Public administration efficiency and the aggravation of public health issues

(Source: Opublikovannyi Doklad YuNESKO po nauke: Rossii meshaet “resursnoe proklyatie” [Published UNESCO Report on Science: Russia Is Hampered by the “Resource Curse”]. Novaya Gazeta [New Newspaper], 2015, November 10. Available at: .

Thus, new global challenges for the Russian economy are not the same (more precisely, there are also some new ones) that used to be in the early and mid-2000s. It causes the necessity of radical changes in all its aspects, and first of all, in the aspect of management. However, the same people with the same political consciousness and economic platform are still “at the helm” of the economic bloc of the Government. Experts, social scientists, economists, financiers, production managers who think about the development of economic and political independence of the country believe that the government is still full of the representatives of those circles, for which the division and the wasting of national assets is a priority. Perhaps, this is the major problem of today, which is the cause of deep internal contradictions in the Russian society. This problem is not only inconsistent with the purposes of country’s modernization and transition to a new technological way, but it also threatens Russia’s national security.

Today no one has any doubt that the roots of the current demographic and socioeconomic problems go back to the period of the 1990s, when the era of the Soviet Union (at the decline of its existence as one of the world’s superpowers) was followed by perestroika and liberal reforms. The change in the social order was accompanied by ill-considered government decisions (primarily, a “predatory” privatization7), which threw the Russian society back for decades, foreshadowing Russia’s lagging behind developed countries in terms of economic and scientific-technological development.

The liberal wing of the Government is still pursuing its economic policies not in the interests of the majority of the population, but in the interests of narrow groups whose needs contradict national development goals and the ideas of justice, law and order. We have to admit that the current Government has no fresh ideas and no comprehensive strategy. Granted, it has technocratic instruments like the Main directions of its activities until 2018, etc., but in fact, Russian ministers and officials have no deep understanding of Russia’s problems, or a clear vision of its future. In addition to the low level of competence of many of them, they fail to go beyond the notions that liberal monetarist approaches are the only possible, non-alternative option, and that all that goes beyond them is notorious heresy and populism. Besides, the work of the current government is affected, of course, by obvious interests of big business and the so-called elite⁸.

The consequences that the ill-considered decisions have for the future management are not limited to technological and economic gap between Russia and developed countries. They affect the quality characteristics of the Russian society and are manifested in the deformation of social structure, social consciousness and behavior, i.e. they are expressed in deep systemic problems of social health, the solution of which can take decades – the time that Russia does not have.

One such problem is the lack of trust in the authorities. On the one hand, it is a widespread global trend. Thus, according to an authoritative international research by the Edelman Trust Barometer9, in 2011–2015, the level of trust in the authorities on average in the 27 countries decreased by four percentage points (from 52 to 48%). In some states, the decline of this indicator was very substantial (10–50 p. p.): for example, in the Netherlands (by 85 p.p., from 75 to -10), Japan (by 62 p. p., from 51 to -11), Italy (67 p. p., from 45 to -12), Spain (by 60 p. p. from 43 to -17), Argentina (by 87 p. p., from 54 to -33), Brazil (by 133 p. p., from 85 to -48) and others (tab. 5).

In Russia in 2008–2015, the level of trust in the authorities increased by 16 p. p. (from 38 to 54%). However, we cannot say that this change is sustainable. Obvious positive changes are observed only in 2015 (level of trust in the authorities compared with 2014 increased by 27 p. p.), which is obviously due to Russian

President Vladimir Putin’s successful actions aimed to strengthen the international standing of Russia.

However, in the previous period (2008– 2014), the level of trust in the authorities in Russia decreased (by 11 p. p., from 38 to 27%). While in some leading countries we note a gradual but steady growth of this indicator over the past three years (in Indonesia: 20 p. p. in 2012, 47 p. p.in 2013, 53 p. p. in 2014, 72 p. p. in 2015; in Germany: 33 p. p.in 2012, 48 p. p.in 2013, 49 p. p. in 2014, 50 p. p. in 2015; tab. 5 ).

The trust in the authorities is focused solely on the top level of the power hierarchy – on the President. However, as the results of the surveys show, Russians clearly share the success of the President in dealing with international political issues and in solving the problems of growth in the quality of life (tab. 6) . “The citizens realize the gravity of the situation in the economy and do not believe that the government is able to steer the country out of the crisis. But those same citizens support Russia’s foreign policy that restored glory to our country”¹⁰ .

The feeling of uncertainty in the future combined with the crisis of trust in the authorities force people to plan their life prospects and achieve them by relying solely on their own resources. As a result, life goals of people become smaller. They are focused on consumer needs and concentrate within the closest social environment of an individual.

Table 5. Level of trust in the authorities in the world*

Country	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2015 compared to 2011, +/-
India	49	43	43	44	53	57	53	82	+38
Germany	27	35	43	33	33	48	49	50	+17
Russia	38	43	38	39	26	29	27	54	+15
Indonesia	n.a	52	62	40	47	53	72	+10
Ireland	35	35		20	35	32	21	26	+6
UAE				88	78	73	88	90	+2
USA	39	30	46	40	43	53	37	41	+1
Canada	39	51		52	56	58	51	49	-3
Australia	n.a.	53		52	47	43	56	49	-3
Malaysia					49	60	54	45	-4**
Sweden	63	39		64	62	65	63	59	-5
China	79	80	74	88	75	81	76	82	-6
Singapore				77	73	82	75	70	-7
France	35	36	43	49	31	49	32	42	-7
Mexico	49	41		42	35	41	28	33	-9
Netherlands	64	74		75	61	62	60	65	-10
Japan	45	45	42	51	25	32	45	40	-11
Poland	11	33		42	28	30	19	30	-12
Italy	29	32	36	45	31	35	24	28	-17
South Korea		38		50	33	44	45	33	-17
Spain	37	34		43	20	20	18	26	-17
Hong Kong					62	63	45	42	-20**
Argentina				54	36	19	23	21	-33
Brazil	22	51	39	85	32	33	34	37	-48
UK	34	41	38	43	38	47	42	43	0
Turkey						40	43	41	–
South Africa							17	16	–
Average	42	45		52	43	50	45	48	-4

Source: Edelman Trust Barometer official website. Available at:

* Dynamics: 2015 to 2012, +/–.

** The countries, in which the level of trust in the authorities for the period between 2011 and 2015 increased by 10 percentage points or more are highlighted in green; the countries, in which the level of trust in the authorities declined by 10 percentage points and more are highlighted in red.

Table 6. In your opinion, how successful is the RF President in coping with challenging issues? (as a percentage of the number of respondents)

Indicator	2000	2003	2005	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Dynamics, 2015 +/- to
													2000	2007	2014
Strengthening Russia’s international standing
Successful	42.3	44.9	47.9	58.4	55.1	49.5	49.9	46.2	43.1	45.6	50.4	51.4	+9	-7	+1
Unsuccessful	30.9	30.1	33.8	24.9	23.7	30.4	29.3	33.7	37.9	36.2	32.4	31.2	0	+6	-1
Imposing order in the country
Successful	31.4	37.5	41.9	53.2	48.2	39.1	41.1	36.6	35.4	39.4	48.0	50.1	+19	-3	+2
Unsuccessful	49.2	45.1	45.1	34.0	34.2	43.5	42.5	50.0	50.7	47.5	39.1	37.9	-11	+4	-1
Protecting democracy and strengthening the citizens’ freedoms
Successful	23.5	29.9	33.6	44.4	39.9	36.7	36.3	32.4	28.8	31.8	37.5	40.3	+17	-4	+3
Unsuccessful	43.8	42.4	47.0	37.0	35.9	41.5	42.6	48.3	52.3	51.0	45.4	41.0	-3	+4	-4
Economic recovery and increase in the citizens’ welfare
Successful	25.6	29.6	35.1	47.2	36.7	31.6	33.5	30.7	28.5	31.3	34.8	34.8	+9	-12	0
Unsuccessful	52.9	51.4	50.8	39.1	46.0	52.4	51.6	56.1	57.9	56.8	53.4	51.6	-1	+13	-2
Source: ISEDT RAS public opinion monitoring.

This phenomenon that science calls “social atomism” is noted by leading Russian scientists (M. K. Gorshkov, V. I. Zhukov, etc.) and by the results of regional sociologic research. Its essence consists in the fact that the interests, needs and hopes of Russians are concentrated at the micro level – the immediate social environment (family, closest friends and relatives). For example, the results of sociological assessments conducted by ISEDT RAS in the Vologda Oblast show that simultaneously with the growth of the quality of life there is a “degeneration” of life plans, they become more consumer-oriented, aimed at today and not at the future.

Thus, in 2001–2014, the representatives of the lowest income groups were less likely to plan for a year the implementation of the necessary medical treatment (the share of those who did not plan it increased by 22 p.p., from 23 to 45%; tab. 7 ), provision of children with high-quality education (by 17 p.p., from 32 to 49%), better nutrition (by 15 p.p., from 10 to 25%). However, during this same period, representatives of the same groups were more likely to plan the purchase of a car (the proportion of those who did not plan it decreased by 9 p.p., from 48 to 40%); the share of those who did not plan to spend their vacation abroad increased only by 4 p.p.

Table 7. Share of the least and most prosperous population who are not planning to... (as a percentage of the number of respondents in each decile group)*

Plans for the year	2001	2014	Dynamics +/-
10% of the poorest
To implement the necessary medical treatment	22.5	44.9	+22
To provide children with good education	31.9	48.5	+17
To improve the quality of nutrition	10.1	25.0	+15
To buy a country house, a subsidiary plot	46.4	61.8	+15
To find a job	19.6	33.1	+14
To buy new clothes and footwear	6.5	19.9	+13
To improve living conditions	22.5	33.1	+11
To spend the vacation in a sanatorium (vacation hotel) in Russia	42.8	50.0	+7
To spend the vacation abroad	53.6	57.4	+4
To increase the salary	16.7	19.9	+3
To buy a car	48.6	40.4	-9
10% of the wealthiest
To improve the quality of nutrition	19.0	41.2	+22
To buy a country house, a subsidiary plot	63.5	81.6	+18
To implement the necessary medical treatment	46.0	62.5	+17
To spend the vacation in a sanatorium (vacation hotel) in Russia	53.3	67.6	+14
To find a job	54.0	66.9	+13
To provide children with good education	59.1	72.1	+13
To buy new clothes and footwear	7.3	16.9	+10
To improve living conditions	41.6	50.0	+8
To increase the salary	19.7	27.9	+8
To buy a car	46.7	54.4	+8
To spend the vacation abroad	62.0	39.0	-23
* Those plans that people are now more likely “not to plan” (by 15 p.p. or more) are highlighted in red.

(from 54 to 57%), the share of those who did not plan to spend their vacation in Russia – by 7 p.p. (from 43 to 50%).

The difference is clear (2–3 times), and we recall that this applies to the 10% of the residents with the lowest income in the Vologda Oblast. The orientation toward consumer needs, the “degeneration” of life plans is noted among the most wealthy people as well, that is, among those who, it would seem, should not worry about the issues such as vacation abroad or the purchase of a car, i.e. the ones who have more opportunities to think about their health and the education of their children.

Thus, social atomism stems not only from the low income but also from the psychological insecurity and from the mistrust in the authorities, the factors deeply-rooted in public consciousness. The proportion of people who experience uncertainty about the future has been and remains very significant (46–63%;

tab. 8 ) in all the decile groups, except for the richest 10% of inhabitants of the Vologda Oblast. In addition, in all the decile groups, the proportion of people who are looking into the future with anxiety increased in 2015 compared to 2014.

The feeling of unpredictability of the future coexists with low levels of interpersonal trust: according to surveys, 79% of the Vologda Oblast residents believe that currently it is impossible to trust anyone or, in extreme cases, you can trust the closest friends and relatives (tab. 9) .

Of particular concern is the fact that uncertainty about the future, the “degeneration” of life plans, people’s mistrust in each other are becoming a more and more familiar way of life to Russians. These phenomena coexist quite peacefully with the good mood and content with life, which 20–60% of people expressed in the 2000s and 50–90% express at present (tab. 10) .

Table 8. Share of people who experience uncertainty about the future (as a percentage of the number of respondents in each decile group)

Decile groups	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
the wealthiest 10%	62.3	70.6	77.2	65.1	36.8	41.0	43.2	53.7	49.3	75.9	70.5	66.7	62.5	67.4
the poorest 30% (including the poorest 10%)	65.6	63.8	71.6	58.1	36.0	42.3	42.2	46.0	49.3	67.4	64.1	64.0	54.4	63.5
the poorest 30%	61.4	63.6	59.4	37.5	34.2	41.1	50.6	41.9	49.3	61.7	55.3	49.8	47.7	56.0
the wealthy 30%	63.4	53.9	54.7	37.2	30.4	45.7	45.8	36.6	43.7	63.7	50.0	43.6	45.5	52.2
the wealthiest 10%	47.4	46.8	30.7	17.8	29.4	42.4	38.1	30.8	30.4	40.9	39.4	31.9	24.3	37.8

Table 9. Who can you trust? (as a percentage of the number of respondents)

Answer option	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015
At present, I can trust no one	26.1	24.7	27.9	27.9	23.5
I can trust only the closest friends and relatives	58.1	56.5	52.5	53.4	55.7
Most of my acquaintances are trustworthy	12.8	16.1	15.2	12.2	12.6
One should trust everybody without exception	2.3	2.5	1.6	3.1	2.5

Table 10. Dynamics of social well-being indicators (as a percentage of the number of respondents in each decile group)

Decile groups	2000	2007	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
The share of people with the “good mood, good condition”
the poorest 10%	26.5	49.1	42.7	41.3	44.6	40.1	44.9	48.4
the poorest 30% (including the poorest 10%)	30.7	53.8	48.6	49.3	54.9	51.5	54.2	56.2
the poor 30%	46.3	60.6	59.3	61.8	66.1	70.0	71.7	68.8
the wealthy 30%	54.1	70.1	72.0	74.2	76.5	80.4	80.9	78.9
the wealthiest 10%	65.5	77.1	80.4	76.7	85.1	84.7	84.8	81.9
The share of people who are “satisfied; partly satisfied, partly not satisfied” with their life
the poorest 10%	22.9	59.5	63.5	58.2	70.6	46.2	43.3	35.1
the poorest 30% (including the poorest 10%)	34.0	59.5	71.1	67.7	75.0	54.6	58.4	53.4
the poor 30%	42.5	65.7	79.9	86.7	84.7	74.3	76.6	77.6
the wealthy 30%	61.1	73.8	81.4	91.3	89.2	88.4	85.5	86.0
the wealthiest 10%	73.5	85.5	86.9	94.9	92.7	90.9	96.3	87.8

In other words, social atomism is a product of modern civilization; it is the part of our lives that is not perceived by ordinary citizens as a global problem, which holds the potential danger of total consequences for all the spheres of public life . Meanwhile, experts warn that the consequences of the atomization of society can be very pessimistic – “from the loss of readiness to live through personal problems without hard protests during the likely new economic crises to the unwillingness to enlist in the army, while the very concepts of “state”, “homeland” as the ultimate guarantors of sustainable development and satisfaction of people’s needs are devaluating, and citizens cease to feel responsible for their fate”¹¹.

Major changes are taking place in the social structure of the Russian society and, first of all, in the middle class – the social layer that today plays an important role in the viability and competitiveness of the country.

Along with the strengthening of the power vertical (this process in Russia has been going on from the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term, i.e. from the beginning of the 2000s), the position of the middle class is becoming more and more important. “The strengthening of the state always leads to the blockage of communication channels between society and authorities. The system “pupates”, its bureaucratic apparatus grows, even against the will of the ruling elites. The movement along the vector of democracy slows down. In order to re-establish its “smooth flow” it is necessary to exert pressure on the middle class as the most responsible, wealthy and educated segment of the population and part of the elite”12. “The fact of formation and development of the middle class is the most important criterion of efficiency of socioeconomic development and strength of the entire system of economic, social, political and civil institutions. However, the development of the middle class is not only the result but also the source of economic growth”13.

The middle class is a social stratum, which has the most powerful potential for dialogue with the authorities. It comprises people who watch over the situation in the country; they are ready not only to criticize the government, but to come to an agreement with it. The pressure that the representatives of the middle class can and should exert on the government consists in active participation in political and public life, in the legitimate resistance to ambiguous initiatives of authorities, in the establishment of mechanisms and associations, i.e. the tools of influence. If the active part of the population does this all outside the platforms for dialogue with the authorities, there arises a revolutionary potential. But if communication with the middle class is established, it creates the prospect of rapid development of the country.

Due to the importance of the role played by the middle class in organizing the dialogue between government and society, its transformation attracts the attention of a growing number of researchers. Experts note that over the last 15 years the Russian middle class has become wealthier, but its size has declined; it is characterized by the processes of internal differentiation by income and ideological beliefs (some spokesmen advocate the stability of society, others speak in favor of its “soft” reform); active consumption in the middle class exceeded all other demands.

In 2003–2014, the middle class experienced a significant decline (from 36 to 15%) in the proportion of those who were able to improve their education or the level of qualification and in the share of those who were able to get a promotion at work or find a new, more suitable job (from 31 to 10%). These recent studies allow us to speak about the presence of a kind of “social imbalance” in the Russian society, which is manifested in the contradiction between the relatively peaceful (according to statistics) state of the labor market with low unemployment and a fear that one can turn out unemployed in the next two or three years, the feeling that more than 40% of working Russians experience. Experts are convinced: despite the irrationality of such a disturbing thought, it has objective and reasonable grounds that include social insecurity of Russians and the inefficient system of state social protection against unemployment14.

Negative trends in the many years of transformation of Russia’s middle class lead to the fact that its representatives express significantly negative opinions concerning the Government. “The internal policy that is criticized by Russians remains the responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers, and the external policy supported by Russians is associated with the President. In addition, it is necessary to point out an important feature: the anger of the middle class is primarily directed toward regional authorities, i.e. the very power that is responsible for the order and quality of life in Russia’s constituent entities”¹⁵.

Today the society (represented by the middle class) formulates quite clearly its requests to the state. Meanwhile, even the most the critically-minded social groups do not want protests and revolutions and try to find ways for constructive dialogue with the state. For instance, according to VCIOM and the Levada Center, 76% of Russians believe that protests against the decline in the standard of living are unlikely, and 77–80% of Russians are not ready to participate in rallies and other protest actions16. According to ISEDT RAS, the level of protest potential in the Vologda Oblast in 1998 was 40%, in 2005 – 32% and beginning from 2007, it does not exceed 20%.

However, some representatives of the economic bloc of the Government, i.e. the people who deal with domestic economic issues, do not pay attention to the society; their interests are connected only with certain social groups that do not care about national and public interests. “...The power, following a path of state capitalism, suppresses small and medium business by pursuing its economic policy. It is difficult to say whether it is done consciously or not. But obviously, it is inconvenient for the authorities to have a wealthy middle class, because it puts forward its claims, protects its property and civil rights and requires transparency. If the middle class were large, the government would have to make agreements with it, to grant it a share in politics. But the “new Soviet power” is not used to it”17.

As a result, a tangle of contradictions is accumulating. Experts have repeatedly drawn attention to this situation, but their opinion is not taken into account. So today, you can hear the proposals of concrete actions18:

• •    provision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation with the powers of the civil General Staff that forms an adequate strategic plan to counter the threats, the implementation of which involved all the bodies of economic administration of the country;

• •    establishment of a special unit in law enforcement bodies that would fight against corruption, it is due to the pressing necessity of “purging” the elite given the possibility of war;

• •    establishment of a center for development management, which should unite leading Russian experts regardless of their

views on urgent measures necessary for the “recovery” of Russia’s economy;

• •    establishment of a government of national trust composed of representatives of different constructive political forces.

These options have different content, but one thing unites them – their direct accountability to the President. This suggests that the country has realized the true reasons underlying the backlog of social health issues. The political and scientific communities are ready to work on the various ways to eliminate them. It is understood that the ineffectiveness of the Government’s domestic policy is now the main obstacle to the improvement of the quality of life of Russia’s population and provision of its competitiveness on the world stage.

Thus, social health issues are a question of strategy rather than tactics and of the future rather than the present. Today is not a threat of growing protest moods, but primarily the issue of the weakening of human potential – the main factor in national security in a competitive struggle for the next few years and decades.

The false paradigm, concept and the lack of scientific strategic planning has led to the low growth and development of Russia. That is why the achievements and recommendations of economic science and international experience are neglected. That is why, despite the availability of rich natural and other resources, the quality of life is low. And this is the main criterion for the low efficiency of power, of the ruling elite19.

The Russian society has changed over the last 20 years. Today, public consciousness, social needs and requirements to the government are quite different than in the early 2000s; that is why the solution of internal economic and political issues requires a fundamental change in the management system. And Russia has little time for this, because the global competition for the dominant position is going on under the conditions of a new technological mode, and Russia’s internal life will soon face a change in its the political cycle (2018).

Sustainable human development can be ensured only through effective management, strategic planning and the adequate perception of global trends – in health, education, culture, the standard of living and quality of life of the population of different countries – by the ruling elite. Here the term “adequate perception” means not only an objective assessment of the situation prevailing in the above mentioned aspects of human potential, but also the formation of appropriate policy, i.e. a set of elaborate, science-based solutions for the medium-term (3, 5, 10 years), and long-term (20, 30, 40 years) perspective.

These solutions include the transition to strategic planning carried out by many developed countries20, the transition that in

Russia is so far “reduced to hosting the Olympic Games and world championships”2119.

The extension of the powers and responsibilities of the Federal Assembly is no less important. A coalition of representatives of all parties must be formed in the Government. The coalition should include people who can not only offer solutions in the interests of the majority of the population, but also take responsibility for the implementation of these solutions. Civil investigations currently carried out by the All-Russian People’s Front should be organized at the federal level. Only in this case will they acquire systemic character and their results will influence all the areas of domestic policy.

The managerial mind should be, on the one hand, flexible and adaptive to changing realities; on the other hand, it should be hard and ready to show political will in addressing the most complex issues. It is necessary to introduce the practice of the change of elites capable of offering effective response to dynamic and successive internal and external challenges. It is essential to create the general ideological vector for domestic and foreign policy. If these steps are absent, it will inevitably lead to the alienation of power from society, the growth of social unrest, the new and more stringent requirements of the population. This may be a factor in the aggravation of social health issues, lingering and increasing in Russia; they affect its social structure (deformation of the middle class, precariat22) and spiritual and value foundations of the Russian society (social atomism, the dominance of consumer interests). According to experts, this can lead to extremely serious consequences for the country in the long term, up to the loss of national identity.

Vladimir Putin during all his presidential terms and especially in recent years conducts an independent foreign policy, regularly drawing the world’s attention to threats inherent in a unipolar world, to the inevitable decline of civilization dominated by one power. This is the keynote of all his public speeches. At that, the conceptual theoretical promises and concrete actions of the President enhance Russia’s status in the international political arena and, according to the results of opinion polls, they are widely supported by the Russian society.

There is no doubt that Russians share Vladimir Putin’s views on the geopolitical arrangement of civilization and on the place of Russia in the multipolar world. So there is no doubt that the absence of such an independent course of internal policy of the Government causes misunderstanding and concern on the part of the population. The Russian society is aware of the need for change and the people are ready to mobilize their efforts to make their country one of the most influential powers in the world in the near future. But still at present it is too early to talk about any “breakthrough”, because it is necessary for the Russian economy at least to overcome the crisis and embark on the path of sustainable growth.

In his annual addresses to the Federal Assembly, the Russian President has repeatedly stressed the need to improve management effectiveness on the most pressing issues of Russia’s life: in particular, it concerns the development of the system of healthcare and education, the functioning of the supervisory and control agencies in the sphere of small and medium business, the optimization of the agro-industrial complex, etc.

“Being on top of the power vertical, the President cannot implement his initiatives when faced with the malfunction of institutions and low quality of public administration, so the tone of his latest Address is “alarmed and anxious”23.

How long will be the patience of the President and the entire Russian society? Especially when we consider the imminent change of the political cycle... Can the Government realize that its 2008 fiscal and monetary policy has led to the stagnation of the economy, and in the future it may throw the Russian society backward by ten years and return it back to the level of the 1990s? Can the ruling elite understand that it would be disastrous for the country in the current geopolitical conditions? Or will Russia find the political will to reorient its economic policy in the interests of wider population rather than narrow oligarchic groups? This ultimately will determine the future of Russia and its national security and competitiveness in the coming decades.