Subjective rights in non-prescriptive legal regulation: methodological foundations of the study

Introduction. Subjective rights have been and are the subject of scientific focus both in this countryand abroad. However, all these numerous studies sinbymyriad mistakes and inaccuracies. This is a serious obstacle to the creation of a relevant to objective state-legal reality theoretical model of the use of subjective rights in the legal regulation. In turn, this makes it impossible to formulate a correct scientific foundation for improving not only legal activity, but also the entire public administration. Purpose. To avoid the methodological problems of legal science that lead to the noted errors and inaccuracies, the paper does not allow mixing of political-ideological and scientific, logical, approach to the phenomena studied. As a result of the analysis of the ontological status of subjective law in the informational aspect, the author concludes that this right does not have its own prescriptive nature, but is associated with prescriptions in the context of the legal semiotic triangle model. The pragmatic aspect of the analysis of the regulatory nature of subjective rights makes it possible to find the real place of these rights in the mechanism of non-prescriptive legal regulation. Conclusions. In the logical-semantic context, subjective law is not a prescription, but a duplicate or indirect exponent of a legal prescription. At the same time, the specifics of the formulation of such an exponent relate to factors of a pragmatic, political and ideological nature. Taking into account these factors allows interpreting subjective rights as special socio-legal assessments of antelegem, prelegem, sucundumlegem, praeterlegem, postlegem, which relate to a phenomenon poorly studied bylegal science that has extremely important practical significance.