Relativism in science and valuable relations

Subject of research is understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive relativism in scientific knowledge and philosophy of science. The relationship between categories of objectivity, truth, scientific rationality is analyzed, and praxeological model of their association is suggested. The article substantiates the assertion that «sociological turn» in thinking about scientific rationality is a form of relativism. Deprived of support to the true knowledge of the laws of nature and society, scientific knowledge is inevitably slipping into relativism, when scientific rationality is replaced by the sociology of knowledge. Based on the analysis, the article argues that relativism in science contradicts our understanding of the value relation, as it deprives scientific activities to achieve sense of truth as purpose of cognition. Objective truth is attained in the process of cognition, when the practice eliminates possible illusions about the true state of affairs. Value relation, along with the essent, substantiates the invariance of the «ob-jective» truth for different communities of scientists. Without support of all subjects of cognition on general knowledge of essent, without exact ascertaining the facts occurring change of essent, knowledge becomes an empty fantasy. The alternative to relativism and dogmatism in the understanding of truth must become a concept that removes the antagonism of these points of view, and make them moments of generalized praxeological concept.