The role of NKVD and GKO member L.P. Beria in strengthening the defensive capability of the 46th army (August - September 1942)

This article examines the role played by the NKVD bodies personally a member of the GKO L.P. Beria in strengthening the defensive capability of the 46th Army in the Caucasus region during August-September 1942. Drawing on newly accessed material from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, the authors attempt to highlight the main shortcomings of the command of the 46th Army and the Transcaucasian Front in defending the passes of the Main Caucasus Ridge. Specifically, deficiencies are identified in the organization of coordination between the command of the 46th Army and the Transcaucasian Front with the party and civilian organizations of the region, the impracticality of using cavalry troops in mountainous terrain, and the redeployment of the 63rd Cavalry Division and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps to the Northern Group of Forces. Particular attention is given to the analysis of the increase in the numerical strength of units of the 46th Army on the defended passes of the Main Caucasus Ridge, the creation of operational groups, mostly headed by NKVD officers, and other similar measures carried out by the central apparatus of the NKVD and personally by People’s Commissar L.P. Beria. Conclusion dwells upon the fact that the role of the NKVD and L.P. Beria in enhancing the defensive capabilities of the 46th Army during the critical period of August - September 1942 underscores the multifaceted nature of wartime leadership and the importance of interagency cooperation in achieving strategic objectives. Through meticulous archival research and analysis, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics at play during the defense of the Caucasus region in World War II.