State Duma election 2016. Economic policy of the president assessed by the people

September 2016 will be the time when elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation will be held; it will undoubtedly be the major event in Russia’s domestic political life.

The State Duma elections as well as presidential elections in 2018 are the key steps after which a new political cycle will begin in Russia. This means that the people who come to power after the nationwide vote will have to justify the trust placed in them and implement their campaign promises. By and large, in 2016 and 2018, Russians will vote for not just specific people, but a course for the country’s political and economic development for the next decade. Thus, of course, elections are an important milestone in the life of the country, and the preparations to them started long before today.

¹ This, in particular, is proved by the following steps taken by Putin during his third presidential term: restoration of the mixed electoral system that provides for the election of deputies under party lists and single-mandate constituencies (draft Federal Law “On elections of deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation” was submitted by the President of the Russian Federation in March, 2013), the law on foreign agents, which has become one of the mechanisms of combating a “fifth column” (Federal Law No. 121 “On amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation in the part that regulates the activities of non-profit organizations performing the functions of foreign agents” was adopted on July 20, 2012); earlier, during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, – the extension of the President’s term from four to six years and powers of the State Duma from four to five years (Law of the Russian Federation on the amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 30, 2008 No. 6-FKZ “On changing the term of powers of the President of the Russian Federation and State Duma”); simplification of procedure of creation of political parties (Federal Law dated April 02, 2012 No. 28 “On amendments to the Federal Law “On political parties”).

Since the previous State Duma elections held on December 4, 2011, Russia has lived through many historically significant events, the most important of which are associated with the Ukrainian crisis, accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and subsequent aggravation of international relations with the U.S. and its allies.

The Russian society approaches the new political season with “the head proudly raised”, but with “empty wallets” and in an environment of openly hostile relations with the U.S. and many Western European countries ² . In these circumstances, it is very important to carry out a scientific and comprehensive analysis of public opinion on economic policy pursued by the President. What bothers Russians a few months before the beginning of a new political cycle? What motives they will be guided by when they come to the polling stations on September 18?

Socio-economic agenda

The socio-economic agenda has long been a subject of much excitement and even fears for Russians ³ . Once the main events of the “Crimean spring” became the thing of the past, price tags began to irritate citizens more and more, and demands that the authorities find ways to solve internal economic problems have become more and more frequent. Even Russia’s successful participation in the Syrian conflict has not been able to provide that psychological effect, which the accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation had on the Russian people in 2014.

Experts have long been warning us that negative trends in the Russian economy are leading the country toward crisis, and the reason for this is not the sanctions, but the inconsistency between the current economic model and the present-day realities. “The economy that is experiencing a downward trend”4; “the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in general is not a short-term but a long-term process, so the recovery is impossible to predict”5; “it is not the sanctions but we ourselves that are to be blamed for the current economic troubles of Russia... It is a man-made crisis, it started without any sanctions, without the Maidan, and everything was clear at the end of 2013”6 – this is how experts evaluated the dynamics of the situation in the country.

However, the official position of the authorities, broadcast through the media, did not recognize the whole danger of this situation in the economy: the Government said there was no crisis or that it would soon pass; moreover, anti-Russian sanctions will give a new impetus to the growth of domestic market and revive the Russian economy ⁷ .

The policy of “tightening the knots” has led to the fact that the economic crisis interfered with the social and psychological spheres, and the consequences of social maladjustment are eliminated much slower than the economic consequences of crises ⁸ .

The social nature of the 2012–2015 crisis is manifested in social stratification. A telling example is the dynamics of the R/P 10% ratio – the ratio of the average income of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% ⁹ . According to experts, it is a critical threshold value of R/P 10% ¹⁰ , the achievement of which demonstrates “the high level of risk for the functioning of social relations, the threat of transition to highly volatile state, low predictability and, hence, the need for quick intervention by the authorities in order to change the dangerous trends” ¹¹ .

However, in post-Soviet Russia, there was and is no “prompt interference” of the government in addressing social stratification issue. R/P 10% corresponded to the threshold critical value (8) only in 1992. In the 1990s – early 2000s, it was 13–14, in the mid-2000s – 15, and from 2006 to 2015 – 16, i.e. twice as high (fig. 1) . And it is only the data of official statistics. But, according to some estimates, the income gap between the richest 10% and poorest 10% is “officially 16 times, in fact – 28–36 times, which is not only higher than in

Figure 1. Dynamics of R/P 10%, times

Source: Federal State Statistics Service, data for the Vologda Oblast – from 1996.

Western Europe, Japan and the US, but also higher than in many countries of Latin America” ¹² .

The process of aggravating social differentiation is illustrated by the data of official statistics and findings of sociological research. Thus, according to public opinion monitoring carried out by ISEDT RAS13, in 2008–2015, the share of negative assessments of the economic situation in the country increased twofold (by 18 p.p., from 18 to 36%), the proportion of pessimistic foecasts about the future of the Russian economy increased almost twice (by 17 p.p., from 19 to 36%; insert 1).

The proportion of people who consider themselves to be “poor” and “extremely poor” for the period from 2009 to 2015 increased by 10 p.p. (from 42 to 47%). The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term has not resulted in any positive changes in the dynamics of social self-identification: in June 2016, just like in 2012, the share of the “poor” and “extremely poor” was 46–47%, while in February 2016 it reached its peak registered in the period from 2009 to June 2016 (i.e. from the time of the global financial crisis; 51%).

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The decline in the indicator means an increase in the share of negative estimates. If the indicator is below 0, then negative assessments prevail over positive ones.

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* The dotted lines highlight the presidential terms: January 2000 – May 2004 – the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin; May 2004 – May 2008 – the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin; May 2008 May 2012 – presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev; May 2012 – present – the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin.

** The wording of the question: “Which category do you belong to, in your opinion?” Answers: “the rich”, “with middle income”, “the poor”, “the extremely poor”, “difficult to answer”.

*** The decline in the indicator means an increase in the share of negative estimates. If the indicator is below 0, then negative assessments prevail over positive ones.

* The dotted lines highlight the presidential terms: January 2000 – May 2004 – the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin; May 2004 – May 2008 – the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin; May 2008 – May 2012 – presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev; May 2012 – present – the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin.

** The wording of the question: “In your opinion, how successful is the RF President in coping with the task of economic recovery and increasing the welfare of citizens”? Answer options: “very successful, fairly successful”, “without much success”, “absolutely unsuccessful”, difficult to answer”.

*** The decline in the indicator means an increase in the share of negative estimates. If the indicator is below 0, then negative assessments prevail over positive ones.

Figure 2. Dynamics of social self-identification of the population (proportion of people who consider themselves to be “poor and extremely poor” and “wealthy and with average income”, as a percentage of the number of respondents)

According to the latest data (as of June 2016), the proportion of people who consider themselves “poor and extremely poor” is higher by almost 5 p.p. than the share of those who consider themselves “wealthy and with average income” (42 vs. 45%; fig. 2 ).

People’s concern about the dynamics of financial position and economic situation is reflected in the assessment of management effectiveness. The results of sociological measurements show that in 2012–2015 in the Russian society there was a growth in support for the President’s performance due to the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term (in 2012), and later – due to the events of the “Crimean spring”. During this period, the level of support for the head of state increased by 17 p.p. (from 52 to 69%) and the share of negative assessments decreased nearly twofold (from 33 to 18%; insert 1).

However, in the first half of 2016, along with the economic agenda becoming more acute and the relevance of international issues declining in the evaluation of public opinion, the level of approval of performance of the President decreased slightly. It was 70% in December 2015, and 67–68% in February – June 2016.

In 2008–2015, the share of negative judgments about the success of the President’s work concerning economic recovery and growth of the welfare of citizens increased by 6 p.p. (from 46 to 52%); by June 2016, it was already 59%. At the same time, the share of positive ratings in 2008–2015 decreased by 3 p.p. (from 37 to 34%), and in February – June 2016 amounted to 28% (see insert 1 ).

It should be noted that the above data reflect the dynamics of public opinion of inhabitants of a particular region (Vologda Oblast). Sociological studies performed at the level of a Russian Federation subject provide important information about assessing the whole of Russian society; allow us to consider the regional specifics of social sentiment more deeply. Especially if such research is based on systematic, scientific approach and carried out in a monitoring mode. In light of this, it should be noted that the data obtained by ISEDT RAS in the course of its 20-year monitoring surveys of the Vologda Oblast residents correlate with nationwide studies conducted by VTsIOM and Levada-Center ¹⁴ . Moreover, according to experts, pessimistic views about the future did not emerge yesterday, so today

“the absolute dominance of the topic of crisis among Russians is quite logical”. ¹⁵

However, along with the increasing negative perception of their own difficulties, the situation in the economy, the growing polarization of the population by income level, Russia has experienced another process: “On the background of the total fall of everything, the profits of large and medium private capital have considerably grown in some “mysterious” way... In 2015, the profit of large and medium businesses grew 1.5-fold in nominal terms, and in real terms, adjusted for Rosstat’s official deflator – by 42.2%”. Thus, the phrase “Russian economy is experiencing a severe crisis” – is only a verbal stamp, because in a society divided into classes there is no phenomenon such as economic crisis common for everyone in all its consequences. “This is not a crisis but a pure manifestation of the universal law of capitalist accumulation, which, as Marx wrote, “leads to the accumulation of misery corresponding to the accumulation of capital” ¹⁶ .

Growth of profits of large and private capital correlates well with the statements of Government representatives who speak about the absence of crisis in the country; however, it reveals another issue: isolation of the authorities from society. “It is premature to speak about the crisis of confidence, but it is clear that economic difficulties the country is experiencing today, introduce significant changes in the relationship between the authorities and society. The changes are manifested primarily in the deterioration of trust in the majority of governmental and non-governmental institutions, the growing alienation of citizens from politics...”17 Probably that is why Russians would like the next Parliament to be, first, more professional (it is not party functionaries and government officials but economists, lawyers, and scientists in other fields of knowledge that are viewed as professionals by our fellow citizens). Second, the Parliament should more adequately represent major social groups and layers of society (teachers, doctors, soldiers, and peasants). Third, in the new Parliament there should be a place for civil activists and public figures well-known in the country, many of which have already gained experience and political “weight”18.

While Vladimir Putin had to deal with a historically significant task of restoring the sovereignty and status of Russia at the international level almost “from scratch” and, subsequently, to protect the country’s interests from its geopolitical rivals, for whom, a strong Russia is, putting it mildly, an inconvenience, individual members of the Government who pursue purely private capital interests “put their hand even deeper into the wallets of wage earners and petty bourgeois, but did not touch large capital profits, although, according to the basic fiscal logic, they ought to have acted the opposite way – after all, the wallets are being emptied out, and profits are growing outrageously.. It was a different logic – the logic of the selfish class interests”19.

Socio-psychological aspects of the 2012 – 2016 crisis

Unlike the two previous crises that the Russian society went through after the “shock therapy” (1999 and 2008), the specifics of modern economic situation in the country consists in the fact that the aggravation of the social injustice issue takes place simultaneously with the growth of patriotic sentiment caused by the tense international situation and, in particular, the events of the “Crimean spring” .

Increasing consolidation of patriotic sentiment in connection with Crimea and Sevastopol joining the Russian Federation have affected all segments of the population. The “Crimean consensus” brought together the businessman and the worker, the housewife and the TV star, the socialist and the liberal... Versatile, deep, vivid emotions that receded and turned into a deep nationwide feeling that is called “Krymnash” (“Crimea is ours”), a feeling that cannot be identified exactly, but that is profoundly embedded in the national consciousness” ²⁰ .

The effect of the events of the “Crimean spring” was powerful but short-lived. During this time, economic agenda “faded into the background”, but no effective management decisions were made that would allow to bring the dynamics of the standard of living and quality of life to a sustainable positive trend.

The results of sociological research indicate that after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 there emerged two opposite trends in the Russian society: on the one hand, improvement of emotional state (from 2009 to 2015, the relevant index has increased from 115 to 143. p.) and a consistently low level of protest potential (17–20% since 2007); on the other hand, the increase in the share of people who experience uncertainty about the future (from 48 to 61% in the period from 2013 to 2015), and the decline in the consumer sentiment index (from 92 to 77 p. for the period from 2012; insert 2 ). These seemingly paradoxical data are actually quite logical. They show that people live for the day and they afraid to look into the future. According to experts, people are getting used to living under an economic crisis and this is the main threat for them ²¹ .

Russians gradually managed to get used to the idea that the “beautiful far away” can actually be far away” ²² , and the uncertainty about the future leads to the desire to satisfy their needs in the present and as quickly as possible. As a result, we are witnessing a crisis of morality, the concrete manifestations of which are almost daily highlighted in the media ²³ .

Quite recently, people have noted that there is more harmony and cohesion in Russia; that they are willing to come together to achieve common goals. The surge of these sentiments (for obvious reasons) was noted in 2014 after the events of the “Crimean spring”. Since then, however, the proportion of those who share this view is becoming smaller: for the period from 2014 to 2016, the proportion of people who consider that today the country has “more cohesion and unity than disagreement, disunity” has fallen by 17 p.p. (from 55 to 38%), while the share of those who “are willing to unite to achieve common goals” – by 7 p.p. (from 29 to 22%; fig. 3 ).

In other words, the crisis phenomena that began in Russia long before the Crimean events and anti-Russian sanctions

Insert 2

** The consumer sentiment index (CSI) is a key indicator of public opinion monitoring; it reflects people’s perceptions of the current economic situation in the country and region and their assessments of their personal well-being and expectations about the prospects for its development in the near future.

*** Wording of the question: “Which of the following problems did you have to deal with last year?” Answer option: “lack of confidence in the future”. The question is asked once a year, the results of 2015 were assessed in February 2016.

Consumer sentiment index (CSI) had a positive trend

Figure 3. Indicators characterizing the dynamics of social cohesion in society (as a percentage of the number of respondents)

have reached beyond the economy. This years-long process, has acquired comprehensive nature. Its specific feature and danger is the latency of its flow, because, as a rule, the more apparent the “collapse” of various aspects of public life, the sooner and more resolute the measures that are taken. The crisis of recent years has developed in the “shadow” of certain successful international moves of Russia, which were constantly mentioned in the media that regularly referred to mental, moral and patriotic feelings of the population. According to some experts, “what is called the Russian national interests in the international arena today is in fact the interests of Gazprom, Rosneft and a dozen oligarchic monopolies, although the majority of people have not realized it yet”24. Because there is “an inseparable connection between capital and war”, and only big business is the “sole beneficiary” in military action. And the development of society as a whole, regardless of any “surge” of patriotic sentiment and national identity, cannot have a strong foundation if pressing everyday issues are not resolved and sustainable development of the standard of living and quality of life ensured.

Internal economic policy on the eve of the elections: administration issues and the relevance of effective action.

In medicine, an untimely diagnostics aggravates the diagnosis; the situation is the same with regard to politics and economy:

“tying the knots” eventually leads to a need to make increasingly difficult decisions. In Russia, the necessity of making such decisions is long overdue, but they are not being made, because there is a split of interests in the Russian political elite responsible for the implementation of this task. It is as if there were two Russias: one is “deeply embedded in the Western world”, the other is “a new constellation of Russian statesmen that inevitably accompany the sovereign growth” ²⁵ . The first group accumulates “quite strong positions of Pro-Western “agents of influence”, those comprador forces whose interests and assets are within the sphere of influence of the “collective West” and who at any cost need guarantees from the West that their interests and assets will be preserved. The second group are “ready to get such guarantees

Today, the liberal financial block of Dmitry Medvedev’s Government implements the very movement to chaos, which is the core of the policy pursued by ruling elites of the world. As a result of the fall of the ruble, privatization, healthcare and education “reforms”, etc. we are getting weaker, not the other way around. It is due to the fact that the liberals pursue the policy in the interests of those who want us to be weak. In fact, all this simply grants the world hegemon embodied by the United States the advantages in a potential fight with us. While President Putin cannot ignore the desire of some representatives of the Russian elite, who see the meaning and purpose of their life in joining the world elite. Supporters of these “ideas” strongly torpedo, sabotage and oppose any actions that aim to protect Russia’s interests, if they in any way contradict U.S. interests, which from the viewpoint of those striving to “join” the world elite can jeopardize this process and even (what a horrible thing!) make it unrealizable. The President cannot ignore these sentiments of some part of the elite – that explains his tolerance toward the statements and actions of some of the most “striking” representatives of those who want to join the world elite”

(Source: Starikov N. Rossii ne privykat’ byt’ v avangarde chelovechestva [Russia is no stranger to being at the forefront of the humanity]. Ofitsial’nyi blog N. Starikova [N. Starikov’s official blog]. Available at:

“from a position of strength”, using Russia’s political and military capacity” ²⁶ .

The struggle between these groups has already been going for over 15 years since Vladimir Putin assumed office as President for the first term and put down to some degree the pro-Western comprador part of the elite that had become rampant in the 1990s. In recent years, this struggle has become increasingly tough and uncompromising, but there have been no actual “breakthroughs” in favor of either group; it prevents the adoption of effective management decisions in economic sphere and ultimately threatens social stability and national security.

A telling example of the inconsistency between the positions in the higher echelons of power may be a dialogue between Russian

President Vladimir Putin and former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin at the session of the Economic Council on May 25, 2016, when, in response to a proposal of the latter “to reduce the confrontation with the West”, which implied even some concessions with regard to the Donbass and Crimea, the President declared that Russia would not trade its sovereignty” ²⁷ . Let us recall that a similar exchange of views between the same persons took place on April 25, 2013 in the live TV phone-in with the President. The difference is that back then “the objections Putin voiced to Kudrin were careful and delicate, and accompanied by continuous compliments toward the “best Finance Minister” ²⁸ . This indicates a lingering and protracted nature of the conflict between the “power” and “comprador” forces of the Russian elite; it also indicates the President strengthened his determination to cross the t’s and dot the i’s in matters of domestic policy.

In general, the second meeting of the Presidium of the Economic Council under the President of the Russian Federation became a very significant event for the understanding of the current situation in the ruling elite.

• •    First, the Council was assembled for the first time in two years ²⁹ , which shows, on the one hand, that economic issues have come to the fore; on the other hand – that there is no systematic work on resolving them.

• •    Second, it once again ³⁰ showed the inefficiency of the Government in addressing key economic policy challenges. “In fact, the Stolypin club and the team of Kudrin’s associates have become independent centers that work out solutions to economic issues. If Medvedev’s Government were able to elaborate satisfactory programs on its own, no parallel structures would be needed” ³¹ .

• •    Third, at the Council meeting, Vladimir Putin noted that “the reserves and resources that propelled our economy at the beginning of the 2000s, are now inefficient”, and he urged “to outline the key priorities of economic policy till 2025, to determine major drivers of economic growth and social development” ³² . Thus, as 10 years ago, Russia’s economy faces the task of finding new growth points alternative to oil prices. The only difference is that in 2005–2007 the situation simply suggested it, but today’s situation necessitates it.

• •    Fourth, the Council session was held “behind closed doors”. In other words, the discussion of key issues that arouse concern among the population, was not revealed to the public, despite the fact that the government pays special attention to the declaration of important activities such as “providing opportunities for citizens and public associations of the Russian Federation to participate in the political life of society” ³³ .

• •    Fifth (and most important), the result of the Council session was that the President again found himself in a situation when it was necessary to find a compromise solution between the two options of dealing with the economic crisis. “On the one hand, the monetary-incentive program of the Stolypin club, which involves feeding the economy with soft loans; on the other hand, the Kudrin program, the essence of which is to economize and carry out institutional reforms” ³⁴ .

Thus, now just like in the middle of the “fat” 2000s, the Russian economy confronts the need to seek new growth points, and the Russian government is faced with the necessity to make management decisions that would objectively help implement basic provisions of the National Security Strategy 2015, which provides for “removing structural imbalances in the economy and its modernization” in order to “prevent threats to national security”.35

However, the non-economic factors that prevented from implementing appropriate reforms 10 years ago have been preserved:

• •    solution to the dilemma falls on the period prior to presidential elections;

• •    there is no doubt concerning the willingness of the U.S. to take advantage of any unstable situation in Russia;

• •    in addition, the President is still forced to maneuver between the interests of society and those of the part of the liberal wing of the Government that expresses the interests of oligarchic capital.

A difficult choice that Putin will have to make consists on the fact that no matter what efforts he makes in order to “reanimate” the Russian economy and solve the historic task of bringing the country to a positive trend of development, they will be inevitably associated with the risk of growing dissent: “Reforms will imply conflict with the elites or the masses. But

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The index of social self-identification in the majority (8 out of 14) of socio-demographic categories in June 2016 was lower than in June 2011 (by 2–10 points) and June 2007 (by 2–20 p.). In other words, people’s subjective perception of their own financial situation over the few months before the election in 2016 remains more negative than it was in the same period before the previous elections to the State Duma. The fact that in the Vologda Oblast in general the index of social self-identification in 2007 and in 2011 was higher than in June 2016 suggests that the deterioration of subjective assessments of financial situation is only partially due to the effects of the global financial crisis.

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In the majority of socio-demographic categories, the index evaluating the success of the President’s coping with the problems of economic recovery and growth of citizens’ welfare was significantly lower in June 2016 than in June 2011, 2007 and 2003. Thus, for the last 16 years (2000– 2016), economic issues have never been so relevant for the population a they are now on the eve of the Duma election. Only in June 2007 in the majority oft socio-demographic groups, the index was above 100 points, which means the predominance of positive assessments over negative ones. Since that time, the index value did not exceed 90 points in any of the analyzed categories.

if we follow the path of stagnation, then there will be no money for social spending, and sooner or later people will take to the streets” ³⁶ .

The fact that the growing dissatisfaction with economic issues in the society and escalation of tension in the relationships within the political elite coincide with the period of the elections to the State Duma is a special catalyzing factor. The results of sociological polls show that in the first half of 2016, representatives of various social segments (including those that differ by income level) assess their financial situation and prospects of its development more negatively than in previous pre-election periods. Thus, the social self-identification index in the majority of socio-demographic groups (in 8 out of 14) was lower in June 2016 than in June 2011 and 2007 (in the Vologda Oblast as a whole – 94, 97 and 104 points, respectively; insert 3 ).

From February to June 2016, social selfidentification has improved in almost all socio-demographic categories. However, we cannot interpret this as a completely positive result. These data confirm the opinion of experts that people get used to living in crisis and find new means of subsistence (by mid-year, largely by working at their household plots). At the same time, the forecasts regarding future prospects of their financial well-being, as well as assessments of effectiveness of government policy to tackle economic issues are getting worse and worse.

The dynamics of forecasts about the future of the Russian economy and people’s personal wealth is reflected by the consumer sentiment index, which in June 2016 was significantly lower (by 10 – 20 points) than in June 2011, 2007 and 2003 (see insert 3 ). The consumer sentiment index (according to the data as of June 2016) does not exceed 90 points in all the socio-demographic groups. In other words, for the entire period from 2000 to the present, people’s expectations have not been so pessimistic as they are today, a few months before the September elections to the State Duma.

Support for the President in all the socio-demographic categories of population remains higher than in 2011; however, according to some experts, this is “the last straw that the mass consciousness holds on to, so as not to sink completely into gloomy pessimism” ³⁷ . At least the fact that the assessment of the President’s success in dealing with the issues of economic recovery and growth of welfare of citizens in June 2016 is more negative than in 2011 and 2007 (in the Vologda Oblast as a whole – 68, 77 and 114 points, respectively) clearly indicates that economic issues are a key factor in the upcoming elections.

It is also important to note that, unlike the previous electoral period (February – June 2011), we observe a deterioration in estimations of public administration efficiency in the first half of 2016 in the majority of socio-demographic groups. This applies both to the evaluation of the President’s work in general and his work on dealing with the material issues of the population in particular (see insert 3 ). All this also proves the severity of economic agenda in the estimates of public opinion and indicates that an alarming situation prevails on the eve of the September 2016 elections compared to previous preelection periods.

Today experts say that the current government will retain their positions in the next Duma and presidential elections, but no one can predict what will happen then, “there are too many unknowns here” ³⁸ . We must not forget that Russia is one of the major players in the international arena; therefore, the Duma and presidential elections in our country is only internal but also external matter. In the context of hybrid warfare, the gap between the government and society can be very convenient for Russia’s potential geopolitical rivals (as was the case after the collapse of the

If in the near future the Kremlin does not implement the whole set of measures that should have been implemented long ago for the development of Russia’s socio-economic potential, elimination of conflict potential between different regions and social groups within the country that has accumulated and is growing, if the open and hidden resistance of the “compradors” is not overcome and neutralized, then this “party of treason” under the “hybrid aggression” by the “collective West” will inevitably play the role of a “fifth column”, which will be at the lead of socially discontented Russian masses.

(Source: Gordeev A. Spor Putina i Kudrina [An argument between Putin and Kudrin]. Gazeta “Zavtra” [Newspaper “Tomorrow”], 2016, June 02. Available at: content/view/nagornyij-2/)

USSR). Thus, “...abandonment of a liberal economy is not just a question of preservation and development of the country. It is a question of preserving world peace. And this is no exaggeration...The price of our electoral vote is not the matter of victory of a particular party or candidate. We are talking about war and peace on a planetary scale” ³⁹ .

However, the new political cycle must first clarify the situation concerning the solution of internal economic and political issues. It needs to show the extent to which the President’s decisions are dictated by the need to maneuver between different groups (to take into account the interests of both the liberal bureaucracy and society) and the

The Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum held in June 2016 has shown that “officials contradict themselves without figuring out what exactly is happening to the Russian economy. Instead of carrying out a serious analysis, they rely mainly just on the feelings. Speeches at the SPIEF could be compiled in a collection of the most ridiculous official statements.

The anniversary, 20th Saint Petersburg Forum has shown two things. First, Russian authorities have no clear understanding of what is going on in the economy. Their forecasts are often based on their feelings and contradict each other. Second, it seems as if some officials lived in a parallel reality because they put forward such extraordinary innovations that the Russian people can only wonder where these officials get their inspiration.

Source: Bashkatova A. Piterskii forum pereborshchil s nelepymi zayavleniyami [The Saint Petersburg forum went too far with ridiculous statements]. Nezavisimaya gazeta [Independent newspaper], 2016, June 20. Available at:

extent to which he adheres to his long-term strategic direction developed back in the late 1990s ⁴⁰ .

The research results show that today the problem of a lingering crisis situation in the economy, the lack of alternative, innovative points of growth and the absence of positive dynamics of the standard of living – all these issues are deeply rooted in the essence of the Russian society, in its social structure and public consciousness. Getting used to crisis can lead to the gravest consequences, because, having learned how to cope with their financial problems on their own, without relying on effective government policy, people can lose interest and trust in the government. And without this trust we cannot speak about social stability and sustainable foundation of people’s support necessary to protect Russia’s national interests in the international arena.

The change in economic model requires, first of all, a change in the system of public administration. The Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum held in June 2016 has shown that Russian authorities “have no clear understanding of what is going on in the economy. Their forecasts are often based on their feelings and contradict each other. Second, it seems as if some officials lived in a parallel reality because they put forward such extraordinary innovations that the Russian people can only wonder where these officials get their inspiration”41. “Among the reformers there must not be any government officials who already were at the helm of the previous “rawmaterial-based” economic model. Despite their professional experience, they will be influenced by the old principles, dogmas and fears... The country’s development management, in our opinion, should be in the hands of people who have experience in creating new productions, managing investment, and developing entrepreneurial environment”42.

It is unknown what decisions the President will make, but we think that it is safe to say that if the confusion noted by experts in the management system remains, it will continue to hamper the efficient solution of domestic economic problems. This means that class inequality and social stratification will only increase, and what is called a crisis today, can go into a deeper phase tomorrow.

Judging by expert assessments and the dynamics of sociological polls reflecting public opinion, it should be noted that three months before the elections economic agenda in the Russian society is of such a great current interest as it has never been before. Probably it will be a key factor that will influence voters’ preferences on September 18, 2016.

Apparently, the election results could seriously affect the dynamics of socioeconomic processes and public sentiment; it is obvious that if the President does not take steps to bring the country to a positive rate of development, then it will be impossible to avoid the aggravation of social tension and, therefore, it will be impossible to ensure national security in the international arena.

First and foremost, it is the head of state that bears the burden of responsibility for the situation in the country, and it is he on whom the society pins great hopes and who currently has a high level of trust in all segments of the population.

Due to the difficult situation concerning the Russian political elite, the cautiousness and precision of administrative decisions taken by Vladimir Putin is understandable and explainable, but, in our view, it can be called effective only up to a certain stage – until the moment when the recession of the Russian economy started.

Unfortunately, in the power vertical there is no effective system of self-regulating mechanisms; there are no organizational structures and effective tools that not only could, but would be required together with the President to formulate and implement an adequate response of the Russian economy to the external and internal challenges is faces. There is no clear system of planning and forecasting, there is no personal responsibility of top-level officials for the achievement of target indicators, the same can be said about all the rest levels of government.

In many cases, the deputies of the Federal Assembly, who see the outrageous facts in the economic or political life, do not have sufficient powers in order to intervene in time, because the system of parliamentary investigations is functioning inefficiently, the procedures of personal approval in the committees and at the meetings of the Federal Assembly of all members of the Cabinet of Ministers are not formalized in legislation (so far, they are approved in a single batch).

Despite the strengthening of the authority of the All-Russian People’s Front, the system of public control remains poorly organized, and this system could be an additional means of increasing the efficiency of work of the authorities at all levels. Only if organization at the federal level is systemic in its nature, the effectiveness of the results of civil investigation will be achieved in all areas of domestic policy.

The unchanging nature of the questions that Russians ask the President during his annual live TV phone-ins (about the state of roads, tariffs, administrative barriers to business, the inability to “reach out” to officials, etc.), suggests that the pressing problems of people are not solved efficiently by the competent authorities: people from different regions of Russia have to apply directly to the head of the state with their complaints of authorities of lower levels.

The speed at which urgent problems in government and in society will be solved, the effectiveness of the President’s decisions – all this will largely depend on the result of the upcoming elections. And not only on their final result, but also on the transparency of voting procedures at all stages of the electoral process that can cause a wide public resonance both in a positive and negative way.

* * *

People’s support, which the President of the Russian Federation still has, opens a “window” of opportunities for the implementation of measures aimed at improving the efficiency of public administration in the new political season. But how long will the trust of the population in the head of state remain high? Will it be possible to use the foundation of people’s support for the purpose of restoring order in the management system and ensure its conformity with the interests of national security? The answers to these questions depend on the President’s political will.