Application of integrated rating mechanisms and matrix non-anonymous generalized median voter schemes to coordination of the agents’ interests

The collective agent coordination problem in organizational behavior systems is consider. In particular, the problem of coordinating of the agents’ interests to assess the degree of achievement of the corporate strategic targets. The relevance of the problem is due to the need to increase the speed of decision-making, the speed of reaction to changes in the external environment, which can be achieved using appropriate control mechanisms. Aim. Improving methods of collective decision making under circumstances where agents have different ranks of significance. Materials and methods. Methods comprise the integrated rating mechanisms and the generalized median voter schemes. The mathematical apparatus was chosen is contingent on the group decision making in organizational systems. Active agents strives to maximize his target function in the process of interaction, which leads to a conflict of interests and a desire to distort information. The chosen methods allow these problems to be solved. The first ones are used to aggregate indicators that reflect the degree of achievement of the private goals of the organization at the strategic level. The second ones are used to identification the true agents’ opinions about the type of target index convolution matrices. Results. The matrix non-anonymous generalized median mechanism is proposed. The non-anonymous statement allows taking into account the interests of agents with different ranks. It is shown how to reduce non-anonymous procedure to an anonymous one. Decisions making process about all elements of the convolution matrices in integrated rating mechanisms with using anonymous median voter scheme is strategy proofnees. However, the results of aggregation are not stability to the agent strategic behavior in cases of application anonymous or non-anonymous coordination procedures. The new integrated mechanism based on the synthesis of known control mechanisms is proposed to overcome the discovered problem. Conclusion. The statement of the problem corresponds to the real procedures of decision making by governance board, when the opinion of one agent turns out to be more significant than the opinion of another agent. The developed mechanism makes it possible to agree on the opinions of experts on the degree of achievement of the strategic goals of the organization; it can also be adapted to solve other applied problems, for example, making a decision on the choice of a project, assessing risks, assessing suppliers, etc.