Russian-Iranian oil-for-goods swap: risks of Russia's participation in the project in the context of deteriorating situation on the global oil market

The article analyzes the “Oil-for-Goods” swap between Russia and Iran. This agreement was concluded in 2017, when the global oil market was relatively stable. The deal had a “political marker” for Russia to strengthen relations with Iran within the framework of the delimitation of spheres of influence in the Middle East. In 2022, the situation changed dramatically, and that’s another reason to recall that the Russian-Iranian project is not profitable for Moscow either in terms of market positions or economically. The article was aimed at assessing the economic feasibility of Russia’s participation in the transaction. As a result, significant market risks for Russia that arose during the conclusion of the agreement were identified, since Russian exporters allowed the Iranian oil to enter their market share almost free of charge. Given the equalization of the position of Russia and Iran in the world market, this becomes critical for our country against the background of Iran’s readiness to regain its market share at any cost (including dumping). Russia, on the other hand, receives from 1.5 billion rubles to 3 billion rubles from maintaining the transaction, which is not comparable with the risks assumed.