Strategic reflection in matrix games

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Practical application of the matrix games historically essentially limited to the principal impossibility in most cases the implementation of incompatible mixed strategies. To expand the opportunities of solving matrix games results in practice the article develops a new classification of games two persons zero sum and a finite number of strategies. Shown practical difficulties of implementing solutions to game-theoretic models of conflict situations of the type «defense-attack» in mixed strategies. For matrix games in this class on the basis of experimental studies formulated rules targeted improvement solutions by use strategic reflection. For iterative method of Brown-Robinson solving matrix games investigated the use of index estimation accuracy of result immediately during the iterative process.

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Iterative method, conflict situation, matrix games, statistical games, improvement strategies

Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/148205381

IDR: 148205381

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