Russian president got a constitutional majority in the State Duma of the seventh convocation
Автор: Ilyin Vladimir Aleksandrovich
Журнал: Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast @volnc-esc-en
Рубрика: From the chief editor
Статья в выпуске: 5 (47) т.9, 2016 года.
Бесплатный доступ
ID: 147223880 Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/147223880
Текст ред. заметки Russian president got a constitutional majority in the State Duma of the seventh convocation
Source: Data of reports of the Federal Treasury of Russia. Available at:
and, in particular, the nature of public sentiment during the presidential elections of 2018.
In this major article, Vladimir Putin noted that the most important strategic tasks in Russia’s development include the need to improve public administration efficiency, to strengthen state authority, and to overcome the split and internal division among major social groups and political elites. The importance of achieving these goals was emphasized by
I am convinced that achieving the required growth dynamics is not only an economic task. This issue is also political in nature and, I dare say, in a certain sense, ideological. More precisely, it is an ideological, spiritual and moral issue. Moreover, the latter aspect at the present stage seems to me especially significant from the point of view of consolidation of Russian society.
Fruitful creative work, which our country needs so urgently, is impossible in a society that is split and internally divided.
The key to revival and the rise of Russia today lies in the public-political sphere. Russia needs strong state power and must have it 4 .
the President in his subsequent policy statements and strategic documents: the 2007 Munich speech, the 2013 speech at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, and the National Security Strategy 2015, etc.
Today, the greatest positive trend is observed only in the solution of the first of these key objectives: in order to strengthen the statehood, the President actively implements personnel reshuffle at all the levels of the administration system 5 .
However, with regard to overcoming the split in Russian society and within the ruling elite, it is still premature to talk about obvious successes in this direction: in Russia, there remains an acute issue of social stratification and wealth inequality; and as for the public administration system, it seems that “there exist two Russias: one is “deeply embedded in the Western world”, the other is represented by “a new generation of Russian statesmen that inevitably accompany the sovereign growth” 6.
In our opinion, special attention should be given to the features that the election to the State Duma of the seventh convocation will be remembered for:
-
1. On 18 September, Russian society demonstrated a very low turnout at the polling stations: 47.9% of voters (52.6 million people). For comparison, voter turnout for the Duma election in 2011 was 60.2% (65.7 million people), and in 2007 – 63.7% (69.5 million people).
-
2. United Russia, due primarily to the revival of a mixed electoral system (voting on party lists and single-mandate districts),
received the constitutional majority in Parliament 7 . This gives the President of the Russian Federation qualitatively new opportunities for the implementation of domestic and foreign policy (including the policy aimed to enhance public administration efficiency) and corresponds to the President’s highest historical responsibility before his country, the responsibility he assumed when he secured his personal responsibility for the implementation of state policy in the sphere of national security (Decree No. 683 dated December 31, 2015 “On the national security strategy of the Russian Federation”) 8 .
Assessing the final results of the vote, Vladimir Putin noted: “At a time of difficulties and many uncertainties and risks, people certainly choose stability and trust the country’s leading political force… The election result was also an expression of people’s reaction to attempts to exert foreign pressure on Russia, and to the threats, sanctions, and attempts to destabilize the situation in Russia from within” 9 .
Figure 2. The dynamics of voter turnout for the election to the State Duma of the Russian Federation for the period from 1999 to 2016

* Increase/decrease in voter turnout for the RF State Duma election (million people).
However, the dynamics of indicator such as voter turnout clearly indicates that a significant number of Russians are not satisfied with the situation in the country. The turnout for the State Duma election has been declining since 2007; moreover if in 2011 compared to 2007, the turnout fell by only four million people, then in 2016 compared to 2011 – by 13 million that is three times more. In general, in 2007–2016, the turnout of Russians for parliamentary election decreased by 16.9 mln people (Fig. 2).
Experts point out many reasons for a low turnout for the election to the State Duma of the seventh convocation: absence of political competition, people’s dist- rust in the transparency of electoral procedures, the fact that the election was held in September and not in December (as usual), poorly organized information campaign, etc. However, it is important to note that despite all these nuances the turnout was and still is a “litmus test” of public senti-ment and civic consciousness. Experts from the Russian Academy of Sciences regard the voluntary refusal from participation in one of the fundamental democratic procedures as a latent form of protest: “It is non-participation rather than protest vote that is becoming the most common means for citizens to express their political discontent”10.
Insert 1.
1 + i n |
о ъ ° |
co |
co + |
*+ |
01 C3> ^ |
*+ |
co + |
LO + |
c: 1 |
CO + |
co + |
1 C3> 01 6 |
CD + |
CO + |
|
LO + |
co + |
1 s Q 1 5 5 S' i > 5 § g-ь fl 1 1 E § "p g |
||||
о ъ ° |
co + |
c\i + |
c\i + |
+ |
c^ + |
CD |
CO + |
c^ + |
*+ |
CD |
||||||||||||
~ о |
c\i ^ |
c\i ^ |
c\i ^ |
c\i |
c\i |
c^ |
CO ^ |
c^ |
co + |
C^ |
c^ + |
c^ |
||||||||||
co S |
C\l |
lo |
c\i + |
g |
°? |
U? |
°? |
°? |
U? |
co |
°? |
LO + |
CO |
|||||||||
g |
°? |
CD |
V |
°? |
CD |
OJ |
csl |
CD |
LO |
°? |
||||||||||||
i. 5 |
CD LO |
CD LO |
CD CO |
§ |
LO |
CO CD LO |
CD LO |
LO |
cd co |
s |
LO LO |
co CD LO |
CD cd LO |
CD LO |
||||||||
CD |
LO |
Й |
g |
CD g |
CD cd LO |
co |
LO |
co |
LO |
CO |
co |
CO cd LO |
||||||||||
s |
Й |
LO |
co |
CO cd LO |
LO |
CD g |
cd co |
4 |
OJ cd LO |
LO |
s |
cd LO |
||||||||||
co |
LO |
LO |
CO LO |
LO |
CD CO |
CD |
Io |
LO |
co |
LO |
co cd LO |
co |
s |
LO |
||||||||
s |
CO cd LO |
LO |
CD LO |
LO |
CD LO |
cd co |
LO |
co cd LO |
Io |
CD LO |
||||||||||||
CD S |
LO |
co LO |
LO |
CO LO |
LO |
co |
IS |
CD cd LO |
cd LO |
LO |
co CD |
co LO |
Й |
|||||||||
g |
co |
LO |
LO |
CD |
co co |
LO |
CD |
LO |
2 |
oq |
LO |
LO |
||||||||||
g |
CD |
LO |
CSJ |
CO |
g |
co CD |
CO LO |
CO g |
CD LO |
LO |
co cd LO |
Й |
s |
|||||||||
g |
S |
CD |
CO co |
LO |
Й |
LO cd |
CD |
Й |
LO |
cd |
s |
LO |
CD |
|||||||||
g |
s |
C\J |
oq LO |
CD |
op |
CD |
CO |
s |
oq cd LO |
CO cd LO |
co |
IS |
LO |
cd LO |
||||||||
E о co |
5 |
E s |
co 5 |
LO CO |
о |
E 2 Cd О о CD CO GO |
О СЛ |
E о |
E 1 ° E g 8 |
E |
Q |
о |
In this sense, low voter turnout on September 18 clearly reflects the dissatisfaction of the population with the dynamics of the standard of living and quality of life, which is reflected in the sociological research data. So, in February – October 2016 compared to 2015 the share of positive ratings of the success with which the President promotes economic recovery and growth of citizens’ welfare decreased in all major socio-demographic groups (by 2–9 p.p., Insert 1 ).
The proportion of people who negatively assess the work of the President in dealing with economic issues for the period from February 2015 – October 2016 also increased in all the main groups, this increase was the greatest (8–9 p.p.) among men 30–55 years of age who have secondary vocational education and, according to their own assessment of their income, are among the 60% of those having average income and 20% of the most wealthy citizens. Thus, today hidden protest potential is accumulated not only in socially vulnerable categories of society (persons of retirement age, the poorest segments), but among people with average and high levels of financial well-being.
Some Russian and foreign 11 experts note that “the power in this election consciously used a tactic to reduce turnout: when the turnout is low, the proportion of manageable electorate voting for the “party of power” and its candidates is bigger… The United Russia Party almost everywhere improved its relative results compared to the results of the voting on December 4, 2011. However, due to the low turnout in absolute numbers of votes, the overall result of United Russia is lower than on December 4, 2011” 12 .
Communist party leader Gennady Zyuganov at a meeting with Russian President noted: “What we all have to analyze is the fact that the party in power had 45 million votes in 2007, this is very powerful support, and exceptionally crucial. In the crisis, critical moments the widespread support of the society is crucial. This year the party in power received 28.7 million votes; they lost 17 million. I understand that there are issues and reasons: if the GDP growth in 2012 was 3.4 percent, last year it was minus 3.7, and we are still in a recession. Losing 7 percent in five years means nearly 90 trillion rubles less in the budget. That amounts to two current budgets”13.
According to the Central Election Commission, the percentage of support of United Russia in the 2016 election increased by 5% (from 49 to 54%), but in fact it lost almost four million votes (3.85
million people), and compared to the 2011 election – almost 16 million (16.19 million people; Fig. 3 ).
Only in 15 out of 83 Russian constituent entities there was an increase in the number of those who voted for the United Russia Party on September 18, 2016. In other regions, the support for the ruling party decreased in comparison with 2011. If we compare the voting results with those of the 2007 election, we will see that the increase in the number of votes in favor of United Russia is observed only in five out of 83 Russian regions (Insert 2).
Figure 3. Dynamics of the share of those who voted for the United Russia Party (in 1999 the party was called the Unity Block) in the election to the State Duma of the Russian Federation for the period from 1999 to 2016

* Increase/decrease in the number of those who voted for the United Russia Party at the election to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (million people).
Insert 2
E S § |
со S со £ |
со |
го |
СП |
го |
го |
го |
Го |
го |
О |
ОТ |
3 |
8 |
го |
о |
Го |
аз |
го |
го |
3 |
Го |
го |
а> |
от |
3 |
О |
ОТ |
8 |
3 |
8 |
го |
го |
го |
го |
8 |
го |
8 |
го |
го |
8 |
го |
||
Е см <от |
сп § со со со |
8 |
Го |
го |
го |
го |
оз |
аз |
ОТ |
О |
3 |
го |
го |
3 |
Го |
Го |
го |
го |
го |
3 |
го |
го |
8 |
го |
го |
Го |
го |
го |
го |
го |
ОТ |
3 |
3 |
го |
Го |
8 |
ОТ |
Го |
го |
го |
8 |
||
ГО |
со ОО см ио со см |
8 |
Го |
го |
го |
8 |
го |
аз |
го |
аз |
3 |
3 |
го |
от |
го |
го |
го |
3 |
го |
го |
от |
3 |
8 |
аз |
Го |
го |
Го |
ОТ |
8 |
аз |
8 |
го |
3 |
3 |
го |
го |
8 |
Го |
го |
го |
ОТ |
го |
|
от |
со со см со |
3 |
го |
го |
3 |
аз |
8 |
го |
3 |
8 |
го |
3 |
8 |
8 |
го |
Го |
3 |
8 |
Го |
го |
3 |
го |
го |
8 |
го |
го |
го |
3 |
го |
8 |
го |
Го |
го |
8 |
го |
см |
го |
Si |
го |
Го |
8 |
||
от |
1 |
о |
ГО |
го |
го |
го |
го |
го |
го |
го |
ОТ |
3 |
Si |
ОТ |
го |
го |
го |
го |
Го |
ОТ |
Го |
Го |
Го |
3 |
го |
ОТ |
3 |
го |
го |
8 |
го |
го |
го |
S |
аз |
3 |
Го |
Го |
го |
го |
го |
||
Е S § |
со со СП |
от |
03 |
ОТ |
со |
s |
го |
го |
го |
го |
ГО |
8 |
S |
5 |
го |
Го |
го |
S |
03 |
см |
ч |
го |
Го |
Го |
▻- |
8 |
го |
аз |
го |
Го |
8 |
3 |
Го |
3 |
От |
аз |
3 |
||||||
Е S о |
со СП ио |
от |
го |
аз |
го |
го |
го |
го |
аз |
го |
8 |
го |
го |
ОТ |
ОТ |
го |
Го |
аз |
от |
го |
8 |
8 |
аз |
го |
8 |
го |
аз |
Го |
8 |
ОТ |
ОТ |
со |
Го |
ОТ |
см |
о |
|||||||
го |
см <4 ио ио |
ГО |
го |
3 |
го |
8 |
го |
см |
s |
го |
8 |
го |
го |
8 |
3 |
S |
s |
го |
3 |
а> |
аз |
а> |
го |
Го |
го |
8 |
а> |
3 |
от |
ОТ |
8 |
аз |
s |
го |
а> |
Го |
а> |
го |
го |
||||
от |
см со $ |
го |
аз |
со |
го |
3 |
го |
со |
го |
аз |
3 |
S |
г- |
8 |
Го |
§ |
3 |
S |
ш |
Го |
5 |
а> |
ОТ |
3 |
S |
S |
LO |
“3 |
8 |
го |
ч |
аз |
го |
Го |
3 |
8 |
ОТ |
го |
го |
3 |
|||
от |
со со 2 |
от |
3 |
со |
8 |
8 |
от |
ОТ |
го |
го |
см |
го |
го |
ОТ |
СО |
аз |
го |
8 |
Го |
го |
го |
8 |
3 |
8 |
3 |
ОТ |
СО |
8 |
от |
го |
ОТ |
аз |
ОТ |
от |
3 |
8 |
8 |
||||||
3 |
| ё 6 Л 1 сс |
ГО m о |
о |
5 о |
о |
га |
го |
Е |
о сс |
Е о сс |
га СО |
1 < о 1 |
< о 'о |
о |
Е |
1 < |
< 'о |
5 |
о □с |
о |
о ^ 5 |
1 н |
о |
'о |
ГО со |
о |
го □с |
н |
о |
Е га СО |
Е |
о |
о |
"га < |
1 < В |
га 5 |
о |
Е со |
1 |
E см g |
ст |
s |
co |
g |
см |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
g |
CT |
cri |
CT |
CT |
CT |
s |
co |
CT |
CT |
CM |
CT |
ст |
CT |
CT |
ч |
s |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
ст |
Ст |
ст |
ст |
ст |
Ст |
Ст |
CD ^ СМ |
ст |
ст |
ст |
сс S 5 LO о о о 'о *о ^ § ° 5 ° $ го га □ |
|
E cm g |
s |
co |
5 |
CT |
О |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
g |
co |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
co |
ст |
ст |
Ст |
Ст |
Ст |
ст |
см |
Ст |
см |
|||||
to |
co |
CO |
co |
CT |
CT |
CT |
g |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
s |
CT |
CT |
co |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
ст |
Ст |
ст |
О |
Ст |
Ст |
Ст |
*Т О LTD ^ |
ст |
ст |
S |
||||
g |
s |
CT |
CT |
CT |
co |
co |
CT |
CT |
s |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
co |
CT |
s |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CM |
CT |
ст |
ст |
ст |
Ст |
Ст |
Ст |
Ст |
LTD ^ СО |
5 |
ст |
ст |
||
g |
ст |
g |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
ст |
s |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
co |
CT |
CM |
CT |
CT |
ai |
CT |
co |
CT |
co |
CT |
Ст |
Ст |
Ст |
Ст |
см |
Ст |
2 |
СМ О со |
ст |
Ст |
Ст |
|||
E cm g |
ст |
a> |
ст |
CT |
о |
co |
CT |
CT |
CM |
CT |
ст |
CT |
CT |
5 |
g |
CM |
CT |
CT |
5 |
cri |
CT |
cri |
s |
g |
2 |
Ст |
ст |
ст |
*т см см |
Ст |
Ст |
ст |
||||||||||||
E cm g |
CT |
CD |
cm |
CT |
co |
co |
cri |
CT |
5 |
ст |
CT |
cd |
co |
s |
CT |
s |
co |
cri |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
О |
Ст |
см |
2 |
СО |
со |
S |
со со ^ |
см |
СО |
ст |
|||||||||||
CT |
CO |
CT |
CM |
CT |
s |
co |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
ст |
co |
ст |
CT |
g |
CT |
CD |
CT |
CM |
co |
co |
CT |
CT |
s |
CT |
CT |
CT |
Ст |
ст |
ст |
ст |
ст |
ст |
о со |
ст |
g |
||||||||
g |
Й |
ст |
CT |
CT |
s |
cn |
co |
CT |
co |
CD |
cn |
cci |
CT |
co |
CT |
CD |
2 |
4 |
tc? |
CT |
"I |
CM |
CT |
CT |
3 |
ст |
c^ |
CT |
CT |
2 |
с^! |
см |
ст |
^ со со |
§ |
см |
||||||||
g |
CT |
ст |
s |
ст |
ст |
CT |
CT |
CT |
CT |
сё |
CT |
co |
CT |
s |
CT |
сё |
CT |
s |
CT |
CT |
S |
s |
CT |
s |
g |
ст |
CT |
E |
сё |
Ст |
ст |
s |
UD |
S |
ст |
о |
S |
Ст |
||||||
3 о |
g 5 |
"ro co о |
1 < 1 |
"ro co |
Ё |
3 |
< |
□ |
E |
о |
< |
E Ж |
о |
E H |
1 < |
О |
о (Й |
о |
"ro co |
о |
1 |
о |
о |
О |
"1 |
'о |
ГО О |
Е < |
^ ГО |
g 5 |
о > |
1 |
< |
The constitutional majority of United Russia in the Parliament is due to several factors. The major ones are as follows:
V return to a mixed election system 16 , which, and it was expected 17 , has allowed the ruling party to gain an absolute majority of votes in single-seat districts (Table) ;
V creating conditions that contribute to the decline in voter turnout (in particular, shifting the date of the single voting day from December to September);
V amendments to the Federal Law “On political parties” 18 , leading to the emergence of “knowingly failing” political forces that took away some votes from the opposition parties;
V smart PR campaign calling voters’ attention to the fact that United Russia is the party of the President (though, actually, “the party that calls itself the “President’s
The transition to a mixed system of parliamentary election is more convenient for United Russia, because it is no longer able to win the election and get a majority by party lists. In total, all these parties can collect 10–12% that will go to United Russia. They can get the entire 100% by single-seat districts 14 .
Under the Medvedev model, the party in power, having gaining 30%, could get a maximum of 150 deputies. Under the new model, even if they get 30% of 225 seats, it will comprise 70 deputies. But by singleseat districts, using the administrative resource, they will be able to put through the representatives of the ruling party and the AllRussia People’s Front, taking the maximum number of districts. Under this scheme they will be able to gain not just a simple, but a constitutional, majority 15 .
Official results of the elections to the State Duma of the seventh convocation*
Party included in the State Duma according to the results of the voting on September 18, 2016 Number of seats obtained on the lists The number of seats obtained in single-mandate constituencies Total number of seats United Russia 140 203 343 KPRF 35 7 42 LDPR 34 5 39 Just Russia 16 7 23 Total number of seats: 225 225 450 * Three seats in the State Duma of the seventh convocation were obtained by A. Zhuravlev, Chairman of the Rodina party, R. Shaikhut-dinov, head of the federal political Committee “Civic platform” and B. Reznik, an independent candidate who was part of the United Russia faction in Duma of the sixth convocation. Source: Central Election Committee announced final results of the State Duma election. RBC of September 23, 2016. Available at: party”, has collected only one-quarter of those who respect Vladimir Putin, despite a huge propaganda campaign”19).
A key question that will determine the relationship between society and the government in the near future is whether the strengthening of positions of United Russia was a result of an increase in public trust in the ruling party and in the President personally or whether this strengthening proceeds from the reasons mentioned above. So far we can definitely say that the victory of the current government in the election on September 18, 2016 is the “credit of trust” issued by the Russian society to the Russian President. However, this “credit of trust” does not mean that people are satisfied with the status quo in the dynamics of the standard of living and quality of life, social inequality and social justice; this does not mean that people voted for the “stability” of the current situation.
On the contrary, the election results mean that the President is given carte blanche to prove himself in real action
We all know it very well that success at the election always means a new challenge and a new frontier, because people pin their hopes on the election, and these hopes need to be fulfilled , because the Parliament is elected in order to solve country’s problems, the problems that voters put before the authorities, including the supreme legislative authority of the country 20 .
corresponding to national interests and strategic lines identified back in 1999 21 and continued in subsequent speeches – in the Munich speech (2007) and at the Valdai forum (2013), in the Address to the Federal Assembly (2014), and in the National Security Strategy (2015).
“In the government there are people who do not flatter themselves with the election performance of United Russia; they realize that the people who did not come to vote send out a very serious message. Because passivity can easily change to another political sign. All the more so that the anger in society is growing. Therefore, there emerges an idea that it is necessary to change something” 22 . In this regard, there are many new persons in the ruling party now; the President has implemented a number of personnel reshuffles and appointed new people to key positions in the system of administration; as many respected experts note, the situation is moving toward a comprehensive reset of the political system. We cannot rule out the option that Russian public administration is moving toward a two- or one-party system 23 .
However, whatever the person-nel changes in the government may be, it is necessary to remember that they should not be an end in itself. If they are not accompanied by satisfying people’s needs for social justice, then it becomes yet another manifestation of imitation, which scientists talked about many times and which Russian society has already faced in its recent history.
In addition, many experts have considerable doubts about the fact that the current government can change the present-day economic trend – whether
Imitation becomes the fruit of activity (conscious or unconscious) when an artificial environment is created for processes and phenomena designed to achieve specific (selfish), putatively socially relevant, group and corporate goals... it thrives in those conditions when there is no steady feedback from the people, when their opinion is not taken into consideration, but they are proposed to follow the decision of the functionaries in power24.
because of a basic misunderstanding of laws of modern economics, whether from the unwillingness to understand them due to a personal interest in the existing state of affairs25.
Another important issue that the current government will have to deal with is as follows: the events of “Crimean spring” stirred in the Russian society a powerful layer of spiritual needs, which “are the basis of the Russian civilization project”, though they were “dormant”26. Today this effect is fading away, it gives way to socio-economic problems; but it is clear that the need for a new ideological paradigm of development will not be able to remain without response from the state.
Russia’s position in the international arena requires this as well, because none of the centers of a multipolar world cannot exist without ideological rod as strong as the American “consumer society”. At the same time, neither socialism nor capitalism will dominate in Russian society, because the experience of both was lived through. “We have already lived under the socialist system and we remember its strengths and limitations well... Restoration of anything (especially in politics) rarely opens up new horizons”27. That is why it is necessary to adopt a completely new ideological content based on a deep, mental feeling uniting the majority of social strata of Russian society, the sense of social justice and high moral ethics.
Thus, “tactical achievement does not eliminate strategic uncertainty”28. The victory of the current government in the State Duma election confers on it the responsibility for solving the two most difficult issues – the withdrawal of the economy from a state of “sluggish depression” and the formation of a new ideological paradigm of spiritual and moral development. After United Russia got a constitutional majority in Parliament and in the entire power vertical (President, Government, State Duma, governors), the ruling elite has no more or less weighty opposition, which could become an obstacle to the making of administrative decisions that the elite considers necessary. The only obstacle is inside it – it is a confrontation between “the statists” and the liberals who defend their own interests and the interests of the “collective West”. The first group accumulates “strong positions of proWestern “agents of influence”, those comprador forces, whose interests and assets are within the sphere of influence of the “collective West” and who at any cost, “dead or alive”, need guarantees from the West that these interests and assets will be inviolable”. The second group is “ready to get such guarantees “from a position of strength”, using Russia’s military-political potential”29.
A crucial role in this confrontation will belong to the head of state, to his political will and the talent of strategic planning. Perhaps this will become a key factor that will affect the choice of Russians in March 2018 during the election of the President of the Russian Federation.
Список литературы Russian president got a constitutional majority in the State Duma of the seventh convocation
- Gorshkov M.K. “Russkaya mechta”: opyt sotsiologicheskogo izmereniya . Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya , 2012, no. 12, pp. 3-11..
- Dvadtsat' let reform glazami rossiyan (opyt mnogoletnikh sotsiologicheskikh zamerov): Analiticheskii doklad Instituta sotsiologii RAN v sotrudnichestve s Predstavitel'stvom Fonda imeni Fridrikha Eberta v Rossiiskoi Federatsii . Available at: http://www.isras. ru/files/File/Doklad/20_years_reform.pdf.
- Osipov G.V. Ne upustit' predstavivshiisya shans! . Sotsiologiya i ekonomika sovremennoi sotsial'noi real'nosti. Sotsial'naya i sotsial'no-politicheskaya situatsiya v Rossii v 2013 godu . Moscow: ISPI RAN, 2014. Pp. 6-18..
- Putin V.V. Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii . Rossiiskaya gazeta , 1999, December 30..
- Stenogramma vstrechi Prezidenta RF s liderami partii, proshedshikh po itogam vyborov v Gosdumu . Ofitsial'nyi sait Prezidenta RF . Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52957.
- Stenogramma vystupleniya V.V. Putina na zasedanii mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba “Valdai” 19 sentyabrya 2013 g. . Ofitsial'nyi sait Prezidenta RF . Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243.
- Stenogramma soveshchaniya Prezidenta RF V.V. Putina s chlenami Pravitel'stva RF 19 sentyabrya 2016 g. . Ofitsial'nyi sait Prezidenta RF . Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52913.
- Toshchenko Zh.T. Novye liki deyatel'nosti: imitatsiya . Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya , 2012, no. 12, pp. 12-23..
- Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 31 dekabrya 2015 goda №683 “O Strategii natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii” . Rossiiskaya gazeta , 2015, December 31. Available at: http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html.
- Federal'nyi zakon ot 22 fevralya 2014 g. №20 “O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii” . GARANT. RU . Available at http://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/526816/#ixzz4Lq0DppDP.
- Federal'nyi zakon ot 2 aprelya 2012 g. № 28-FZ «O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal'nyi zakon “O politicheskikh partiyakh”» . Available at: https://rg.ru/2012/04/04/partii-dok.html.
- Ferris-Rotman M. Putin's party shores up power in parliamentary elections amid weak turnout. The Wall Street Journal 18.09.2016. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/russians-head-to-polls-to-vote-for-new-parliament-1474184676
- Russian election unlikely to loosen Putin's grip on power. The Guardian 18.09.2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/18/russia-votes-in-election-unlikely-to-loosen-putins-grip-on-power
- Schmidt F. Keine oppositionelle Partei schafft es in die Duma. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 18.09.2016. Available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/in-russland-schafft-es-keine-oppositionelle-partei-ins-parlament-14442041.html
- Ilyin V.A. Pravyashchie elity -problema natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossii . Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: fakty, tendentsii, prognoz , 2016, no. 4, pp. 9-34
- Putin V.V. Vystuplenie na zasedanii mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba “Valdai” 19 sentyabrya 2013 g. . Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243
- Prokhanov A.A. “Gosudarstvo Polyarnoi zvezdy” . Gazeta “Zavtra” , 2016, March 17
- Lyubarev A. Nizkaya yavka spasla “Edinuyu Rossiyu” . Informatsionnyi portal “Gazeta.ru” ot 16.10.2016 . Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2012/10/16_x_4813741.shtml
- N. Starikov: “84% of the population trust Putin. A little more than half of these 84% came to vote in September 2016 (turnout was 47.9%), and only half of those who came voted for the United Russia” (source: Starikov N. The results of the 2016 election campaign. N. Starikov's blog of September 19, 2016. Available at: https://nstarikov.ru/blog/70943
- Glazyev S.Yu. Chego ne khochet znat' prem'er? . Gazeta “Zavtra” , 2016, September 29. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/blogs/chego_ne_hochet_znat_prem_er
- Savel'ev D. Zachem idti nazad v sotsializm? . Literaturnaya gazeta , 2016, no. 36 (6566), September 14.
- Kon'kov N., Nagornyi A. No porazhen'ya ot pobedy.. . Gazeta “Zavtra” , 2016, September 22. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/blogs/no_porazhen_ya_ot_pobedi
- Gordeev A. Spor Putina i Kudrina . Ibidem, June 02. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/nagornyij-2/