optimization of economic system management

The article examines the impact of distributed ledger technologies (DLT systems) on governance efficiency in economic systems. It is shown that DLT systems are not limited to narrow application in the field of digital currencies and smart contracts, but represent a fundamental institutional mechanism that helps reduce transaction costs, increase transaction transparency and form more advanced market relations. The analysis is carried out from the standpoint of transaction cost theory, new institutional economics, and public choice theory. Particular attention is paid to the role of distributed ledger systems in spontaneous order and polycentric governance according to Ostrom, as well as in Buchanan’s «constitutional choice», where users voluntarily accept algorithmically defined rules of the game. The authors conclude that the decentralized nature of DLT, supported by cryptographic methods and economic incentives, is capable of transforming organizational and political institutions, stimulating the growth of trust and inclusiveness in collective decision-making processes.