The concept of the right to a dignified life in pre-revolutionary legal philosophy, particularly in relation to the justification of socio-economic rights

The article conducts a comparative analysis of perspectives held by key advocates of the right to a dignified life in Russia, while also critically reflecting on these viewpoints. This contributes to the ongoing discourse within contemporary Russian scholarship on the existence and implications of the right to a dignified life. To this end, the views of pre-revolutionary thinkers are considered including S. Solovyov, P. I. Novgorodtsev, I. A. Pokrovsky, B. A. Kistyakovsky and S. I. Gessen regarding the problem and their development. A comparative analysis of these perspectives highlights significant divergences on the following matters: 1) whether to acknowledge solely the right to life itself (as advocated by Pokrovsky) or the right to a dignified life (as argued by Novgorodtsev); 2) whether the right to a dignified life should remain solely a moral entitlement (as suggested by Solovyov) or also encompass a positive legal entitlement (as posited by Kistiakovsky); 3) whether the right to a dignified life necessitates a transition from capitalism to socialism (as proposed by Kistiakovsky) or not (as contended by Novgorodtsev). These thinkers have yet to resolve several fundamental issues essential for substantiating any subjective right, whether moral or positive. Furthermore, the reliance of their proposed justifications on the socio-economic context prevents the recognition of the right to a dignified life as natural, unconditional, and inalienable. To address these issues, the author draws upon the Western philosophical and legal tradition. It has been shown that Western scholars' efforts to establish the moral foundations of human rights are closely tied to the aspiration of ensuring a decent standard of living for every individual. A common rationale for both firstand second-generation human rights lies in the challenges associated with justifying the right to a dignified life. These challenges highlight the broader difficulties in justifying human rights as a whole. As a potential solution to the aforementioned challenges, it is suggested to view socio-economic rights solely as a mechanism for safeguarding personal and political rights, rather than as a means to guarantee a "dignified" life. But in this case, the right to a dignified life is unlikely to be classified as a universal human right.